



THE
AMERICAN
BC
CATHOLIC QUARTERLY
REVIEW.

~~Bonum~~ est homini ut eum veritas vincat volentem, quia malum est homini ut eum ~~veritas~~ vincat invitum. Nam ipsa vincat necesse est, sive negantem sive confitentem.

S. AUG. EPIST. ccxxxviii. AD PASCENT.

VOLUME XIII.

FROM JANUARY TO OCTOBER, 1888.

PHILADELPHIA:
HARDY & MAHONY,
PUBLISHERS AND PROPRIETORS,
505 CHESTNUT STREET.

COPYRIGHT, 1888,

BY

HARDY & MAHONY.

70746

THE AMERICAN CATHOLIC QUARTERLY REVIEW.

VOL. XIII.—APRIL, 1888.—No. 50.

THE LAW OF NATURE DIVINE AND SUPREME.

CARLYLE says somewhere in his "History of the French Revolution," "Nature rests on dread foundations, and Pan, to whose music the Nymphs dance, has in him a cry which sends men distracted." The cry of nature in behalf of starving men seems to have robbed some people of their wits.

The Atlantic cable has so fully explained the circumstances under which I appealed to the law of nature that I hardly like to weary the reader with a repetition. Nevertheless, I may so far return upon the past as to say that my words were spoken in a Conference, not a mere public meeting, and written for use in one of our most literary, I may say esoteric, reviews.

My object was to show the foundations, both natural and legal, of our English Poor Law, and to prove that its administration has drifted from its first principles and deviated from its essential obligations. The relief of the poor in England until the 5 Elizabeth, cap. iii., was by the voluntary action of private and ecclesiastical charity. Both in the tithes and in the lands of the Church the poor had a share by right. The *bona ecclesiastica* were described as "*Vota fidelium, pretia peccatorum, patrimonia pauperum*" (the oblations of the faithful, restitution for sin, the patrimony of the poor). I am not one of those who believe that the relief of the poor before the suppression of the monasteries was adequately discharged by

the monasteries. They were, indeed, a thousand centres from which alms daily flowed. But this must have been partial and local. Their lands were one-third of the land in England, but the population of the remaining two-thirds were not relieved by them. For these the palaces of the bishops, the homes of the clergy, the castles of the rich, and the houses of the faithful at large afforded such relief as was given and received. The whole of this almsgiving was voluntary, springing from the law of Christianity, and resting ultimately on the law of nature.

When the Act of Elizabeth made this natural obligation compulsory by law it did not extinguish nor suspend the Christian or the natural law. Nor did this law recognize only the *obligation* of those who possess by the positive and human law. It also recognized the natural *right* of the poor to share in the common sustenance of the earth.

Now this high and sacred foundation of our Poor Law has been absolutely denied by many. It has been the habit to denounce it in all notes and tones. Even so moderate a man as Mr. Fawcett asks whether it might be wise and just to abolish the Poor Law, and answers only that "it would not be wise and just to abolish it precipitately." If put to the vote of the ratepayers I fear that it would certainly be abolished. But if there be a natural right in the poor to sustenance in time of extreme need, the Poor Law can never be abolished. Nevertheless, even good and generous people do not know or remember that such a natural right, with its correlative natural obligation, exists. They pay their poor rate, as they think, as a tax or out of pure benevolence and gratuitous charity. This habit of mind rests on a denial of the rights and obligations of nature, and generates an essentially erroneous and even immoral habit of mind. To combat this perversion of morals and to recall people, if possible, to a higher sense of duty, I affirmed that the foundation of our Poor Law is the natural right of the poor to work or to bread. The next morning the *Times* newspaper rebuked me for countenancing this "popular fallacy." Truths are not fallacies, and fallacies are not truths. To call it a fallacy is to call it a falsehood, and to propagate such a denial of truth both natural and Christian is fraught with consequences both harsh and dangerous.

It can hardly be necessary to justify what I have said among Catholics, I might even say among Christians; but both Catholics and Christians are often not fully aware of the broad and solid ground on which they habitually rest. I will, therefore, draw out in full what the other day I gave only in reference. I do this not out of pedantry but out of prudence, for some good men may, for want of knowledge, be misled.

The doctrine of the Catholic Church may be briefly stated in the words of St. Thomas Aquinas, who sums up what had been always and everywhere taught before him; and his *Summa Theologica*, with the Holy Scripture, has been laid open in Œcumenical Councils as the highest authority in the tradition of Catholic doctrine.

I. By the law of nature all men have a common right to the use of things which were created for them and for their sustenance.

II. But this common right does not exclude the possession of anything which becomes proper to each. The common right is by natural law, the right of property is by human and positive law, and the positive law of property is expedient for three reasons:

1. What is our own is more carefully used than what is common.
2. Human affairs are better ordered by recognized private rights.
3. Human society is more peaceful when each has his own, protected by the law of justice: *suum cuique*.

III. Theft, therefore, is always a sin, for two reasons:

1. It is contrary to justice.
2. It is committed either by stealth or by violence.

IV. But the human and positive law cannot derogate from the natural and Divine law. According to the Divine law all things are ordained to sustain the life of man, and therefore the division and appropriation of things cannot hinder the sustenance of man in case of necessity. Therefore the possessions of those who have food superabundantly are due by the natural law for the sustenance of the poor. St. Ambrose, quoted in the "Decretals," says: "It is the bread of the famishing that you keep back and the clothing of the naked that you lay by; the money you bury in the earth is the release and liberation of those who are in misery."¹

For the sake of those who may not have ready access to the works of St. Alphonsus, the following passages may be given.

The text of Busenbaum is as follows: "*Qui pro se vel alio in extrema necessitate constituto alienum accipit quantum necessarium est, nec furatur nec tenetur restituere postea sic assumptum, si quidem re et spe indigens fuit.*"

It is to be remembered that St. Alphonsus consulted for his theology some eight hundred authors, and his decisions, therefore, rest upon the widest foundation, and may be safely followed.

St. Alphonsus says that this doctrine is *certain*, and is founded upon the doctrine of St. Thomas, that in such a case "all things are common"; for the law of nations, by which the division of goods was introduced, cannot derogate from the natural law. "Though in extreme necessity a poor man has a right (*jus habet*) to

¹ St. Thomæ Aquin. *Summa Theolog.*, 2da 2dae, Quaest. lxvi., Art. 1, 2, 5, 7.

the goods of others, he has not a right to the extraordinary goods of others, but only to those which ordinarily suffice for the sustenance of life." He says that "as the poor man has a right (*jus habet*) to take what he needs, no one ought to hinder his taking it." "Forasmuch as in extreme necessity all things are common, a rich man is bound in justice to give help to the poor, because the poor man may justly take it, even without the will of the owner" (*cum ille juste possit eam surripere etiam invito domino, et suam facere*). Throughout the whole treatise St. Alphonsus repeats over and over again the word *jus* or right possessed by the poor man.¹

This doctrine lies at the foundation of the positive law of property in all Christendom. It exists as an unwritten law in all Catholic countries; in France it is the *droit au travail*, in England it is clothed in a legal statute in our Poor Law, under which every one has "a right either to work or to bread without work." In the old Scotch law it was recognized under the title of *Burdensech*: A starving man had a right to carry away as much meal as he could on his back. All these authorities I give, not by way of example or exhortation to larceny, but in proof of the natural right from which they flow.

My friends in America have kindly sent me the newspapers which have commented upon my words, and I learn from them that the opinions of judges, barristers and divines have been asked and obtained on what I have said. I have read their opinions with great care. Those of Judge Altfeld, Judge Prendergast, Judge Baker, and Mr. Brady are calm, solid and judicial opinions, all the more remarkable because, not having the context of my words before them, they were compelled, like comparative anatomists, to construct the whole skeleton by proportion and measurement. In this they have shown a true judicial acumen, for which I thank them. Judge Waterman wisely says that to clothe the lawfulness of taking a neighbor's bread, in extreme necessity, in the form of a legal enactment would be unwise and mischievous. In this I fully agree. Such questions belong to conscience and moral theology. The right to bread or to work may be clothed in positive law, but to erect the lawfulness of breaking a law into an enactment would lead at least to confusion. I wish I could equally commend the answers of the divines. The discernment of jurists at once perceived the law of nature which underlies all positive law. It may seem strange that the divines did not even more rapidly discern it. Any Catholic priest would have at once seen that the question was one not of courts of law, but of moral

¹ Theologia Moralis, lib. iii., tract v., cap. i., tom. i., pp. 333, 334, 335. Ed. Basano, 1847.

theology. But here moral theology hardly exists except in the Catholic Church. I do not pretend to know how this may be among the Protestant communions of America. I speak only of England. In the Established Church the chief and almost the only works of moral theology are Bishop Andrewes on the "Ten Commandments," Jeremy Taylor's "Ductor Dubitantium," and Bishop Sanderson's "Cases of Conscience." All three are nearly forgotten. Jeremy Taylor's works are voluminous, elaborate and eloquent. He believed, however, that his chief and most enduring work would be his "Ductor Dubitantium." It is simply forgotten. It is a large folio of casuistry, the nearest approach in Protestant literature to the moral theology of the Catholic Church. No one now but a student here and there reads it. Few even know of its existence. It forms no part of the education of non-Catholic divines. The truth is that three hundred years ago the chairs of Canon Law and Moral Theology were abolished.

It must always be borne in mind that my purpose was to justify and elevate the Poor Law of England by showing that it was founded upon the natural right of man to life and to the sustenance of life. In proving this I was compelled to show that this natural law is supreme over all positive law. The two questions, though distinct, are indivisible, as we have seen in the texts already cited from St. Thomas and St. Alphonsus. The opponents of the Poor Law, to evade the main question, promptly seized on the latter to escape the former. My words were as follows: "The obligation to feed the hungry springs from the natural right of every man to life, and to the food necessary for the sustenance of life. So strict is this natural right that it prevails over all positive laws of property. Necessity has no law; and a starving man has a natural right to his neighbor's bread. I am afraid that those who speak so confidently about rights, obligations and laws have not studied, or have forgotten the first principles of all human positive law. If the law of property did not rest upon a natural right it could not long exist. They who deny it justify the dictum, *La propriété, c'est le vol*. . . . Before the natural right to live all human laws must give way."¹ I gave the example of the natural law of self-defence, before which the commandment, "Thou shalt not kill," gives way.

The calm and business-like way in which you in America have treated this matter contrasts with the hasty utterances of some of my countrymen, and brings out the historical difference of your fresh and vigorous commonwealth as compared with our old, traditional, unreflecting society in England. We are like the Great Babylon of old with its massive walls and gates and hanging

¹ Fortnightly Review, January, 1888, p. 154.

gardens, on which time has no power. In our city of three days' journey the minds of men are slow to move. The past is forgotten in the present, the present is the rule of opinion; old truths revived are looked on as novelties and modern errors; whatsoever is the popular opinion of the day is supposed to be the tradition of all time. Most men believe that all things are as they were from the beginning, and that what is new to them cannot be true. Mr. Lowell has sketched to the life our confidence in the supremacy of our wisdom:

" England really thinks
The world is all in darkness if she only winks."

I have committed *lèse majesté* by rudely reminding some who rule over public opinion in London of the fresh mother earth and of the primeval laws which protect her offspring. I was unconscious of my audacity. I thought that I was uttering truisms which all educated men knew and believed. But I found that these primary truths of human life were forgotten, and that on this forgetfulness a theory and a treatment of our poor had formed a system of thought and action which hardens the hearts of the rich and "grinds the faces of the poor." I am glad, therefore, that I said and wrote what is before the public, even though for a time some men have called me Socialist and Revolutionist, and have fastened upon a subordinate consequence, and neglected the substance of my contention in behalf of the natural rights of the poor.

PROF. HUXLEY'S DEMURRER.

WHEN, some months ago, in the *Fortnightly Review*, Mr. Lilly accused Prof. Huxley of materialism, and supported the accusation by alleging that the great scientist not only upheld causationism in the material sense, but held mind to be a function of the brain, and looked forward to the time when we should arrive at a mechanical equivalent of consciousness, Prof. Huxley in reply, it may be remembered, admitted the allegation, but denied the accusation. That is to say, he put in what Mr. Lilly (a lawyer as well as a philosopher) might call a *demurrer*, which he argued in a characteristic play of logic, wit, and eloquence, wherein he fairly outdid himself—the only rival indeed that he has reason to fear. The brilliancy of his argument none will deny. We purpose in this article, however, to try its validity, of which, for our own part, we do not think so highly. Whether or not he turn out to be “guilty as charged” (a matter by no means of the highest concern), the examination may lead, directly or indirectly, to clearer views on the subject of the *charge*, which, we must say, begging everybody's pardon, seems darkened by the multitude of its illustrators. We offer no apology for elbowing our way into this goodly crowd, since the darkest hour, according to the proverb, is just before day; in which case, though we may not disperse the darkness, we can hardly make it denser without becoming a “herald of the dawn”; so that, whatever fate awaits our presumption, truth is not likely to prove the loser.

With a view to simplicity, we accept without qualification, for the purposes of this inquiry, Prof. Huxley's definition of materialism. “I understand the main tenet of materialism to be,” he says, “that there is nothing in the universe but matter and force, and that all the phenomena of nature are explicable by deduction from the properties assignable to those two primitive factors.” Materialism thus understood Prof. Huxley rejects, with satirical emphasis, while reasserting the opinions pointed out in Mr. Lilly's allegation. To sustain his demurrer, he of course must show that these opinions are not derivable from materialism, or resolvable into it. Accordingly, this he undertakes. Let us look at his showing; and first, of causationism.

Twenty years ago Prof. Huxley said: “A really spontaneous act is one which, by the assumption, has no cause; and the attempt to prove such a negative as this, is, on the face of the matter, absurd.

And while it is thus a philosophical impossibility to demonstrate that any given phenomenon is not the effect of a material cause, any one who is acquainted with the history of science will admit that its progress has, in all ages, meant, and now, more than ever, means, the extension of the province of what we call matter and causation, and the concomitant gradual banishment from all regions of human thought of what we call spirit and spontaneity." He added: "And as surely as every future grows out of the past and present, so will the physiology of the future gradually extend the realm of matter and law, until it is co-extensive with knowledge, with feeling, and with action." The opinion he then expressed in such words he now repeats in these: "I hold that opinion now, if anything, more firmly than I did when I gave utterance to it a score of years ago, for it has been justified by subsequent events. But what that opinion has to do with materialism I fail to discover." Possibly we deceive ourselves, but it seems to us that we are fortunate enough to discern what eludes Prof. Huxley's sharper sight.

If "the realm of matter and law" is "co-extensive with knowledge, with feeling, and with action," it must include "all the phenomena of nature," which, therefore, are the effects of material causes, whereof the elements are "matter and force"; but, as "all the phenomena of nature are explicable by deduction" from their causes, and as their causes are compounded of "matter and force," it follows that "all the phenomena of nature are explicable by deduction from the properties assignable to those two primitive factors"; which is Prof. Huxley's definition of materialism. Unless there is a flaw in this reasoning, and we have searched for one in vain, Prof. Huxley stands logically committed, by his own words, to materialism, in his own acceptance. His opinion respecting causationism has so much "to do" with materialism that it makes him a materialist in spite of himself.

Nevertheless, he stoutly refuses to "accept the situation," insisting, amongst other things less cogent, that "Augustine, Aquinas, and Calvin" were materialists, if he is a materialist, inasmuch as they all cherished, not less heartily than he cherishes, the "disbelief in spontaneity." True, but they did not hold, as he does, that "the realm of matter and law" is "co-extensive with knowledge, with feeling, and with action," or register, as he has registered, a decree banishing from that realm "spirit" as well as "spontaneity." He styles his argument here a *reductio ad absurdum*, but the absurdity, we conceive, appears in the premises rather than in the conclusion, the argument being not so much a reduction to an absurdity as a deduction from one—a *deductio ab absurdo*. The province which those famous theologians assigned to spirit, matter, and law, Prof. Huxley quietly assigns to "matter and law," un-

seating the triumvirate they acknowledged, and seating, in place of it, a duumvirate they notoriously disowned, yet to which he airily assumes they yielded true allegiance. This is the real absurdity. Calvin believed, doubtless, in the universality of causation, but he did not believe, as Prof. Huxley avows that he himself does, in the universality of material causation; he was a determinist, indeed, but not a materialist. Prof. Huxley is both, or there is no meaning in words—no virtue in logic.

With respect to causationism, therefore, his opinion resolves itself into materialism; and his demurrer breaks down. Let us now turn to the remaining point.

In the article under notice Prof. Huxley renews his assertion that "consciousness is a function of the brain," supplementing it with the admission that "material changes are the causes of psychical phenomena," and reaffirms, in different words, the pith of this sentence in his celebrated address on Descartes' "Discourse": "I believe that we shall, sooner or later, arrive at a mechanical equivalent of consciousness, just as we have arrived at a mechanical equivalent of heat." Yet what all this "has to do with materialism" he also fails "to discover." The connection is very real, nevertheless, and, if we mistake not, is capable of being clearly shown.

Causation, we may premise, is not creation, but transformation—the change of a given quantity of force into another form without altering the quantity. Essentially a cause and its effect are not two different forces, but one force in two different forms; they constitute an equation, of which relation the homogeneity of the two members, it were needless to say, is the fundamental property. Hence, a cause and its effect are necessarily of the same nature; they are, in the last analysis, consubstantial. This is a corollary from the law of the conservation of energy. It is a necessary truth. We now come to the point.

A function Prof. Huxley defines as "that effect or series of effects which results from the activity of an organ"; it is thus the effect of a material cause, and as such is itself material. In this nutshell lies the whole case. If "consciousness is a function of the brain," consciousness is material; for an organ and its function are of necessity co-essential. If "material changes are the causes of psychical phenomena," those phenomena are material; for causes and their effects are con-natural. If we can "arrive at a mechanical equivalent of consciousness, just as we have arrived at a mechanical equivalent of heat," consciousness is of the same nature as the equivalent from which it emerges, and just as material as heat is, no matter how much more subtle, how much more highly involved, how much more intricate and exquisite the texture of its

interrelations; for equivalence presupposes homogeneity. And, if all this be so, there is for us "nothing in the universe but matter and force," and "all the phenomena of nature are explicable by deduction from the properties assignable to those two primitive factors"; for, if mind is material, everything is material. We see only one way by which Prof. Huxley can escape this conclusion; and that is, to retract the opinions which necessitate it.

But he believes in them too much for that, if not quite enough for submission to their logical consequences. In point of fact he frankly repeats them, and still refuses to "accept the situation." He is gloriously obstinate. It is here that Prof. Huxley has most need for all his surpassing resources as a polemic, and here at any rate, we think, that he rises most clearly above himself, cleaving the upper air of philosophy with such freedom, strength, and beauty, with a playfulness so nearly riotous and wholly irresistible, and with such a chastened yet rejoicing and infectious sense of his own incomparable powers, that we confess we read the article with passionate admiration many times, before we read it once with conscious discrimination. There are passages that for ease and vigor and vivid grace—for prodigal splendor combined with rigorous precision, magnificence with distinctness—are hardly equalled in literature: passages that suggest the image of tropical luxuriance in the sober lights and cool shadows of temperate skies. But our admiration is getting the better of us once more.

We return to the point. It is our business to show that this captivating flight, even when not wheeling above the question or wide of it, is as idle as it is admirable. *Allons!* "Nobody hesitates to say," Prof. Huxley urges, "that an event A is the cause of an event Z, even if there are as many intermediate terms, known and unknown, in the chain of causation as there are letters between A and Z. The man who pulls the trigger of a loaded pistol placed close to another's head certainly is the cause of that other's death, though, in strictness, he causes nothing but the movement of the finger upon the trigger. And, in like manner, the molecular change which is brought about in a certain portion of the cerebral substance by the stimulation of a remote part of the body would be properly said to be the cause of the consequent feeling, whatever unknown terms were interposed between the physical agent and the actual psychical product. Therefore, unless materialism has the monopoly of the right use of language, I see nothing materialistic in the phraseology which I have employed." Ah! but in each of these illustrative cases, be it noted, in the homicidal as in the alphabetical, not merely is the chain of causation formed entirely of material links, but the swivel of the effect, if we may so express it, is material likewise: the concatenation is material through-

out. Does Prof. Huxley admit that in the case illustrated the chain of causation, including the swivel, is formed in like manner? If no, his instances are irrelevant, ordinary cases of causation, mediate or immediate, having nothing to do with the extraordinary case in which a material event is supposed to cause an immaterial one. If yes, he surrenders his point, and acknowledges, in the teeth of his own sarcasm, that his "phraseology" is purely and simply "materialistic." His illustrations either do not illustrate, or illustrate his materialism. We are far from thinking that "materialism has the monopoly of the right use of language," but unfortunately Prof. Huxley's practice, in this instance, adds no confirmation to our opinion.

We now approach the citadel of his defence, having first to encounter, however, what he probably regards as its bulwark. "It seems to me pretty plain," he tells us, "that there is a third thing in the universe, to wit, consciousness, which, in the hardness of my heart or head, I cannot see to be matter or force, or any conceivable modification of either, however intimately the manifestations of the phenomena of consciousness may be connected with the phenomena known as matter and force." Herein Prof. Huxley, we cannot help thinking, does injustice to his comprehension. He can "see" that "consciousness is a function of the brain"; he can "see" that "material changes are the causes of psychical phenomena"; he can "see" that we may "arrive at a mechanical equivalent of consciousness, just as we have arrived at a mechanical equivalent of heat"; and, if he can "see" any one of these things, he infallibly can "see," nay, does "see," that consciousness is some "conceivable modification" of "matter and force": for so much is implied in the perception of each.

Taking, for example, the relation of cause and effect, which in fact comprehends the others, it is absolutely impossible to "see" that consciousness is the effect of material changes, and not to "see" that it is material; for the change of a material event into an immaterial one involves the destruction of matter, which, in addition to being unthinkable, would tear the fabric of modern science clean from its foundations, setting the stately wreck adrift upon the waves of chaos. Nor this only. Seeing that the consciousness of a material thing dematerializes it, and seeing further that every material thing is capable of passing into consciousness, and does pass into it sooner or later, the immateriality of consciousness involves the annihilation of the material world, the microcosm devouring the macrocosm, at odd moments, till it leaves "not a rack behind." Prof. Huxley's argument wipes out matter. But this is not the worst of it. If all causation is material, as he holds, and mind is not material, as he also holds, what becomes of mind

as a causative agency? Nay, what becomes of mind as an effect? What becomes of mind in any mode? It cannot be a cause, for every cause is material; nor can it be an effect, for nothing material can lapse into immateriality. It vanishes altogether. Conceding the truth of Prof. Huxley's opinions, mind is literally nothing if not material; and he cannot "see" that it is material, he protests. His argument thus wipes out mind as well as matter: it abolishes the universe. The nimble microcosm, having swallowed the macrocosm, swallows itself, without leaving the faintest trace to tell of either. Most people would say that an assertion of which this is the outcome must be untrue.

It is due to Prof. Huxley to say that we have his authority for pronouncing the assertion untrue. It would be impossible, we are sure, to cite a higher authority, and almost impertinent, we feel, to cite any other. Certainly no authority could be more to the point. A prefatory word may be pardoned us. Self-evidently, the abyss between the material and the immaterial, if passable from either side, is passable from the other—admitting that material changes are capable of causing psychical phenomena, psychical changes are capable of causing material phenomena; mind must act upon matter, provided matter acts upon mind; for action and reaction are equal and opposite. The reader will please bear this in mind. "Have we any reason to believe that a feeling, or state of consciousness," asks Prof. Huxley, in the course of one of his late discussions with the Duke of Argyle, "is capable of directly affecting the motion of even the smallest conceivable molecule of matter? Is such a thing even conceivable? If we answer these questions in the negative, it follows that volition may be a sign, but cannot be a cause, of bodily motion. If we answer them in the affirmative, then states of consciousness become undistinguishable from material things; for it is the essential nature of matter to be the vehicle or substratum of mechanical energy." And these questions he himself answers in the affirmative, emphatically and unequivocally, when he asserts that "consciousness is a function of the brain," that "material changes are the causes of psychical phenomena," and the rest. Consequently, states of consciousness, Prof. Huxley being judge, are "undistinguishable from material things"; which is as good as declaring his inability to "see" that consciousness is not material. Instead of being unable to "see" that it is material, therefore, he is unable, on his own admission, to "see" that it is anything else.

Furthermore, Prof. Huxley has avowed, in no uncertain terms, that, beyond "the abyss of geologically recorded time," he can "see" the evolution of living protoplasm from "not-living matter"; and, if life from lifeless matter, why not consciousness from life? Surely this latter evolution, no less than the former, must

fall within the range of a vision so telescopic, especially since "the ultimate generalizations" of both, in the evolutionary philosophy, are confessedly "expressions of the same fundamental process"; this significant fact in particular we commend to his attention. In philosophy as in other things, it is the first step that costs. He has taken *that* (a mighty stride), and generously footed the ample bill. Let him not spurn the banquet he has ordered and paid for. If he has no stomach for the feast himself, he should not spoil the appetite of the guests he has bidden to it, much less attempt in his qualms to upset the table and throw the dishes out of the window. One must needs account such conduct very improper.

Again, since every effect and its cause are phenomenally unlike and substantially inconceivable, what, we pray, enables him to "see" that any effect is of the same nature as its cause, but that invariable and unconditional sequence which attests the causal relation, backed by that law of the conservation of energy which defines the relation? Naught else; and these are both at his command in the case of consciousness, as in every other case of causation. In a word, the identity of mind and matter, as we have repeatedly implied, comes out in their relation of cause and effect, assuming it to exist; and whoever can "see" them in that relation must perforce "see" them to be the same. It is true, there are men who cannot "see" that which treads on the heels of what they do "see," but they are those who have never been able to "keep up with the procession" that Prof. Huxley leads. We refuse to believe that he, walking at the head of the march of mind in this broad day of the nineteenth century, is that kind of a man.

"Wrong not yourself, then, noble Helican,"

If, however, Prof. Huxley means simply that he cannot "see" *how* consciousness results from material changes, he says what undoubtedly is true, and what will remain true at all possible stages of human development; but not more true of consciousness than of every other effect. In the chain of physical causation that gives rise to consciousness, he can "see" how consciousness results from the last link, just as well as he can "see" how the last link results from the link next to the last, or any one link from any other; the causal relation is perceivable in every case, the causal tie in none. The causal tie, with the substance of the links, is inconceivable, lying beyond the reach of the human intellect. If our inability to "see" it proves that consciousness is immaterial, it proves equally that every other effect in nature is immaterial—that "matter and force," in short, quite through the wide compass of their manifestations, are immaterial; which, it strikes us, is proving too much

—particularly for an argument that draws its potency from impotency.

We think we may be permitted to pass on to the citadel.

And here, as may be plainly seen, Prof. Huxley deems himself unassailable. With Macbeth at Dunsinane, he feels, and virtually exclaims :

“ Our castle’s strength
Will laugh a siege to scorn.”

And assuredly his position is formidable in appearance at least. “ The arguments used by Descartes and Berkeley to show that our certain knowledge does not extend beyond our states of consciousness,” he declares, “ appear to me to be as irrefragable now as they did when I first became acquainted with them some half-century ago. All the materialistic writers I know of who have tried to bite that file have simply broken their teeth. But, if this is true, our one certainty is the existence of the mental world, and that of *Kraft und Stoff* falls into the rank of, at best, a highly probable hypothesis.” Dr. Büchner, a German materialist, at whom the phrase *Kraft und Stoff* is here fired, let us say in passing, appears to be, for some reason, one of Prof. Huxley’s pet aversions, coming into his head, at the mention of materialism, as a sort of “ horrible example.” For aught we know, the aversion may be perfectly rational, or perfectly the reverse. We cheerfully give Prof. Huxley the benefit of the doubt. This by parenthesis; now to the assault.

But, first, we must express our regret that, in place of storming a citadel, with the prospect of which we inadvertently flattered ourselves a moment ago, we are reduced to the undignified and somewhat viperous business of *biting a file*, whereupon our “ little ” proof, in the most favorable event, will be “ rounded ” with a gibe. There’s strategy for you ! What our illustrious scientist does not know about the art of disputation is not worth knowing. He may be trusted for putting his adversary “ in a hole,” if he has to dig it on purpose. But to seize our steely foe.

Prof. Huxley, then, agrees with Descartes and Berkeley in saying that “ our certain knowledge does not extend beyond our states of consciousness.” What states of consciousness? Primary or derivative? If primary, our “ certain knowledge ” does not extend beyond the primordial sensations, stopping short both of mind and of matter, the conceptions of which are eventually built up out of those sensations, incapable, meanwhile, of yielding the knowledge of themselves as states of consciousness, for lack of these conceptions ; whence it follows that we can have no “ certain knowledge ” of anything, not even of our primordial sensations, which we know as sensations by means only of that self-consciousness ultimately

evolved from them. If derivative, our knowledge of matter is demonstrably more certain than our knowledge of mind; for the latter not only is reached by a process more complex and less distinct, as well as longer, than that which develops the former, but is reached through the former, upon which it depends. Our states of consciousness, to recapitulate, are either primary or derivative. If our "certain knowledge" is confined to the first, we have no "certain knowledge"; if to the second, our highest certainty is the existence of the material world. Prof. Huxley's argument, it will be seen, lands him in a dilemma. His jubilant assumption falls of its own weight. We need not stay to elucidate this point, for two reasons. In the first place, it is the familiar doctrine of modern psychology—a psychology which Prof. Huxley, as an evolutionist, may be presumed to accept. In the second place, it has nothing to do with the question, anyhow.

The relative certainty of our knowledge of the mental and of the material world has no bearing on the question as to whether the former is derived from the latter or the latter from the former, or, to calculate the statement for Prof. Huxley's meridian, whether or not there is anything in the universe but "matter and force"; because this certainty, incline whither it may, while consistent with both sides of the question, and serving to prove neither side, cannot be pleaded in favor of either without in effect taking the question for granted. "Our one certainty is the existence of the mental world," Prof. Huxley contends. The question in dispute, though, relates not to the "existence" of the mental world, but to its nature, upon which "our one certainty" throws no light, sufficing at best to show only that mind, whatever its nature, knows some of its modifications with greater certainty than it knows others. As to what its nature is, whether material or immaterial, this unique "certainty" proves nothing. Yet this is the question at issue. Regarding this question, strange as it must seem, the fact to which immaterialism "points with pride," and which materialism may be supposed to "view with alarm," is utterly insignificant, presuming it to be true, fitting in with both solutions, and contributing to neither. To adduce it in proof of either is a veiled *petitio principii*—begging the question, and that, too, in a mask.

Besides, pleading any state of consciousness, as a state of consciousness, in proof of the nature of mind, real or symbolical, implies that mind is capable of knowing not simply its states, but itself—capable of being, in the same act of thought, both subject and object; which is absurd. It is as if one should try to see his own eyes, or to lift himself by his waistband. The direct attitude of mind towards the nature of its states is the same as towards the reality they represent, the substance of the symbols transcending

subjective experience, as the substance they symbolize transcends all experience. Consciousness testifies directly to neither. Mind is no more conscious of itself as material or immaterial than of its ultimate substance ; it knows immediately as little of its symbolical as of its substantial nature. Both lie outside the sphere of consciousness. For this reason, by the way, Mr. Herbert Spencer's elaborate endeavor to test the identity of a unit of feeling with a unit of motion, by comparing the two in consciousness, is not less illegitimate than futile, since neither term of the comparison is present or presentable in consciousness, except phenomenally ; and it is one of the truisms of philosophy that the widest unlikeness in phenomena consists with the fullest identity in their proximate as well as their ultimate nature. Phenomenally heat is extremely unlike motion, yet heat and motion are identical, as respects not only their underlying substance, but their constituent substance, being alike material in their nature, and alike symbolical of the same unknowable reality. Wherefore phenomenal unlikeness, whether attested by consciousness mediately or immediately, and though as wide as that between motion and the feeling of motion, is not competent to disprove identity of nature, symbolical or substantial. On the supposition of the special analysis in question, indeed, a unit of motion and a unit of feeling stand to each other in the relation of cause and effect ; so that a unit of motion, as it presents itself in consciousness, becomes a unit of feeling, different in form from the antecedent unit, but in substance identical with it. Mr. Spencer himself describes a unit of feeling, in this supposed case, as the correlative of a unit of motion. Very well ; a thing which is the correlative of another must be of the same kind with the other ; correlation asserts community of nature—reciprocal convertibility. A unit of feeling and a unit of motion, by the supposition, differ in form only, as we have said ; in substance they are the same. So reason determines. What Mr. Spencer terms " the immediate verdict of consciousness " is a false verdict, transgressing the facts of consciousness, and usurping the office of reason. No state of consciousness, as such, can legitimately render any verdict concerning the nature of mind, as regards symbol or substance ; the nature of things forbids it. So far as this question is concerned, the evidential value of " our one certainty," be the certainty what it may, is exactly zero.

And the same mathematical symbol expresses with the same exactness the defensive value of Prof. Huxley's stronghold. The castle of whose strength he boasts is " a castle in the air," too unsubstantial to yield even the obsidional crown, which, on the unimpeachable authority of the gallant Baron of Bradwardine, we " wot well was made of the grain that takes root within the place

besieged." The citadel turns out to have been a mirage. And the *file*, alas! the redoubtable, tooth-breaking, adamantine file, is a phantom.

Nor is this the be-all and the end-all. There remains a file, that is not a phantom, for Prof. Huxley to bite, even-handed justice commending the ingredients of his hardened engine to his own teeth. Although what he calls "our one certainty" does not bear at all on the case of materialism *versus* immaterialism, there is something that does bear squarely on this issue, and which he, if nobody else, is bound to recognize. What it is our readers have not now to learn. The truth is, he begins his inquiry into the nature of mind at the wrong end of the series, if we may credit his opinions. He should prosecute the inquiry objectively, in lieu of subjectively. Investigating the nature of mind from within is, on his assumption, investigating effects out of relation to their causes, —examining only the figured side of the tapestry—ignoring the back of the shield. To consciousness indeed he must look for the effects of which the function mind consists; but for the nature of these effects, as concerns materialism or immaterialism, he should look to that of which they compose the function, and with the nature of which, accordingly, their own is identical; he should look to the organ of mind. An effect is known by its cause. The nature of a function is determined by the nature of its organ. If Prof. Huxley would know whether mind is material or not, and believes in his opinions, regardless of their consequences, let him look to the brain, of which, he says, mind is the function. Unless he mistakes error for truth, there and not elsewhere he will find what he seeks; and when he finds it, and rubs his eyes, he will not "fail to discover" that he is as "deep in the mud" of materialism as Büchner is "in the mire." The strangest thing of all is that he should now stand up to the chin in this primitive mixture without suspecting it.

Yet that such is his predicament admits of no doubt; for if, in fine, as he asserts, mind is a function of the brain, consciousness the equivalent of mechanical energy, material changes the causes of psychical phenomena, the realm of material causation co-extensive with the phenomena of nature, and all that, it is a logical necessity, absolute and flagrant, that mind originates from "matter and force," and "all the phenomena of nature are explicable by deduction from the properties assignable to those two primitive factors." So much is certain. Either his opinions are false or materialism is true: they are its legitimate offspring. To this conclusion the renowned scientist is forced. All roads, in the Huxleian field of thought, lead to materialism. The conclusion may be cavilled at, quarrelled with, recoiled from; but it cannot

be escaped. Here the candid reader, we are persuaded, will agree with us, whether he interpret the conclusion as establishing the truth of materialism, or, what is more likely, as reducing to an absurdity the opinions from which it flows. As for this, we leave him to his individual bias, content for the moment that he accept, as we believe he must, the conclusion itself. Our argument is strictly *ad hominem*.

We have now touched upon all that appears to us relevant and substantial in Prof. Huxley's magnificent plea. Concerning the inconceivability of "matter and force," in themselves, he indeed has some remarks, all just, and all expressed with his accustomed felicity, but not one of them to the present point. So far as we are aware, no materialist professes to be able, or holds it important, to follow phenomena, of whatever kind, behind the curtain of the infinite. The impossibility of doing it tells only against the discretion of him who makes the attempt. No one nowadays, barring perhaps some philosophic eaglet "mewing" his "mighty youth," is mad enough to try it. Prof. Huxley's account of his own boyish misadventure in the prosecution of this Quixotic enterprise is amusing, but the lesson it teaches, if he will pardon the remark, is needed by nobody, and at all events has no relevancy in this discussion. Materialism, to do it justice, deals solely with phenomena, asserting merely that the phenomena we call mental are evolved from the phenomena we call material, and, hence, are at bottom identical with them, whatever may be the common substance of the two orders of phenomena, as to which materialism asserts nothing, save only the self-same inconceivability adduced to confute it; and the infuriate adversary, who, with the drawn sword of analysis, runs that hapless *ism* out into the silent wilderness of *noumena*, should reproach himself, and not the innocent victim of his speculative rage. It would seem really as if at this point the wits of our polemical philosopher had gone a wool-gathering. To bring forward the inconceivability of noumena, as an objection to a doctrine which he himself had just defined in terms of phenomena, is a logical confusion of which we have not known him to be guilty before. Seldom, in truth, is such a master of controversy betrayed into so glaring an *ignoratio elenchi*. But Homer sometimes nods; though it should be said, in fairness to the wide-awake old bard, that he rarely takes his catnaps while he has on hand business of importance, and never when the fate of Troy is trembling in the balance. By the bye, Prof. Huxley is in the habit of saying that, if he were compelled to choose between idealism and materialism, he would take idealism, and of saying at the same time, with a touch of Pharisaical complacency, that he is not as those other men who would make mind the measure of the universe, forgetting or

overlooking the obvious inconsistency of the two assertions with each other, since idealism assumes that things exist only in the mind, independently of which, as it claims, they have no existence, thereby making mind not merely the measure of the universe, but the universe itself. Were he to execute his fond hypothetical resolve, he would jump out of the frying-pan into the fire; and there is no telling what he might or might not do if he should ever "discover" that he is in the frying-pan.

However, we do not hold a brief for "the beast materialism." Our client in this case is the jewel consistency; in whose favor we now ask the opinion of the court, Prof. Huxley, it is plain, having failed to sustain his demurrer. The opinions which he fathers, if the court please, are all resolvable into materialism; and, now and here, have been so resolved. His demurrer, we submit, must be overruled.

AMERICA DISCOVERED AND CHRISTIANIZED IN THE TENTH AND ELEVENTH CENTURIES.

THE intelligent reader of current public events in this country cannot have failed to notice frequent occurrences of late, which point to the discovery and colonization of the western continents, and parts of our own country, and the introduction of Christianity therein, five hundred years before the achievement of the great deeds by which Columbus brought the two continents almost face to face. On one day we read in the public prints of the unveiling in a great northwestern American city of a statue of Leif Ericson, the Northman, discoverer of America in the tenth century. We next read of the inauguration of a similar monument in honor of the same hero at Boston. And to-day we read a petition presented to the American Congress at its present session, asking that in the approaching celebration of the centenary of the Constitution, in 1889, a public and national recognition be made of the events commemorated by the Viking's statues at Milwaukee and Boston. This petition is signed by eminent scientists, antiquarians and historians in every part of our country, and to it we see appended the signatures of the leading officers and members of the Historical Societies of Vermont, New Hampshire, Virginia and other States; of General James Grant Wilson and other members of the Genealogical and Bio-

graphical Society of New York; of such artists as Daniel Huntington, Church, Moran, Brown, and others; of professors in our leading universities, and of many other most eminent and learned Americans. It is thus clear that the claim of Norse discoveries on this continent has entered into the living and current national traditions and life of our people. The learned few, the instructors of our people, seem satisfied and convinced. It is time now for this learning to be popularized and given to the people. The masses of our people must hear and judge. The present writer long ago investigated this claim of the Northmen and became convinced. It is proper first to state what achievements are claimed for the Northmen as the discoverers of our country, and this claim we will now state. The historical evidences in proof of the claim will be presented afterwards.

In the case of Columbus, who made a masterly and exhaustive study of the history of navigation before and up to his time, of the voyages of discovery before then achieved, of the traditions of the classic times in relation to the existence of continents beyond the then inhabited globe, as well as of more modern voyages, and had also explored the field scientifically as well as historically, there was an exact theory, a mass of direct and resultant information, and a firm conviction that, if afforded the means, he would discover the then unknown countries. We will refer again to this subject in another part of this article. But in the case of the Northmen no such methods were followed. The discovery made by them was in its very earliest stages the immediate result of accident; in the second stages the result of their love for the sea and habits of adventure and sea-roving; and in the third stages the result of their natural inclination to follow up the results thus attained. They were the most adventurous people of the world at that time, the most skilful and determined navigators, the most likely people of all nations to make the discovery of the lands lying so accessible beyond the Atlantic Ocean. Mr. Edward Everett justly remarked of them: "It is plain that no achievement of naval adventure, related of such a people, can be considered beyond the line of probability."

The Northmen, wandering fragments of Asiatic tribes, after traversing Europe, found a home and founded a nation in Norway, only when the sea arrested their progress. Here they achieved a permanent conquest and founded the mother country, from whose sea-indented shores proceeded so many expeditions pregnant with the fate of nations. The Orkneys, the Ferroës, Shetland and other distant lands and islands became familiar to these rovers of the seas. In 860, Naddod, a Norwegian pirate, on his voyage to the Ferroës, was carried far out of his course by a tempest, and this

accident led to his discovery of Iceland, the *Ultima Thule* of the ancients. This ice-clad island became a colony of the mother country. About the year 900 Rollo made the conquest of Normandy. In 1060 we find a Norman prince established in Apulia. In 1066 William the Conqueror becomes the master and King of England, and founds the present dynasty of Great Britain. It will thus be seen that the Northmen were at the height of their power and activity when they discovered and colonized portions of the Western Continent in the tenth century.

The despotism of the Kings of Norway drove from the country many of the bravest, boldest and most independent of the leaders and their families. Harold Haarfagr (the Fair-haired) determined to make himself sole monarch of Norway. The ambition of one of Norway's fairest and proudest daughters stimulated his own. Enamored of Ragna Adilsdatler (the daughter of Adil), he proposed to make her his queen; but she answered that the man she married would have to be King of all Norway. He gallantly and proudly accepted this challenge of love and ambition. After twelve years' hard fighting, during which time he would neither cut nor comb the fair hair for which he was so celebrated, he succeeded in conquering all Norway and thereby in winning his queen. At the battle of Hafersfjord, in 872, he consolidated the thirty-one small republics of that Spartan country into the united Kingdom of Norway. The proud families of the former republics would not submit to the harsh and tyrannical measures of this rude and iron-clad conqueror. Many of the leading men and families of the country were either expelled or voluntarily expatriated themselves. Some went to the Hebrides, some to the Orkneys, and others to the Shetland and Ferroë Islands. Iceland, which had been discovered by the famous Norse Viking Naddod, in 860, became a favorite asylum of most of these bold and unconquered refugees, on account of its remoteness and consequent security. Thus Iceland became a colony of Norway, and ultimately a dependence of the mother country. Among the voluntary exiles from Norway who settled in Iceland was Gunnbjorn, Ulf Krage's Son, a bold rover of the sea, who, in 876, was driven out to sea in a tempest, and discovered the white cliffs far to the west of Iceland, and bordering the eastern coast of Greenland. They received the name of Gunnbjorn's Rocks. Similar reports were heard from time to time from other mariners, and the imagination of these bold sea kings heightened the romance of the discovery. "Sailors' yarns" of great and marvellous details were spread and became traditional. One of these dread adventurers, Hollow Geit, claimed that he had gone thither over the ices with an Icelandic she-goat, had seen gigantic oaks covered with acorns

as large as men, and rocks of ice that shivered the ships in their passage.

Among the Northmen who went into exile from Norway was Thorwald, son of Oswald and grandson of Ulvi. His son Eric the Red had taken part in some disturbances in Norway, and was probably compelled to fly from punishment, for he had killed his man. Thus Norwald and his son Eric went together and settled in Iceland, and founded the settlement of Hornstrand. After the death of his father, another manslaughter by Eric caused him to feel the necessity for another emigration, for he was now condemned to another exile, and as he had heard so much of Gunnbjorn's Rocks, he determined to go in search of them and of the country foreshadowed by them as probably being not far distant. Accordingly in the spring of 984, he fitted out his ship and sailed in the direction given for Gunnbjorn's Rocks. He was accompanied by another prominent Iceland, Heriulf Bardson, a man of wealth and influence. He passed the famous Rocks and discovered the eastern shores of that vast body of land now known as Greenland. The land was found in the 64th degree of latitude. He landed and gave the name of Midjokel to the place, which means mountain in the midst of ice. He saw masses of rocks and ice commingled; and as the ices descended to the sea they became united to the already vast icebergs, and presented to the eye barriers at once fearful and grandly beautiful.

Eric faltered not, but pressed his brave ship southward, doubled Cape Farewell, and with his mind teeming with visions of fame and colonization, settled at the fiôrd Igalikko, which he called Eric's fiôrd. He erected a vast building at Brattahlida, availing himself of the rock palisade for one of its walls, and here with his colony he established himself. When Jorgensen in more recent times discovered the ruins of this vast pile, they seemed like the remnants of a town and showed evidences of immense toil in its construction. Eric's voyage westward from Iceland had awakened great hopes among the Icelanders, ever ready by their national tastes and habits to seek adventure, for Eric had promised to seek a land that was, unlike Gunnbjorn's Rocks, suitable for human habitation. Eric, on his part, was as skilful in schemes of colonization as many of our own contemporaries. He said to himself, if this country has a fine and attractive name, it will draw the unwary adventurer and colonist hither. So he called this bleak and ice-clad land by a name more suited to Florida. It was he that bestowed upon it the suggestive name of Greenland. He spent the winter at Ericseya, and it was in the following year, 985, that he settled at Brattahlida, after having spent the summer in exploring the western coast and in giving names to many places. In the

second year of his residence in Greenland his colonization schemes began to succeed, and having returned to Iceland to promote the movement, he returned to Greenland in 986, with no less than thirty-five Icelandic ships with colonists for the new country discovered by him. Of these only fourteen ships arrived in safety; the others were swallowed up in the waves and ice. Thus a new and independent state sprang up far beyond what had been considered the habitable globe. As Iceland was at this time a republic, so the community of Icelanders in Greenland modelled their political institutions after those of Iceland. By these events the United States loses the prestige of having been the first republic established in the western hemisphere. The population of Greenland increased as rapidly as its harsh and repellant climate would permit. Indeed no other people than the Northmen, the hardiest of Europeans, could have succeeded in making a settlement on those inhospitable shores. Not only Icelanders, but Norsemen from Norway, emigrated in considerable numbers to Greenland, and a flourishing colony was established, and trade between the colony and Iceland and Norway became permanent. The town of Ericsfiôrd became a prosperous and somewhat populous place. Explorations were made along the coasts and new settlements established. It is not known how far to the north these explorations and settlements extended, but a pillar inscribed with Runic characters in 1135, on one of the Woman's Islands on the east shore of Baffin's Bay, and found there in 1824 by Sir Edward Parry, proves that one of their expeditions went as far up as Upernavik, in latitude $72^{\circ} 50'$, and made a clearance there, if not a settlement. Eric and his companions found no previous human being or native races inhabiting the country, for no mention is made of the Esquimaux, or Skrælings, as the Northmen called them, in those extreme northern regions, in any of the ancient manuscripts until the fourteenth century. The towns or settlements extending from and around and beyond Ericsfiôrd were called Ostre Bygd (or east country or shore) and Westre Bygd (or west country or shore). Modern investigations and discoveries of the ruins of Norse structures have clearly proven that both settlements were on the west coast, the Ostre Bygd being the southern settlement, and the Westre Bygd being the northern settlement.

The Northmen had never failed in any of their undertakings, and the success of the Greenland colony was in keeping with their history. It is certain that at one time there existed and flourished no less than three hundred farms and villages in Greenland, extending from Cape Farewell to Disco. In 1261 Greenland had been claimed as politically, as well as socially and by consanguinity, be-

longing to Norway, and with regret became subject to the mother country. From that remote period to the present time, none of the land-pirating nations of Europe, which have extended their conquests into Africa and Asia as far as India, to say nothing of their American acquisitions, have ever coveted this crystal, icy gem, which still glitters in the crown of Norway. Not only did Greenland wax strong and prosperous as a Norwegian colony, but the Christian religion gained a firm foothold in the country. Churches and monasteries were erected and maintained for centuries, and Greenland became the seat of a Catholic bishopric, and had a succession of seventeen bishops. We propose to defer the consideration of the ecclesiastical history of Greenland and Vinland to a future time, when in a separate article we will trace the progress of this most interesting branch of our subject. For the present we conclude our notice of Greenland proper with a brief reference to the extinction of the colonies, the history of which is buried in mystery and darkness. Crantz, himself a Norwegian, in his "History of Greenland," repels with indignation the thought that so miserable a race as the Esquimaux, whom the Northmen contemptuously called *Skrælings*, could have been "capable of overmatching the Norwegians, a nation of conquerors, invading their populous colonies, barricaded as they were by craggy rocks, and destroying them root and branch, so that not a living vestige of them is now to be found." Nor does he find in the annals of the race any accounts of war. He attributes the principal cause of the extermination of the Greenland colonies to pestilence. A plague, known as the *Black Death*, ravaged some of the fairest portions of Europe, destroying not only man and beast, and all living things, but even the very roots of trees, and shrubs and herbage withered away under its poisonous breath. Commerce between Greenland and Norway, and the constant passage of vessels between the two countries, must have easily brought the infection across the ocean. The severity of the climate and the absence of the finer comforts of wealth and civilization and of good medical treatment, gave easier spread to the plague, which decimated the population and greatly reduced their strength and numbers. The more northern settlements, becoming depleted by disease, were probably abandoned, and the entire colony became finally congregated in the southern, or *Ostre Bygd*. The savages increased in numbers and in territory as the Norwegians were reduced. Finally, the plague left but little for the savages to accomplish. Still there are shreds of history that lead us to the belief that their extinction was not sudden or entire. Remnants of the colony must have survived the *Black Death*, and these probably amalgamated with the natives, and gradually lost all individuality. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries at-

tempts were made to discover the lost colonies, and in 1721 the Danish missionary, Hans Egede, succeeded in establishing himself at Godthaab, but his congregations consisted only of Esquimaux. The Northmen were gone.

Soon afterwards the Moravian Mission was founded and continues to the present day; and the settlements have increased. The sites of the colonies of the ancient Northmen have now been thoroughly identified; the ruins of the churches and other structures of the Catholic Northmen of the eleventh, twelfth, thirteenth and fourteenth centuries have been found and identified with certainty; and it is now demonstrated beyond a doubt that Igallikofjord or Ericsfjord was the site of the long-lost colony of Eric the Red. Learned societies in Europe and America are making daily progress in elucidating the history, the geography, and the antiquities of the Greenland of the Northmen. The historical societies of New England, the Royal Society of Northern Antiquarians at Copenhagen, and the Société des Americanistes in France and other countries are among the foremost laborers in this interesting field. The *Antiquitates Americanae*, by Professor Rafn, published at Copenhagen in the ancient Norse language, in modern Danish, and in Latin, in 1837, gives illustrations of the monuments and ruins now remaining to attest this history, and *fac similes* of the manuscripts that recount its details. Greenland was the base of operations for the Norse explorations and discoveries of unknown shores. We will now proceed to give the results of the latter.

Bjarn Heriulfson was the Norse discoverer of the first land of our continent. A glance at the map of the world will show to the most casual observer how closely together in those northern regions the lands lie. Iceland is not far from Norway; Greenland is not far from Iceland; and from Greenland to Labrador, from Labrador to Nova Scotia, from Nova Scotia to New England, the transit by sea is short and easy. Considering the wonderful maritime genius of the Northmen, it is a matter of surprise that these discoveries were not sooner made. The discovery of Iceland by Naddod was in some respects an accident, for a tempest carried him off his course from the Ferroë islands to Iceland. The discovery of the rocky sea-borders of Greenland by Gunnbjorn was, in some respects, an accident, for he too was carried out to sea by a storm. So the discovery of the American coasts by Bjarn was, in some respects, an accident, for, in search of Greenland, he stumbled on New England. Yet there was method in all these accidents. Discovery, colonization and traffic were the ideas that, after all, guided the ships of the Northmen. They were so accustomed to visit lands and islands, living out at sea and out of the beaten track of navigation, such as Iceland, Shetland, Ferroë, and the Ork-

neys, that Greenland, and the lands to the south, including our own shores, seemed to them but no distant parts of the same system or chain of islands. To them such events were commonplace. But to the philosophical and religious mind of Columbus the same events were a solution of the earth's geography, a continent given to civilization, a new world to Christendom.

Among the companions of Eric in his voyage of discovery from Iceland to Greenland was Heriulf, an old mariner, who had become a large land owner and settler in Iceland. He too, like Eric, made a home in Greenland. His son, Bjarn, continued his commercial voyages, and was trading at some distant mart when his father went to Greenland with Eric. His custom always had been to return from his voyages in time to spend the winter with his father. The ancient chronicles describe this youth as brave, generous, and promising beyond example. His devotion to his father was in keeping with his high and noble character. On returning to Iceland in 986, to spend the winter around the family hearth, he learned for the first time of his father's departure for distant lands to the west in company with Eric. He resolved at once not to unload his vessel, or even tarry for a short time, but to proceed at once over the unknown deep in search of his father, and in order to spend as usual the coming winter with him. No amount of expostulation could deter this young Viking from putting his daring purpose into execution. He had but the vaguest notion of the direction and situation of Greenland. He followed the guidance of the stars. His exploit is recounted in the Saga of Eric the Red, which states that he had good weather the first three days of his voyage. The polar currents must have carried him from the direct course, for he could have reached Greenland in three days. Tempests and thick mists now impeded his progress for several days and nights. When the sun appeared, he saw the outline of an unknown land, looming up like a blue cloud. Approaching and scanning the land, it was found to be covered with forests and furrowed with small hills. "This is not the land we seek," he said to his men, "for we are assured that the mountains of Greenland are high and covered with ice." Then heading to the north, he discovered, after a day and night's navigation, a level country covered with trees. Here his sailors desired to land in order to replenish their supplies of wood and water; but the young adventurer was in search of Greenland and his father. After three days' sailing they approached an island, all barren and intersected with glaciers, and passed it by. And again, after two days and nights of navigation in the open sea, they discovered another land, whose towering cliffs of eternal snow and ice broke in against a lowering sky. Here at once Bjarn recognized "Green-

land's icy mountains." Here they landed, and saw a boat at the shore. It happened that the place was not far from the residence of Heriulf, for it was called Heriulfness; and soon the father and son were embraced in each other's arms.

The circumstances of this remarkable voyage, its western direction from Iceland, its diversion to the southward, the courses of the wind and water currents, and the corresponding distances measured by the time of a sailing vessel, all unite in determining with fair and just accuracy the parts of the American coast that Bjarn saw and along which he sailed. The learned geographers and skilful critics, who have reviewed all these circumstances, have decided that the first land discovered was Nantucket, one degree south of Boston; that the second land discovered was Nova Scotia; and the third land was Newfoundland. There are certainly no other lands on a voyage approaching and reaching Greenland from the south that can be identified as the lands discovered by Bjarn.

Bjarn Heriulfson now abandoned seafaring and resided with his father the remainder of his life, spending most of the time in Greenland, occasionally visiting Iceland and Norway. Some years after his sailing along the American coasts, he visited Norway, and recounted his adventures to some of the most intelligent and influential men of the country. Jarl Eric, who was present, and others, censured his indifference to the importance of his discovery, blamed him for not going ashore and exploring the country. His narratives, however, added to the enthusiasm already created in Norway and Iceland by the discovery and colonization of Greenland.

Now a new element entered into the wonderful forces which formed the startling character of the Northmen. Olaf Tryggvason, the king of Norway, became converted to Christianity towards the end of the tenth century. His zeal for the conversion of his subjects knew no bounds. He made vast tours through the country accompanied by Christian missionaries, for the diffusion of the new religion. Military escorts also accompanied this royal missionary, and it is said that the shrines and altars of Odin fared roughly at his hands. So great was the respect of the Northmen for power and strength and force, that the energy and power with which the king supplemented the milder arguments of the missionaries, resulted in the conversion of Norway to Christianity. An expedition to Iceland, accompanied with missionaries, had the same result. Now that Greenland was the object of so much attention, the convert-king desired to bestow also on his Greenland countrymen the blessings of Christianity. Eric, the founder of Greenland, had two sons, who were among the most intelligent and promising of the rising men of the time and country, Leif and Thon-

stein. The latter remained with his father, who was then in Iceland. Leif was on a visit to the court of Olaf, where the Christian influences of the royal household and of the zealous missionaries led to his conversion to the new faith. He was also ambitious of renown, and sought glory in adventure and discovery. Having heard the accounts which Bjarn gave of the new and unknown lands lying to the south of Greenland, and yet remaining unexplored, he coveted the fame of becoming their explorer and colonizer. In this purpose he purchased the ship of Bjarn, enlisted thirty-five sailors for the voyage, and prepared to sail in quest of the southern lands. The king also charged him with the still more glorious mission of introducing Christianity into Greenland, and appointed a priest and several other holy men, "*sacri ordinis*," as the Icelandic Sagas state, to go out to Greenland on the same voyage with Leif. The voyage was made successfully by following the directions of Bjarn, and trusting to his knowledge of the stars. Eric, his father, yielded at first to his entreaty, and consented to accompany the expedition, in order to favor it with his experience and prudence, as well as by the good luck his presence was in the opinion of the sailors thought to bring. Eric was still a pagan, and as it was a part of the belief of the followers of Odin that they enjoyed in Valhalla the wealth they had amassed in this world, he securely hid his treasure, mounted his horse and started to ride to the shore where the ship was anchored. On his way to the ship his horse stumbled and Eric was thrown to the ground, and, though not seriously hurt, he construed the accident as an omen sent from Odin warning him not to embark. But Leif, with a brave soul and Christian faith, rejecting the pagan superstitions in which he had been educated, and which he had now abjured, joyously sailed in his stout ship with his thirty-five sailors and the Christian missionaries sent to evangelize the pagan Greenlanders. This was in the year 1000. His was a veritable voyage of discovery. It was more—it was a mission of Christianity. No wonder that, in the chronicles of the Sagamen and Scalds, Leif has received the title of *The Fortunate*.

His voyage was unlike that of Bjarn; it was from north to south. He first saw a level country, stony, desolate, and encompassed with mountains of ice. He called it *Helluland*, or Stony Land, and in this description and location is recognized by modern critics our own Newfoundland. Thence steering southward he saw the second land discovered by Bjarn, with a low and hillock-shaped coast of white sand, with great forests in the background. This he called *Markland*, or *Woodland*, and in this we recognize the modern Nova Scotia.

Sailing again, and with a favorable wind from the northeast, he

reached in two days an island, "near which," as D'Avezac writes, "extends a peninsula to the east and north, just as Cape Cod is now seen to extend to the northeast behind the island of Nantucket." He passed through the narrow sound separating the main land from the islands of Nantucket and Martha's Vineyard, and describes the coast most accurately. He is now in regions unseen by Bjarn or any other European; the beautiful country entices him onward and southward; he enters Rhode Island bay and ascends Pocasset river. Here he and his companions landed, and, with ceremonies customary with the Scandinavians, took possession of the country. Some of the sailors light a large fire, and others explore the country, marking the trees and rocks with their axes as a guide for returning to the ship. Leif then caused trees to be cut, and large buildings were constructed which were called Leif's huts, *Leifsbudir*. He explores the country by sending each day half of his men inland, with strict injunctions not to separate, and to return each night to sleep at Leifsbudir.

One of the most enthusiastic among his men was a German named Tyrker, originally a captive, but subsequently the instructor and foster-father of Leif. One evening he was missing on the return of the exploring party of the day. Leif was much concerned on his account and reprimanded the others for returning without him. Leif with twelve men went in search of his foster-father, and soon found him. "Why, my foster-father," said Leif, "have you come so late, and why did you leave your companions?" Tyrker, on the contrary, was quite elated with his wanderings and with a discovery he had made. On the impulse of the moment he replied in his native German, which no one could understand, then, speaking in the Norse language, he said, "I have not been very far; I bring you in the meantime something new. I have discovered vines loaded with grapes." Leif, incredulous at such news, said, "Do you speak the truth, my foster father?" Tyrker replied, "I am sure that I speak the truth, because in my country there are vines in abundance."

And so it turned out upon subsequent investigation, and so to this day that region abounds with wild grapes. Leif then joyously called the country *Vinland*, the land of the vine. This romantic and striking circumstance gave great *éclat* to his discovery throughout the northern or Scandinavian parts of Europe. Adam of Bremen was told this circumstance in the next century by the King of Denmark.

The observations made of the country and climate accord with wonderful accuracy in locating Vinland the Good, of the Northmen, in the region near Newport, Rhode Island. The winter was spent at Leifsbudir, and in the spring Leif loaded his ships

with woods of rare beauty, with skins, and grapes, and sailed for Greenland. When he had got within sight of the mountains of Greenland, Leif had the happiness of rescuing from death five Norwegians, among whom was Thorer, first husband of Gudrid, who afterwards became celebrated in the annals of the Northmen in America.

This expedition of Leif was regarded as the most fortunate of all; for he had discovered Vinland the Good, had rescued five of his countrymen from death at sea, and had introduced Christianity into Greenland. The ecclesiastics who accompanied the expedition were the first Christian priests in that early age that visited America. They afterwards became the founders of the church of Greenland, which flourished for several centuries. The remains of its temples are now visited by adventurous tourists and are familiar to the Moravian missionaries of Greenland. Leif Ericson was thus the discoverer of our country.

The fame of Leif's success gave great stimulus to the Norwegian expeditions. Thorvald, the other son of Eric, and brother of Leif, was thrilled with the same ambition. Leif gave him the trusty and stout ship which had already visited the coast of the new lands twice; he also gave him permission to occupy the houses he had erected in Vinland, *Leifsbudir*, and added all his experiences and his wise counsels. Thorvald selected thirty men for the expedition, and sailed westward on the course of Bjarn and Leif in 1002. No difficulty was experienced in finding Vinland, for the route was now familiar, and Thorvald and his companions spent the winter in Leifsbudir, or Vinland the Good, our own Rhode Island. In the spring he caused a reconnaissance to be made of the country to the south. The small islands along the coast were visited, and on one of them they saw a small barn, the only sign of human occupation of the land. An island extending far towards the west was the limit of their southward explorations, and this was probably our own Long Island. In the ensuing summer Thorvald undertook to explore the coast to the northward. A violent storm broke the keel of his ship, and he remained a few days to make repairs. On resuming his course he said to his companions, "Let us raise upon this point of land a keel of a ship and give it the name of *Kialarnes*, or Cape of the Keel," and this was done accordingly. This point of land is now identified by modern critics and geographers as the Cape Cod, the Nauset of the Indians, situated in 42° of latitude. He next proceeded westward and landed near a promontory, which is now believed to be Gurnet Point, or Cape Allerton. So attractive was the surrounding country that Thorvald said on landing, "This country is very beautiful; I would wish to build here my

home." This remark proved to be fatally prophetic of his long and last resting place.

On returning to the ship they perceived three dark spots at the foot of the cliff, and on going to them they turned out to be carabos, or wicker boats, covered with skin, and under each were concealed three men. The Northmen were by education and national tradition adventurers, pirates and murderers, looking upon piracy and murder not as crimes, but as so many claims to distinction and honor in this world and in the Valhalla of the future life. The thought of conciliating the natives, of paving the way to their confidence and friendship, of opening the road to trade and colonization, or of availing themselves of their knowledge of the country and its resources, seemed never to enter into their plans or methods. Their first impulse was to seize and slaughter the natives found concealed under the carabos, an impulse no sooner felt than executed. One only escaped, and he could distinctly hear, above the splashing noise of the Northmen's boats as they returned to the ship, the cries of agony and death from his countrymen, as they were slaughtered and thrown into the deep sea. There were some Christians with the expedition, but probably few; it is hoped none took part in this slaughter; but Thorvald, who, by a sort of nuncupative will, directed his own tomb to be surmounted by the cross, emblem at once of redemption and mercy, did not, and probably could not, stay the red hand of massacre, nor save from knife or wave the unoffending natives. But the demon of carnage held him too as its hostage.

After the slaughter of the eight Esquimaux, or Skrælings, the Northmen explored the country around the promontory and the bay, and thought they saw what seemed like the habitations of men on the distant and elevated bank. Returning to their ship and eating the evening repast, all were speedily buried in slumber. But soon their sleep was disturbed by the din of war, there was no watch kept that night, and from the first to awake came the fearful cry, "Awake, Thorvald! Awake, Northmen! If you wish to save your lives, cut the cables and put to sea immediately!" On seizing their arms and rushing on deck the Northmen saw their ship surrounded by numerous carabos manned with natives, yelling for vengeance on the murderers of the morning, and, after the discharge of a cloud of arrows, the flotilla disappeared as suddenly as it came. The slaughter of the preceding morning was already avenged on the Northmen in the person of their chief. Thorvald was mortally wounded by an arrow, probably a poisoned one, which struck his shield, rebounded and penetrated his body under the arm. He announced to his companions his approaching death, advised his countrymen to depart from the shores which they had made fatal to themselves, and pointing to the

beautiful promontory, which he had so much admired as a place where he would like to build his home, he said, "I have foretold my lot; for I will rest there a long time. Bury me in this spot, and place two crosses on my grave, one at my head and the other at my feet, and in future this shall be called *Krossanes*, or Promontory of Crosses." These were Thorvald's expiring words. The prophecy was soon fulfilled, and the remains of the chieftain, one of the bravest of Vikings, were soon reposing under the two crosses he had directed his companions to erect at his head and feet. Returning to join the remainder of the expedition at Leifsbudir, in Vinland the Good, they recounted the sad end of their exploring expedition to their companions who had remained there. The Northmen spent the following winter, their third, in Vinland. In the next spring, 1005, they prepared to depart for Ericsfiord in Greenland. On this expedition, as well as in the preceding one of Leif, the Northmen must have gathered great quantities of wild grapes in the fall, and have dried them; for in the spring the ship was loaded with grapes. On arriving at Ericsfiord their first duty was to seek Leif, and announce to him the tragic death of his brother.

Within recent years a singular and romantic interest has attached to the death and burial place of Thorvald Ericson. In 1831 the skeleton of a warrior was found buried in the vicinity of Fall River, a *veritable skeleton in armor*. His sword was like those used by the Northmen, the breastplate also corresponded, and the Swedish chemist, Berzelius, analyzed a part of it and found it composed of the same metals used in the North during the tenth century. This relic attracted great attention at the time, and was the subject of much learned discussion among profound scholars, geographers, antiquarians, archæologists and historians. The silent warrior has never yet related his mysterious history. Well might the poet conjure him to tell his tale:

"Speak! Speak! thou fearful guest!"

One of the most beautiful poems of Longfellow, *The Skeleton in Armor*, commemorates the fate of Thorvald in the person of the Fall River warrior, and makes the son of Eric the Red relate his discoveries, claims the erection of the old tower at Newport as a Northman's work, relates his contempt of human life and of the human species, and his glorious entrance into Valhalla:

"Three weeks we westward bore,
And then the storm was o'er,
Cloud-like we saw the shore
Stretching to leeward;
There, for my lady's bower,
Built I the lofty tower
Which to this very hour
Stands looking seaward."

We will give the last two stanzas of this startling poem :

“ Still grew my bosom then,
Still as a stagnant fen,
Hateful to me were men,
The sunlight hateful !
In the vast forest here
Clad in my warlike gear
Fell I upon my spear,
Oh, death was grateful !

“ Thus seamed with many scars,
Bursting these prison bars,
Up to its native stars,
My soul ascended.
There from the flowing bowl
Deep drinks the warrior’s soul :
Skaal ! to the Northland, skaal !
Thus the tale ended,”

In the same summer Thorstein Ericson, third son of Eric the Red and brother of Leif and Thorvald, determined to go in search of his brother’s remains. He fitted out a vessel, manned with twenty-five selected men, and started on his errand of fraternal piety. He was also accompanied by his wife, Gudrid, a woman remarkable in Norwegian chronicles for her beauty, dignity, prudence and Christian virtues, and also as the first among the Norse women that became a mother on our shores. The personal adventures and remarkable life of this the first of American mothers, ending in her spending an honored and pious widowhood in a convent at Rome, would deeply interest our readers if we had the opportunity of relating them here. This expedition was unsuccessful. The ship was tossed about all summer on the ocean. Finally they reached Lysefjord on the west coast of Greenland, where Thorstein and several of his men died. Gudrid then returned to Ericsfjord, in Greenland, and put herself under the protection of her brother-in-law, Leif, as head of the family.

The next and most remarkable of all the expeditions to Vinland was that which was undertaken by Thorfinn Karlsafne. This hero was descended from three families of kings. He was rich, powerful, capable and brave. He went to Greenland in 1006 and became the guest of Leif, at Brattahlid, in the very house that Eric had built. Eric was dead, and Leif was head of the family. At the Yule feast of the Northmen, now become the Christmas of the converted Greenlanders, Leif was disconsolate at his inability, in that distant and frozen land, to make good cheer ; or, as he expressed it, to provide the necessary “ good things ” for a proper celebration of the great holy-days. Thorfinn,

perceiving this, played successfully the character of Santa Claus, and threw open the richly stocked store-houses of his vessels, and a *Merry Christmas* was celebrated in the stone castle, and indeed by the whole community. Gudrid must have lived in sorrowful retirement up to this time, for it was only during the Christmas festivities that Thorfinn saw her for the first time. They were noble and kindred spirits. The name of *Karlsafne*, which had been bestowed upon Thorfinn, signifies *destined to become great*; and, according to a ghost story related, in the Icelandic Sagas, of Gudrid's first husband, he arose from his bier in the midst of death and predicted a brilliant future for Gudrid. So when Thorfinn asked her hand of Leif, he answered, "Let her follow her destiny." The marriage took place in the winter of 1007, and formed an appropriate sequel to the Yule festivities.

Vinland had now become famous in Greenland story. In the long winter evenings its fabulous riches, its vast domains and forests, its beautiful waters, its spontaneous vineyards, and its magical climate were dwelt upon by Skald and Sagaman. The writer has seen, and will quote below, an ancient Latin poem, of Scandinavian authorship, in which Vinland is described as a mighty empire with three kings. The Esquimaux and their chiefs would scarcely realize that they had been the subject of so grand an epic in the classic language of Virgil and Horace. It is related in the Sagas that Gudrid first advised Thorfinn to lead an expedition to Vinland in his ships. But Thorfinn and Gudrid had more enlightened and enlarged views of the enterprise than any of their precursors. Neither Leif, nor Thorvald, nor Thorstein went to Vinland with any intention of planting a permanent colony there, as is manifested by the fact that none of the adventurers carried their families with them, nor did they carry flocks, or herds, or agricultural implements, or other tokens of a settlement. But Thorfinn Karlsafne made every preparation he could for colonization and conquest. He was accompanied by one hundred and fifty-one men and seven women, and they carried with them cattle and sheep. Had his companions been composed entirely of married men and their families, this expedition would have resulted in the permanent colonization of New England. They arrived in safety at Vinland, after visiting Kialarnes, Martha's Vineyard and other places on the New England coast, all of which are described with a minuteness and accuracy most remarkable under the circumstances.

In their search for Vinland, Thorhall, a rude and superstitious pagan, raised dissension among the colonists, and left the expedition with nine men and took a different course. The Northmen never surrendered their independence or their freedom of action.

Though Thorfinn commanded the expedition, all were free. The manner in which Thorhall announced his discontent is characteristic of the race, and affords also a specimen of their literature after the style of the *improvisatore*, or Norse Skalds. Thorhall, while carrying water to his ship before departing from Thorfinn, raised the pail to his mouth to drink, and thus sang :

“People told me when I came
Hither all would be so fine ;
The Good Vinland, known to fame,
Rich in fruits and choicest wine ;
Now the water-pail they send,
To the fountain I must bend,
Nor from out this land divine
Have I quaffed one drop of wine.”

When fresh food became scarce, and Thorhall and his companions had wandered or withdrawn, the Christians supplied themselves with food from the flesh of a whale cast on the shore ; but Thorhall, who was a pagan, taunted them with the inefficacy of their Christian prayers for food, for the flesh of the whale had made them all sick, and they were still suffering. Thorhall, claiming to be guided by his patronal deity, Thor, pretended to predict or foresee that on the shore abundance of fish and game could be procured. So obvious a course had never occurred to their bewildered minds, but it was no sooner tried than abundance of food rewarded their search. Thorhall now abandoned the expedition altogether, and, as he hoisted sail, he sang his second strophe :

“ Let your trusty band
Haste to Fatherland ;
Let our vessel brave
Plough the angry wave,
While those few who love
Vinland here may rove,
Or, with idle toil,
Fetid whales may boil,
Here on Furdustrand,
Far from Fatherland.”¹

The region or part of Vinland which was the site of Thorfinn's proposed colony was traversed by a river (now Taunton River, according to the conclusions of the learned), and locating himself on the opposite bank from Leifsbudir, he built houses for himself and his people.

The Sagas give clear and intelligent accounts of his explorations of the country, of his traffic with the natives, of the development of the colony, and of their sojourn for three years in the country.

¹ Beamish's Translation.

The most interesting event in the history of this expedition and colony was the birth of a son to Thorfinn Karlsafne and Gudrid. He was born in 1008, near the present Buzzard Point, in the State of Massachusetts, and was the first man of European blood of whose birth within the limits of our country we have any historical record. His name was Snorre Thorfinnson. He made his mark afterwards in Scandinavian annals, and his descendants were distinguished in the Church and in the State, in the republic of letters and of the sciences; and the Scandinavian sculptor, Albert Thorwaldsen, was not the least famous of this illustrious family.

As mentioned in the Sagas, this effort at early colonization on our shores lasted three years. At first the Northmen, guided by the more prudent counsels and example of Thorfinn and Gudrid, established friendly relations with the natives, which might have become lasting and have resulted in a permanent colony but for some apparently trifling accidents that led to a misunderstanding between the Northmen and the Esquimaux. Owing to such misunderstanding hostilities broke out suddenly between them, however, and the result was an abandonment of the country by the Northmen.

The attempt of Thorfinn and Gudrid to colonize Vinland is claimed to have been recorded by the Northmen in Roman and Runic characters upon a rock situated on the right bank of the Taunton River, in Bristol County, Massachusetts. This is the celebrated DIGHTON WRITING ROCK. As interpreted by many learned critics, it is said to record the name of Thorfinn and to give the number of his men; a representation of his vessel, and a picture of Gudrid and her child; and to refer to the act of taking possession of the country. While many learned men are enthusiastic in their support of this interpretation of the remarkable rock with its inscription, others ascribe it to the Indians, and others still to the action of the elements. The inscription was copied by Dr. Danforth in 1680, by Cotton Mather in 1712, by Dr. Greenwood in 1730, by Stephen Sewell in 1768, by James Winthrop in 1788, and by some of the New England Historical Societies, and by others four times in the present century. It has been visited by tourists for centuries, and is so visited still. It was shown to General Washington during his military operations in Rhode Island in the Revolutionary War, who thought it resembled the figures and pictures he had seen painted on the wraps and buffalo robes of the Indians of Virginia. Scandinavian scholars and many of the learned in this country recognize the Dighton Writing Rock as a genuine monument of the Norse colony in Vinland. The learned and enthusiastic Professor Rafn, in his great work, "*Antiquitates Americanæ*," interprets the inscription, in conformity with

the accounts of the Sagas, thus: "Thorfinn, with one hundred and fifty-one Norse seafaring men, took possession of this land." We have seen fac-similes of all the copies taken of the inscription; while bearing some resemblance to each other they differ widely. Yet in all of them there is enough to give plausibility to the claim of the Scandinavians, and still more to interest and puzzle the curious and the learned.

The Sagas give detailed accounts of the battle which Thorfinn had with the Skrælings, and of the modes of warfare practised by the latter. One feature in the conflict was a panic created among the natives by the appearance of a frightened bull belonging to the Northmen, which escaped from his confinement and plunged through the field with loud and echoing sounds. No less a panic was created on the battlefield by the appearance in front of the fighting Northmen of a frantic woman of gigantic stature, an Amazon of the fiercest type, who rallied her countrymen to the fight and spread dismay among the Skrælings. This was Freydis, an unscrupulous woman, a natural daughter of Eric the Red and sister of Leif and Thorvald. She subsequently took a most unworthy part in the history of Vinland. The Sagas further give an account of Thorfinn's explorations of the country south and north of Vinland; for, though he saw that he must ultimately return to Greenland and to Norway, he resolved to learn and report as much as possible concerning the country, its geography, its inhabitants, and its products. The winter following the engagement with the natives was spent in Vinland, but dissensions and social disorders, long brewing, now assumed a shape which confirmed his resolution of departing in the spring.

Thorfinn's expedition consisted of three ships when it left Greenland for Vinland. One of these was carried away from the expedition, as we have seen, by Thorhall, the hunter, to whom it must have belonged. The second was commanded by Bjarn Grimolfson. In the spring of 1010 Thorfinn and Bjarn with their respective vessels prepared to sail back to Greenland. An incident connected with Bjarn and his ship deserves to be related as illustrating the Norse character. Bjarn discovered that his vessel had been attacked by the *teredo*, a destructive worm, which had eaten the sides of his ship into honeycomb, so that she was unfit to go to sea. But he had another boat, which had been smeared with sea-oil, and this the worms did not attack. This smaller boat had capacity for carrying only half of the company. At Bjarn's suggestion the Northmen coolly resolved to cast lots to determine who should return on the vessel homeward bound, and who should accept the fate of remaining behind. Bjarn took his chance with the rest. The lots were drawn, and Bjarn was among the fortunate ones.

He and the others, who were to have the good fortune of returning home, descended from the larger ship and entered the smaller one, leaving the other half of their company on the doomed vessel, and were about to sail. Suddenly a young Iclander, who had been persuaded by Bjarn to leave his father's house in Iceland and join the expedition, and who had drawn the lot of perishing with the sinking ship, cried out from the latter, "Dost thou mean, Bjarn, to leave me here?" Bjarn answered, "So it seems; it is impossible to do otherwise; the lots are cast." The youth replied, "Very different was the promise you made to my father, when I went with thee from Iceland, than thus to leave me, for thou saidst to my father we should both share the same fate." Bjarn then honorably and heroically exchanged places with the young Iclander, whom he put upon the homeward bound boat, while he ascended again and took his place on the doomed and worm-eaten vessel. Bjarn and his unfortunate companions perished amidst a sea of waves and worms. The smaller boat returned in safety to Iceland and Norway, when the young Iclander and his companions recounted the heroic act of Bjarn Grimolfson. We rejoice in renewing and repeating this souvenir, which the Icelandic Sagas so graphically and admiringly preserve, of this heroic Viking. May his ill deeds be forgotten in this generous act. To Bjarn we address the words of Lord Byron:

"I know thee for a man of many thoughts,
And deeds of good and ill, extreme in both,
Fatal and fated in thy sufferings."

But Thorfinn and Gudrid, and Snorre, their native American son, children of prophecy and favorites of fortune, returned to Greenland and to Norway in their brave ship, which was loaded with a rich cargo of grapes from Vinland, of valuable wood called Mazur, supposed to be bird's-eye maple, furs, and other products of the country. These articles were sold in Norway at fabulous prices, and Thorfinn realized a fortune. He and his family and companions were treated with extreme honor, and he was recognized as having more than realized the prophecies. But his deeds and his fame would have been complete only on his achieving the permanent colonization of Vinland. His failure to do so left the field open to the glorious achievements of Columbus. He spent his last days in Greenland. After his death and the marriage of Snorre, Gudrid made a pilgrimage to Rome, and spent her last years in one of the many religious houses of the Eternal City. Rome was then, as she has been ever since, alive to geographical discoveries, as affording the channel for conveying the faith to heathen peoples. Rome was represented in the western hemisphere by a succession of seventeen bishops in Greenland, and one

of them, Bishop Eric Upsi, became the apostle of Vinland in the twelfth century, a fact which indicates a permanent settlement of Northmen in Rhode Island. It is quite probable that Gudrid's narratives of Thorfinn's expedition, of the birth of Snorre, and of the native races plunged in paganism, made a deep impression at Rome, and that there were not wanting learned and curious geographers to record her story. It is believed that the traditions of these expeditions of the Northmen to distant lands beyond the ocean reached the eager ears of Columbus, that he not only saw and read accounts of them at Rome, but, on the occasion of his voyage to Iceland in the spring of 1477, heard the legends of Vinland from Norse tongues, and learned them more minutely from the Monastic manuscripts preserved in the ancient convents.

The next expedition to Vinland soon followed after the return of Thorfinn. The leading spirit in this attempt was the notorious Freydis, wife of Thorvard. Her husband was the weakest of Vikings, for he was under the complete control of his unscrupulous and covetous wife. Freydis formed a partnership in a voyage to Vinland with two Icelanders, the brothers Helge and Finboge, who arrived in Greenland with three ships in the summer of 1010. Freydis broke faith with her partners at the very start, quarrelled with them immediately on her arrival in Vinland, plotted and accomplished their assassination, and when no Northman in her husband's crew was willing to kill the five women who were with the party of Helge and Finboge, she seized an axe, and with her own hands butchered them on the spot. She seized all the goods and property of her murdered victims, her late partners, and in the spring of 1011 returned to Greenland. In spite of her threats to murder any one who should divulge her crimes, the murder leaked out, and Freydis justly became the opprobrium of her race and of her sex.

Vinland is mentioned in other Sagas, and in connection with subsequent voyages. As the Greenland colonies continued to maintain themselves and to flourish for four hundred years, and as Vinland was well known to the Greenlanders, it would seem improbable, if not impossible, that so adventurous and sea-roving a people could have discontinued their intercourse with this attractive region. As Leif, Thorvald, and Thorfinn had achieved glory by their expeditions to Vinland, and as the two last had also acquired fortunes in the same adventures, the fame of Vinland must have long afterwards resounded throughout Greenland, Iceland, and Norway. The last direct expedition to Vinland, however, of which we have any record in the Sagas, is that of Bishop Upsi, in 1121, and it is related that this zealous and devoted prelate, though appointed Bishop of Garda in Greenland, either re-

signed his episcopal office, or, having accepted it, went in search of his flock in Vinland, and devoted himself to the conversion of the natives. It is probable that missionary efforts in Vinland did not cease with Bishop Eric, for we have an account of a new land west of Iceland being discovered by two missionaries who went out from Iceland. Greenland was too well known and too thoroughly colonized to be referred to in this account. Some suppose Newfoundland was the land referred to. And in 1347 mention is made of a voyage from Greenland to Markland. At the time of this latter expedition the plague of the *Black Death* was raging in Norway, and its population was reduced from two millions to three hundred thousand. The plague continued to rage till 1351, and is supposed to have been communicated to Iceland, Greenland, and Vinland, by the ships passing between those countries and Norway. The *Black Death* is believed to have resulted in the final extinction of the Greenland and Vinland colonies. If any permanent colony was ever established in Vinland by the Northmen, as some suppose, and cite the old tower at Newport as proof of this fact, or if even occasional intercourse was maintained between Greenland and Vinland, all ended with the extermination of the Norwegian colonies in Greenland. It seems singular that the Northmen should have attached so little importance to the discovery of Vinland; but as they did not perplex their minds over the scientific theories involved, and cared not to explore the earth for the information of the inhabitants thereof, or for the benefit of science or general commerce, questions left for Columbus to study and to solve, the indifference of so rude a people seems not unnatural. It is also remarkable that none of the leading men among the Northmen, even those who had acquired fame and profit as explorers of Vinland, such as Leif, Thorvald, and Thorfinn, should have ever thought of persevering in the efforts commenced in that direction. They seem to have acted upon individual impulse or interest, and upon the acquisition of fame and fortune for themselves, they rested upon their honors and enjoyed their fortunes, though comparatively young men, for the remainder of their lives. Gudrid, the wife of Thorfinn Karlsafne, was a warm and generous advocate of Vinland colonization. She, like Isabella of Spain, was the inspiration of the enterprise, and had Thorfinn conquered and colonized Vinland Gudrid would have been the good angel of the country. D'Avezac, Kohl, Rafn, and Gravier are of opinion that Vinland continued to be known and visited by the Greenlanders, Icelanders, and Norwegians generally. Humboldt seems to sympathize in this view, and to attach some historical value to an ancient Ferroeese poem in Latin, in which Vinland is mentioned as a populous land governed by kings.

There is nothing that so arouses the cupidity of man or fires his imagination as the discovery of unknown and distant lands. From early ages the civilized portions of the world have often been electrified by such events, and the literature of such ages teems with the most extravagant accounts of what neither historian nor poet had seen. The epic poems of every people and of every age have been imaginative, creative, as well as historical. Thus the Ophir of Solomon has frequently been found and dimly located down to the age of Columbus and his discoveries, and even to the discovery of the gold regions of our own California. El Dorado was not only revived in the Spanish chronicles and poems of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, but even then renowned captains and brave soldiers sought it amid the everglades of Florida and the wastes of Mississippi. Not only were these phantom regions enriched with endless treasures, but were governed by mighty kings and emperors, and embellished with every barbaric grandeur. Such extravagances of poet and chronicler have passed away, but the true historic basis of them all remains, and real modern and business-like republics have now succeeded to the Ophir and El Dorado of past centuries. And so it was with Vinland and the Icelandic and Norse poets and historians of the mother countries. And thus we find that the Sagas and Scalds of the Northmen are filled side by side with the most authentic historical records and the wanderings of poetic imaginations. The world has admired such things in Homer and in Ossian. May we not at least tolerate them in the Sagamen and Scalds of the Northmen? It is with such sentiments that we now proceed to mention the ancient Ferroe poem, in a part of which Vinland is mentioned, with scarcely more exaggeration than the contemporaries of Columbus used in heralding and describing the countries discovered by him.

The manuscript of this interesting poem is preserved in the Royal Library at Copenhagen, the Latin text is printed in Professor Rafn's *Antiquitates Americanæ*, and Mr. Joshua Toulmin Smith gives a free but substantially correct translation of it in his *Northmen in New England*, endeavoring to preserve the style, rhythm, and verse employed in the original. The story of the poem is as follows: A certain prince of Sweden had two sons, Holdan the Strong, and Finn the Fair. The former, though the least favored by nature, was to succeed to his father's throne by the right of primogeniture, and the latter, though endowed with rich gifts of mind and person, was without a kingdom or a fortune. He became a redoubtable adventurer, and went forth to seek in marriage the most beautiful princess of the western island. Fair Ingeborg, daughter of a reigning king, was the object of his choice, and she favored his suit. Her father, the king, rejected it with disdain, on

account of the inequality of their royal standings. Finn the Fair resented the king's insults, fatal deeds ensued, and Finn was thrown into prison. The beautiful princess sends a trusty messenger to Sweden to acquaint Holdan the Strong with the sad fate of his brother in prison. Holdan was incensed; he descends from his throne and hastens to the relief of his brother, whom he releases from the dungeon-walls, and slaughters the king himself. The two brothers then repair together to the princess to urge again the suit of Finn. The princess informs them that if Finn will sail to Vinland and overcome the three kings of that noted land she will favorably consider his suit and answer make on the return of the conqueror. The brothers repair to the distant Vinland, and Finn challenges the three kings and their twelve hundred warriors to mortal combat. The challenge is accepted, and Holdan witnesses the contest. Finn slays on the first day hosts of the Vinland warriors. On the second day the remainder of the twelve hundred warriors are killed. Finn then by turns overcomes and slaughters two of the kings, and is about to kill the third king when he is himself poisoned by a dragon flying over his head. Holdan now takes up the fight, and slays the third king. He then returns to Ingeborg, the beautiful island princess, relates to her the exploits and death of Finn before overcoming the third king of Vinland, and his own victory over the surviving king; he then offers himself to her in the place of Finn the Fair. Ingeborg informs him that she can never love another than Finn. He urges his suit. The princess reserves her answer till morning and sleeps one night upon her bosom, but, overpowered with grief, she expires before sunrise. Holdan ended his days in misery.

It would be interesting to modern scholars if we had space to spread this entire poem of one hundred and four verses upon our pages in the original Latin, but we will content ourselves at present with giving in English only the verses which relate to Vinland. The contest lasted two days or more, and has been likened to the achievements related in the "Famous Ballad of Chevy Chase," where

" In one day, fifty knights were slain,
With lords of great renown."

We will now give those verses which, commencing after the narrative of Finn's release from prison, relate to Vinland, in the

ANCIENT BALLAD OF FINN THE FAIR.

" Hail Ingeborg, thou royal maid !
' Both fair and beautiful art thou ;
Wilt thou this prince elect,' they said,
' And take him for thy husband now ?'

“ Then Ingeborg doth answer make,—

‘ This matter is most hard to do ;
But, if the VINLAND KINGS you’ll take,
An answer, sure, I’ll give to you.’

“ Then powerful Holdan thus replied,—

‘ T’will grief and sorrow bring to all :
For who shall reach the Vinland tide,
Then perils dire shall sure befall.’

“ Then Finn the Fair, with rapid stride,

The palace quits, and seeks the shore !
‘ To VINLAND straight my course I’ll guide,
Though Ingeborg I ne’er see more.’

“ His silken sails he raises then,

On yards of gold extended wide ;
His sails he never furls again,
Till VINLAND from the helm he spied.

“ Then Finn, within the garden nigh,

His costly robe he o’er him threw ;
And, so attired, with bearing high,
Straight to the palace halls he drew.

“ And, so attired, with bearing high

Straight to the palace halls he drew :
Five hundred men were standing nigh
The VINLAND KINGS before his view.

“ Then entered Finn the palace hall

And stood before them face to face ;
The KINGS sat on their thrones, and all,
Unmoved and silent, kept their place.

“ It was the morning of the day,

Scarce yet Aurora’s light appeared,
When there the VINLAND KINGS, they say,
Twelve hundred armed men prepared.

“ And there the VINLAND KINGS, they say,

Twelve hundred armed men prepared ;
‘ Gain’t these, brave Finn the Fair, that day
To try his strength, unaided, dared.

“ And in the midst Finn now is seen,

Active in fight before them all ;
Loud clang their arms that time, I ween ;
Now two, now three, before him fall.

“ And in the midst Finn still is seen,

In strength he far surpasses all :
Loud clang their arms again, I ween ;
Now five, now six, before him fall.

“ For two whole days the fight did last ;
 From clashing swords the lightnings played ;
 Nor on the earth his footsteps passed,—
 His slaughtered foes his path had made.

“ And in the midst Finn still is seen,
 Nor dares, for honor's sake, to flee ;
 And now, 'tis said, that there remain
 Of all that host but only three.

“ And in the midst Finn still is seen ;—
 Full well his deeds are known to fame ;—
 And VINLAND KING the first, I ween,
 By his good sword is hewn in twain.

“ And in the midst Finn still is borne,
 Nor dares, for honor's sake, to flee ;
 The second VINLAND KING that morn
 His sword hath hewn in pieces three.

“ Just then a dragon, o'er his head,
 His fatal venom pouring, flew ;
 And Finn himself at length lay dead,
 Whom poison, and not arms, subdued.

“ When Finn thus Holdan, furious, saw,
 By poison, and not arms, subdued,
 Then VINLAND KING the third, straightway
 With his good sword in twain he hewed.”

It would certainly be an interesting field of inquiry to investigate the question whether Columbus had any knowledge of the Norse discoveries in the western hemisphere, and to what extent. There are a number of circumstances strongly tending to show that Columbus knew something of these events. His long and thorough study of the subject in all its aspects must have guided his mind to this information. The absolute certainty he professed to have that he could discover land in the west could not have rested upon theory alone ; it must have been based upon information of facts also. He himself states that he based his certainty on the authority of learned writers. Among the learned writers he had access to was the book of Adam of Bremen, published in 1076, “On the Propagation of the Christian Religion in the North of Europe,” to which is added a treatise “On the Position of Denmark and Other Regions Beyond Denmark.” In this work Adam of Bremen gives an account of Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Iceland and Greenland, and adds : “ Besides these there is still another region, which has been studied by many, lying in that ocean (the Atlantic) which is called VINLAND, because vines grow there spontaneously, producing very good wine ; corn likewise springs up there without being sown.” And he adds to this account of Vinland

these words: "This we know not by fabulous conjecture, but from positive statements of the Danes." His recorded conversation with the Danish king, Svend Estredsor, a nephew of Canute the Great, is the direct source of his information. The visit of Columbus to Iceland in February, 1477, brought him in more immediate contact with the traditions and written accounts in relation to the Norse discoveries in the western continent. He is believed to have conversed with the bishop and other learned men of Iceland, and as his visit there was fifteen years before he discovered America, and only one hundred and thirty years after the last Norse expedition to the lands in the Western Ocean, he must have met Icelanders whose grandfathers lived in the time of that expedition and perhaps were members of it. It is unlikely that Columbus could have been so active in his researches for geographical and nautical information as all his biographers represent, and yet have been in the midst of so much information on those subjects without coming in contact with it. Columbus never divulged to the public the extent of his knowledge of facts pointing to lands in the Western Ocean. At Rome also Columbus must have heard of the Norse expeditions to Greenland and Vinland. Gudrid, wife of Thorfinn, made a pilgrimage to Rome and spent three years there before her death. Her accounts of the wonderful voyages she had made to the unknown western lands must have been recorded in some of the religious houses she visited. It is also argued that, as Pope Paschal II., in the year 1112, appointed Eric Upsi Bishop of Gardar in Greenland, and the bishop visited Vinland as part of his spiritual domain, Columbus, in search of such knowledge, must have found it where it was most accessible. There is also some ground for believing, though the fact is not established, that a map of Vinland was preserved in the Vatican, and that a copy of it was furnished to the Pinzons. Facts such as these must have formed a considerable part of the knowledge acquired by Columbus in his many years of study. When his crew mutinied on the ocean, he showed his confidence in the facts he had acquired, by promising them that if he did not discover land within three days he would abandon the voyage. The land was in sight in half the time he claimed. Would he have risked his all, a new world even, upon a promise which would have been an insane act but for the facts he possessed? Leo XIII. has now opened to historical students the treasures of the Vatican; may we not now hope to solve this interesting question? May we not hope to recover the history of the Church of Greenland and Vinland, and of the seventeen bishops and of the numerous missionaries who first carried the Cross to the West?

THE PRESENT ATTITUDE OF ENGLAND TOWARDS
THE HOLY SEE.

THE recent interchange of courtesies between the Pope and Queen Victoria has been variously interpreted by Englishmen. Yet there does not seem much room for speculation. "Diplomacy has no charm but mystery;" and here the charm of mystery is wanting. That the hereditary chief of English Catholics, the Duke of Norfolk, should be sent as the Queen's envoy to the Holy See at the time when Ireland's Catholic heart is thrown into the balance of Home Rule, is a move on the part of the Queen's government which explains its own simple intention. That his Holiness should graciously receive the envoy, and should thank Queen Victoria for her present is no more than a paternal act of courtesy such as has been shown to other sovereigns. It is not on the diplomacy of the matter that any speculation need be hazarded. The point which is interesting for Catholics is, *how* have the English Protestants judged a mission which, *prima facie*, suggested an approach to the Holy See; which, at least, bears the look of a willingness on the part of England to "renew diplomatic relations with Rome."

It would be a mistake, to begin with, to suppose that the English attitude is at all "religious," in the old sense of the word. The "No-Popery" cry is not now heard in England; but this is not because England is becoming Catholic. English Protestants have only recently begun to inherit the full fruits of what Carlyle called the Two Revolutions. The first revolution was the "Reformation," the second was the French Revolution. By the first revolution, divine authority was shaken; by the second, feudal authority was dethroned. Let us allude, just for a moment, to this second revolution as auxiliary to the development of the first. Feudal authority is now practically extinct in Europe, though the traditions of class-power still linger. The word "feudal," though it is antique, still conveys to us a right impression of the old imperium of the classes and the aristocracy. That imperium has been displaced by a new democracy. It has not been usurped but displaced. So complete was its displacement, say in 1846, that Pope Pius IX., when he first came to the throne, was spoken of—with a fantastic inaccuracy—as "the idol of European liberalism." This only meant that Pope Pius IX., in the ardent generosity of his nature, sought to unite the best instincts of modern

liberalism with affectionate loyalty to the Church. "The pontiff who was to accomplish the reconciliation of the Church and modern society," as M. Guizot expressed it; "the man who had placed the idea of emancipation and liberty on the highest pinnacle," as M. Victor Hugo preferred to put it, was that glorious pontiff who had his illusions dispelled by the revolution which murdered Count Rossi. Still, the transitory recognition by Pius IX. of a new state of the political and social order—which he earnestly hoped to sanctify by Catholic loyalty, but which he found to his cost to be most disloyal—showed how perfectly evident was the fact that society had changed, and was changing in 1846. The temporal power has now disappeared, and usurpation is crowned in the Quirinal. The new liberalism has been proved to be irreligious, in the sense that it does not care for religion. And it is in this sense that the present English Protestant attitude, in regard to the authority of the Holy See, must be explained as at once conciliatory and disloyal. It is conciliatory, because amity is agreeable, as well as, perhaps, prudent under all the circumstances. It is disloyal, because no care for the Catholic religion is at the bottom of the new departure in diplomacy. In one word, expediency is the motor of the diplomacy, and indifferentism is the motor of the amity.

In a recent number of this REVIEW we noticed a little book which had been written by Rev. John MacLaughlin, of which the title was, "*Indifferentism; Or, Is One Religion as Good as Another?*"¹ That little book set forth the truism that the real enemy of Catholic truth is, in these days, not antagonism but indifferentism; a spirit of "caring for none of these things," which is mistaken for the spirit of liberality. With much power, yet simplicity, the author worked out the argument that the disposition to propose the question—the frame of mind which could propose it—"Is one religion as good as another?" is proof positive that the questioner has not grasped the primary truism that "one faith and one baptism" must go together. Now, the present attitude of English Protestants towards the authority of the Holy See must, in the first instance, be explained by "indifferentism." It is not an indifferentism which is moral, or which is contemptuous, but which is a result of an acquired attitude of the intellect. Couple what was said before in regard to the change in the social order, with this new (religious) indifference to positive truth, and each, in some measure, explains the other; each acts upon the other correlatively. The modern social order is grounded on the principle that the *vox populi* is the *vox Dei* in all things. The modern religious order, if there be such a thing, is therefore in-

¹ Published by the Catholic Publication Society, New York.

cluded in the social order. In other words, it is assumed that a man's religion, and therefore the religion of "society," is democratic, in the sense of being individual; a man owing obedience to his own conscience alone, in the sense of his interpretation of the Divine will. Here we have the meeting of the revolutions. Liberalism in religion, which began with the "Reformation," and social liberalism, which began in '89, have joined hands, as they were bound to do, in declaring religion to be opinionative, and in divorcing all politics from all religion.

This is the broad statement of the new position, though it does not touch the question of *real* Christian freedom, be it religious, or social, or political. The men who are called, in England, advanced Liberals, are often the most devoted and loyal Catholics; while some of the most rigorous of the Tories are men without any religion at all. The only fact to be insisted on is, that with the majority of English Protestants liberalism means "indifferentism" as to Divine truth quite as much as it means self-rule in politics. The two revolutions have culminated in the production of a population which insists on these two postulates: "Every man ought to have equal voice in framing the laws of his country;" and, "No man ought to be interfered with as to his religion."

Such general remarks were almost necessary in the consideration of the present attitude of England towards the Holy See. The England of to-day and the England of thirty years ago are not the same England at all. Take three broad distinctions: Thirty years ago there was but little Radicalism and no disloyalty; to-day there are fifty newspapers that preach both. Thirty years ago there was a downright horror of the Papal power; to-day there is a mild eulogy of its beneficence. Thirty years ago there was a national insistence on positive truth; to-day there is a pervading skepticism or indifferentism. Add to these distinctions the new birth of the Rationalist school, which now affects to ally the natural sciences with religious search, and we have a new element in the "religious mind" which almost banishes the old contests, or makes it unreasonable to contest earnestly about anything. Once more: The complete decay of the old Evangelical school (to whom be all honor for its warm attachment to the sentiment, if not to many of the doctrines, of Christianity) has removed that traditional fortress of at least earnest Christian feeling which kept all the assaults of skepticism at bay. And, finally, the new begetting of that strange anomaly called Ritualism, the combination of the very extremest of opposites—the claim with the repudiation of divine authority—has made Englishmen rub their eyes with astonishment at the spectacle of a fictitious, little, English, Catholic Church, which, while being the heir of the

wildest Protestantism that ever was known, affects to be Catholic—*minus* obedience. These growths of the last thirty years have so altered the English attitudes in regard to what used to be "Gospel Truth," that we cannot wonder that the English attitude towards the authority of the Holy See has become correspondingly modified.

We must distinguish between the attached and the unattached members of what is still called the National Church of England. The attached members are those who practise the Anglican religion; the unattached are those who only advocate it. Among the unattached we find a warmer approval of the Norfolk Mission than we do among the good old-fashioned Anglicans. The unattached take the line which is expressed by the *Manchester Courier*: "To the great majority of people, to all who have succeeded in ridding themselves of an excess of sectarian spirit, these interchanges of civilities will appear fitting." But the attached Anglicans have "*not* succeeded in ridding themselves of an excess of sectarian spirit"; which is, after all, a mere euphemism for ceasing to be in earnest about what is true or is not in the Church of England. The London papers, as a rule,—*Times*, *Standard*, *Daily News*, *Daily Telegraph*,—advocate the happy renewal of friendly relations; but this is always on the ground that "so many of the Queen's subjects are Roman Catholics," and that "it is a good thing to help forward the pacific settlement of the Irish question by constitutional means." No allusion is made to the desirableness of drawing the Anglican Church one inch nearer to communion with the "Roman Catholic Church." The ordinary journalists must be classed among the indifferentists, so far as all religion is concerned. When, however, we read the columns of the "Church papers" we find a very different tone or spirit. Strangely, the Ritualists are the most bitter against the Holy See, while affecting to be the most careful of Catholic truth. Thus the *Church Review*, a strong advocate of Ritualism, prefers to warn its Anglican readers against trusting to Roman Pontiffs, some of whom were of such stupenduous ill-repute that "the mention of their names takes one's breath away." This same organ, however, is even more hard on its own sect than it is on the Popes or on the Catholic Church. And it cannot fail to be instructive—in strict reference to our inquiry as to the attitude of England towards the Holy See—to notice how the Ritualists view *their own* Church, their own so-called authorities, their own priesthood. If they have a contempt for what they *have*, yet remain happily and complacently in such barrenness, we cannot wonder that they do not look to the Holy See to give them what they neither admire nor desire. In the same issue in which the *Church Review* warned

its readers against placing any confidence in the Popes, it thus spoke of the life of its own sect from 1600 to 1845 :

"She [the Church of England] became hidebound in pompous 'respectability'; her ministrations became rare, slovenly, and perfunctory; her expositions of doctrine watery and undogmatic; her prevalent demeanor secular and self-seeking; her conduct frequently frivolous and irreligious, not seldom riotous and debauched. And what were some of the results? Churches full of emptiness, while closed against all comers during five-sixths of the solar year; scarcely less full of emptiness at the hebdomadal recitation of Matins and Evensong, with sleep-compelling prelections on the Lord's Day, as by law prescribed; churches be-pewed with wooden compartments, festooned with cobwebs, begrimed with dirt, besmeared with whitewash, bedraped with baize; churches wherein God's altar was the most rickety and meanly-vested table in the parish; wherein for the desecrated font was substituted a paltry hand-basin. . . . It is not surprising that a Church governed with so little wisdom, with such cynical disregard of the best interests of the souls committed to her maternal care; with such mean conceptions of the real dignity of the priestly office, and such exalted notions of the grandeur attaching to worldly pomp and pageantry; that a Church, in short, which was the obsequious vassal of the rich, and the strong, and the despiser and oppressor of the poor and feeble, should have confounded in men's minds and obliterated the distinction between spiritual ranks and offices and between earthly and spiritual things."

After this sweeping condemnation of its own sect—of its whole life and character for about two hundred years—we are informed, and in the same issue, by an Anglican D.D., that "the Church of England, since the Reformation, is simply the old Church of England with its face washed and dried with a very rough towel." Very rough, indeed, if the description we have quoted is to be accepted on Ritualistic authority. But we may reasonably enquire: If the Church of England has been a failure, and the Holy See has been a failure,—two postulates with which the Ritualists head their creed,—to what communion are poor Christians to attach themselves, with any sort of self-respect or Church-respect? The answer is supplied to us by the same journal, and perhaps this passage will give us a sufficient notion of the prevailing spirit of the Ritualists at the present day, of their "attitude" towards the authority of the Holy See :

"The two nations of which the Vatican and its Jesuit ring stand in greatest terror, are Russia and Italy, because in both the Heavenly King of nations, by His liberating and unifying spirit, has stirred up and keeps alive a pure nationality. Russia is, so to speak, the foremost secular representative—the *Advocatus Ecclesiæ* in the ancient ecclesiastical conception, of an antiquity, orthodoxy, and catholicity to which the Tridentine and Vaticanist pseudo-Catholicism cannot pretend."

Thus "the hereditary lie, Czarodoxy," as Gregory XVI. called it, is the real heir, the real ideal of Catholicity; and though there is no chance of English Ritualists ever enjoying that ideal, in the sense of Anglican communion with Czarodoxy, still, it must be a comfort that there *is* an "*advocatus ecclesiæ*" somewhere between Siberia and the Danube.

Such quotations, from a recent number of a Ritualist paper—and in the same month in which it criticised the new relations which have sprung up between England and the Holy See,—may suffice to prove two terrible truths: the one, that English Ritualists despise the Church of England; the other, that they almost hate the Holy See. If we may refer for a moment to the comic side of such an “attitude,”—and it will be a relief to get a smile out of the painful subject,—the “Clerical Advertisements” in Ritualist papers let in a flood of mocking light on the extraordinary frame of mind of “priests” and “deacons.” Our enquiry in this article is, what is the present attitude of Englishmen towards the authority with whom they have opened new relations? And we may indirectly hazard what that attitude may be inferred to be from their conception of *their own* clerical order. If the clergy are of different minds as to their own priesthood, they cannot very well be agreed as to the Catholic priesthood; still less can they be agreed as to the Divine authority of the Holy See, from which all authority flows as from a fountain. Now let us take half-a-dozen clerical advertisements at random from two or three of the Ritualist church organs, and see what such advertisements would intimate in regard to clerical “views” on the Holy See.

“Wanted, a curate in priest’s orders; married, moderate, and with means.” Well, the three characteristics might go together. “Wanted, curate for mission church, musical, mod., or mod. high.” “Mod.” standing for moderate, and “high” meaning ritualistic, “mod. high” would mean a diluted or watered ritualist, or a sort of elastic gentlemanly confessor of what you please. “Would accept a small living in nice neighborhood,” is the self-commendation of one curate; and “married, but without children,” is the bashful apology of another, who seems to hope that his *modus vivendi* may be condoned. “Curacy wanted by a mod. Cath.” As there is probably a good deal more of the “mod.” than of the “Cath.” in this gentleman of too transitional a theology, we should think that a prudent rector would wish the gentleman to strike a balance between the two somewhat contending states of mind. “In exchange, for a few months, pleasant country vicarage, good fishing, pony-chaise, light duty:” this must be tempting to any clergyman of quiet tastes. “Wanted, a title to priest’s orders, good voice, single, private means.” Rector’s daughters will draw the attention of their reverend parents to a curate who may prove to be an acquisition. “Town curacy wanted; views broad.” This advertisement, at least, strikes us as *bona fide*. “Breadth” is the supreme requisite of every honest Anglican mind, which, like the *Church Reviewers*, despises all churches except the orthodox—with which it has no more real communion than with the Wesleyans.

Hopeless as all these "attitudes" must seem to be, on the part of the ritualist rectors and curates, there is, undoubtedly, a minority of English Ritualists who are still asking for the old paths, and who are in earnest. But, if we inquire of the Low-Church party what is *their* attitude or animus, the answer is exactly the same as it ever was. Thus, we find in the *Record* and in the *Rock*—two papers which have been for half a century the guiding organs of the most rabid of the Low-Church party—exactly the same tone, the same spirit, which was theirs, say, in the year 1846. The *Record*, when speaking of the Pope's Jubilee, says: "We are very sure that, whatever may have happened in other quarters, there still remains a large section of the public to whom the reopening of diplomatic relations with Rome will be a source of undisguised pain and dismay; an act calling for the strongest protest against all responsible for it." The *Rock* says: "Emphatically we say, as Protestant Englishmen, that no greater curse could fall upon us than a recognition of the Pope's power." And again: "Our remarks in reference to the flirtations that have been carried on between the Vatican and the British government would be just as applicable had the Pope represented the truest system of religion ever known, instead of being the representative of the most bigoted, superstitiously corrupt form of Christianity." And once more, the *Church Times*, a sort of half-way, or *via media*, organ between Ritualism and pugnacious Low-Churchism, is of opinion—while speaking of the Pope's Jubilee—that "a Pope is still wanted who would drive out the hysterical cults and crazy superstitions which have sapped the moral strength as well as the Catholic orthodoxy of the Latin races."

A glance at the favorite organs of the Nonconformists (and the present writer has been at the pains to read every one of the Dissenting organs which have referred, during the past two months, to the Papal Jubilee) will show exactly the same bitter Protestant spirit. Methodists, Baptists, Independents, all display the "heretical pravity." If we turn to the Scotch journals, it is the same thing. "Our Church is well represented in Italy," says a foreign correspondent of "The Free Church of Scotland Monthly Magazine"; "but Popery, a new form of paganism, reigns there."

It would be unendurably tedious to quote more of the nonsense which deluges all these Protestant papers. The sort of sensation which a Catholic has, after spending one whole day in looking down the columns of Dissenting journalism, is an enfeeblement of the mind, such as he would experience after waking from a nightmare of fantastic illusions, in which imbecility and falsehood had been choking him. Yet it was necessary, when judging of the English "attitude," to gauge the length and breadth of English

journalism. Briefly, this attitude may be said to be suggestive of three evil impulses or leanings: to make the worst, always the worst, of the Catholic Church; to preserve and ever augment religious schisms; to glorify disobedience, under the pretext of always protesting against the corrupt teachings of authority—from which you differ.

A reference to the more recent of the publications—books, pamphlets, essays, sermons—which have been written or edited by Anglicans, brings out the same melancholy truths. An Anglican's idea of the Holy See, when he ventures to express it in print, is always, that it is the negation of that individual enlightenment—which should make every man his own private Holy See. It is rather from his praise of private judgment than from his abuse of the Catholic fountain of dogmatic truth, that we see the attitude of his English Protestant mind. Manifestly a man cannot insist, at one and the same time, on his own right *to judge* Catholic authority, and his own duty *to obey* Catholic authority. The attitude of a so-called Churchman may be expressed, perhaps, in this way: "Catholic authority is binding on the Christian conscience; Roman Catholics say that the Holy See is the final arbiter on faith and morals; and so it *would* be, if it always agreed with *me*; but unfortunately, I cannot educate it to such perfection. I see, of course, that authority to teach is the same thing with authority to know; and I see that authority to know must mean the guidance, infallibly, by the Holy Spirit. The Holy See has always set up this claim. But, as I can prove the Holy See to have been in error, not once only—but a dozen or a score of times—from the very fact that it has differed from *me*, there is an end of the papal claim, and I am reduced to the necessity of referring to my own infallible self. It is a very awkward predicament, I admit; the more so, because I have a hundred brother churchmen—bishops, rectors, and curates—who also differ from *me* in dogmatic truth. But so long as I retain the privilege of being an Anglo-Catholic,—that is, of uniting the theory of obedience with the practice of opinionative self-teaching,—I cannot surrender my liberty into the hands of the Holy See, which does not first consult *me* as to its decretals. I teach my parishioners (being a clergyman) the duty of obedience to the Church; that is, of obedience to my Church—my Church, as interpreted by *me*. Yet this duty of obedience is theoretical, hypothetical, conditional, or relative, in all respects. The obedience is neither implicit nor explicit; it is only a sort of workable abstraction. I cannot command obedience from my flock, because they have as much right to command obedience from me; seeing that I, like them, interpret all Catholic doctrine in the sense most agreeable to my judgment. Even in that very

painful difficulty—my judgment of the Roman Church by the primitive Church, and therefore my judgment of both together—I am obliged to enshrine my own personal infallibility within the limits of my own judgment of that infallibility; an effort which it is obvious every one of my congregation could make as well as myself—or, as Martin Luther. I regret that I was not born a Holy See. But as I was not, the only thing which is left to me is to protest against the arrogance of an authority which might be infallible if it would only listen to *me*, but which is necessarily fallible as it does not do so.”

Thus far we have sketched the tone of the Anglican mind, journalistic, clerical (though not lay) in judging the authority of the Holy See. Let us now glance at two other English phases: what may be called the Governmental and the Social. As to the first, we need only add this remark—for what was said at the beginning was almost enough—the English Government makes no mystery of the *why* of its diplomacy; desiring only to stand well with the Holy See, because the Holy See can direct the counsels of the Irish clergy. There is not one thought given to “conversion” in such diplomacy. If the Holy See were to adopt a course which should be unfavorable to Tory tactics, the “new relations” would be dropped, or would be turned into recriminations which would be unfilial on the part of the Government and of its press. This is all that need be said about the matter. The British Government has no more loyalty to the Holy See than has the Government of the Sultan or the Shah.

“Society” in England takes a different view. Society thinks of the Pope as an interesting figure, historic, mediæval, and even Christian. It usually speaks of him with the respect due to an antique, to a beautifully preserved specimen of a past type. It does not, in these days, grow angry with him. It rather likes his adherence to old ideas. We are so painfully modern or nineteenth-centuryish that it is delightful to retain one absolutely perfect symbol of what centuries of our ancestors used to esteem. Beyond such an archæological veneration, society does not trouble itself to wander. For, be it remembered that three-fourths of English society sits lightly to the reality of the Christian faith. The traditional sentiment of what Protestants account Christianity still hallows the natural sentiment of society; but this traditional sentiment is little more than a tender liking for a gospel of kindness or amiability. There is nothing supernatural in the sentiment, unless it be in the consciousness that what has reference to a future life must necessarily be in such sense supernatural. So that society is not prepared to consider the Holy See in its claim

to infallibly *teach* divine truth, but only in its claim to *represent* a high ideal of authority, order and morality.

This estimate may be called the "man of the world's" estimate. And society consists chiefly of men of the world. During the last forty years—especially the last ten years—society's talk has been chiefly flavored by speculation; not by speculation as to the more true or the less true, but as to the probability that nothing can be known about (religious) truth. The "attitude" of society towards religion is that of the student of occult mysteries, who, finding himself baffled on the threshold of his enquiries,—by the fact that he has to mount above the natural life,—prefers to "give it up" as transcendental, and not to be initiated into so much trouble. What Father MacLaughlin calls "indifferentism," comes to the aid of society as a rescue from such intolerable research. A few years ago, when society accepted Christianity as the normal traditional creed of all Englishmen, it was natural, it was agreeable, to discuss different "forms" of it, and to advocate either this view or that view. In those days the Holy See was an object of intense interest, although of intense aversion, to most Englishmen; because the postulate of society being "Christianity is divine," the right form of it was supremely important. Society has abandoned that postulate, and asks now, "Is *any* religion divine?" So that society's estimate of the Holy See has become an *outside* speculation,—for the men of the world who prefer to meander with modern thought;—not a judgment arrived at from the most interested of all motives, but a grouping of hypotheses for excuse's sake.

"Indifferentism" is the kernel of the whole matter. Forty years ago, in English society, we could scarcely sit in any drawing-room without hearing somebody arguing about religion; the High Church and the Low Church contending for their superiority, or the different disciples of popular clergymen breaking lances. We were in danger of being "button-holed" by every stranger we met on some controversy about doctrine or ritual, while there was sure to be some fanatic in every roomful who would inform us that "the Pope was the man of sin." In these days, when religion is referred to, it is ordinarily on some of the side issues of the natural sciences, or with allusions to Herbert Spencer's arid egotisms, or Professor Huxley's *ex cathedra* negations. It would be a question which it would be difficult to answer: which of the two frames of mind is the better, the earnestness of purely heretical contentions, or the indifferentism of the dry-bones called Modern Thought? Whatever the answer, the truth remains indubitable: that for the *odium theologicum* which used to revile the Holy See, we have now a benign and complaisant sufferance of its "mixed good"; for the

old fear of the Pope, we have respect for him ; for the caricatures of his powers, we have speculation as to their benefit ; for the execration of his tyranny, we have the admission of his moral influence ; for the ridicule of his anachronism, we have the eulogy of his enlightenment. So far, English society has made advances. And we are speaking now only of English society, not of any of the schools or the scientists. The huge mass of more or less educated persons, gentlemen and ladies, who are "in society,"—no matter whether it be in high society, or in respectable society,—is now imbued with a reasonable (natural) estimate of the authority and the beneficence of the Holy See. Religion, as has been said, is not in the question, save in the way of traditional Christian sentiment ; yet there is a gain in the dying out of antagonism, though in the void which is created there may be a loss.

To come down to the humbler classes, the working classes : What do they think, say about Leo XIII. ? So far as they think at all, their ideas are as lucid as are those of their superiors in education. Their conception of a Pope is that he is an amiable old gentleman, residing in the once-capital of the pagan world, and inheriting and teaching not a few of the superstitions which were common to the "Divine Emperors" of old. As "the Free Church of Scotland's Monthly Magazine" expressed it, in words which we quoted a few pages back, "Popery is the new form of paganism which reigns in Rome." If the educated Scotch Episcopalians can edit and can credit an absurdity of which children ought to be ashamed, we need not be surprised if the clouded fancies of the English masses entertain not dissimilar impressions. Yet there is this difference between the masses and the classes : that the former have no motives in being deluded, no motives of social ease or personal gain. *They* have no benefices to be given up, no circle of rich friends to be alienated, no conventional "cold-shoulder" to be braved, no fortune or position to be lost. So *they* simply cling to their traditions with the easiness of not caring to be disturbed, or with a perhaps unconscious willingness to be enlightened should the opportunity be offered by some friend. It is true that the working classes do not *talk* much of such matters, as the higher classes are in the habit of talking ; indeed talking, save on personal or on business matters, is not a habit of the working man. "Conversation," as society understands it, is necessarily not common among the masses ; chit-chat, or personalities, or business-exchanges being the normal occupation of the tongue. But though they do not converse, they can understand ; nor has the Catholic half the trouble in teaching *them* which he has in battering the fortresses of respectability. There is no throwing up lines of defence, in preparation for Catholic aggression on the part of the

simple, working poor. There is no intellectual pride, or very little of it. For such reasons the "conversion of England," if it may be looked for, must begin rather with the humbler than with the richer classes. Speak to a working Englishman; explain to him the simple principle of pastoral unity, and he grasps it without difficulty, perhaps with pleasure; nor does he wish, *ab initio*, to resist you. His will is commonly childlike or sincere. *He* has no *odium theologicum*. It may be true that the "attitude" of the English masses is not filial, nor even intelligent, towards the Holy See; but this is solely because they know nothing about it; nothing save what such luminous authorities as "the Free Church of Scotland Monthly Magazine" writers, or the editors of the English *Record* or *Rock* may be generously pleased to vouchsafe to them.

There is a "thinking" class in England which is not to be confused with "society," nor with the clergy, nor with the Agnostics, nor with the men of the world. It is a large class, composed of men of all professions, and of every known intelligent avocation. "Men who think," is their generic; "Men who differ," their specific. This large class combine "attitudes" which, to a Catholic, may seem incongruous, but which to hosts of unbelievers seem harmonious. They are sincerely Christian, rationalistic, and quasi-pagan. They would defend (their) Christianity against all comers; yet their mood is to argue everything in the abstract, as though a heresy were a hypothesis, not a falsehood. These men, most amiable, most cultured, take this sort of view of the Holy See: "It has an obvious advantage in point of unity; the only mistake is, that it proceeds on the assumption that to obey is to believe—in a religious sense. A man's belief should be the offspring of enquiry, not the handing over the intellect to governance, but the yielding of the will to conviction. After all, what is faith, intellectually? Faith is the yielding of the will to the balance of probabilities; but that balance must be struck by the conscience—by our own conscience, not by another's. You Catholics say that the Holy See has been appointed the divine arbiter in faith and morals. If so, what you believe in is the Holy See; you do not believe, first, in truths themselves. This seems to me a shifting of responsibility. If faith be a duty, the exercise of that duty must be, not obedience, but sincerity. The intellect is responsible in faith, as the will is responsible in morals; but if you take away the exercise of the intellect, by substituting obedience for examination, you not only take away intellectual faith, but you make the exercise of the intellect to be sinful. In a plain, divine command, such as, 'Thou shalt do no murder,' I apprehend the simple duty of obedience. But when you advise me to accept all faith

on another's dictum, I reply, this is not faith, it is obedience. Your rejoinder, that 'truths which are divine can only be defined by divine authority,' appears to me to miss this important postulate, that we are not intended, as Christians, to *know* all truth, but to *search* for as much truth as we can discover. Search is gone when obedience comes in. Do you tell me, then, that search is not a duty; that the Holy See supersedes the duty of search; that in the one word, obedience—let me call it resignation—you sum up the whole duty of the intellect, dismissing all further responsibility? I see, of course, your meaning, as a Catholic: that faith, which is the fruit of a pure obedience, and which is graced with the reward of a holy life, is better than discussion or dissertation, which keeps the mind in irresolute attitude of believing; yet I cannot apprehend how a Christian is to merit grace by abandoning intellectual solicitude, by relegating responsibility to authority, by simply saying '*you say so, sufficit.*' Your theory of the Holy See is exceedingly beautiful; I will add, it is even essential to unity,—that is, to corporate, visible unity,—yet, it seems to me to be the purchase of a beautiful unity (consistent, I admit, with the Divine Unity in its aspect of one God, one Truth) at the cost of that obligation which appears to me to be paramount—the working out of our Christian belief by our measure of gifts."

If this be a fair statement of the attitude of the "thinking-class," it follows that they have not grasped the elementary truism that faith, in the Catholic, is a divine gift; that the Catholic intellect is taught by the Holy Spirit to apprehend the perfect reasonableness of the Catholic faith, in its integrity, its harmony, its divine beauty, as well as in its details, its "articles." Our "thinking" friends may reply, "You beg the question." Our answer is one of fact, not of theory. Every Catholic, who keeps close to the sacraments, is rewarded with the intellectual apprehension of the fitness, and therefore divineness, of Catholic truths. So that our "thinking" friends are in error in speaking of the "abandonment of the reason"; they should have said, the "consecration of the reason." A Catholic uses his intellect in his faith a thousandfold more than does any Protestant, because he is in perpetual meditation on the divine, intellectual harmonies which sweep, like strains of music, through the Catholic Church, enriching while stilling all thoughts. Thus much had to be said, in reply to one class of Protestants whose intellectual amiability may be conceded.

But now of the antagonistic school of thought. There are many very clever and charming Englishmen, who are amiable towards all things—save the Holy See. In a recent Encyclical to the bishops of Bavaria, Leo XIII. used these words: "It is necessary

that Christian wisdom should shine before the eyes of all, so that the darkness of ignorance, which is the greatest enemy to religion, having been dispelled, the truth may shine forth far and wide and happily reign. Nay, more; it behooves that those manifold errors be refuted and dispelled which, taking their rise either in ignorance or wickedness, or prejudiced opinions, perversely call away the minds of men from Catholic truth, and *engender a certain hatred of it in their dispositions.*" That word *hatred* applies to other persons besides "the ignorant, the wicked, or the prejudiced." It applies to many who have a strange monomania for hating without moral or mental cause. Undeniable is the fact, that many Englishmen grow wrath at the bare mention of the Pope or the Holy See; as though some chord had been touched which vibrated in cruel agony at the remembrance of an unforgivable wrong. Men who are always reasonable on other subjects, grow irrational when they touch upon this one; fling all decorum to the winds; and rave against "that master-curse of mankind," as though *they* had been ruined or poisoned by it. It would be out of place to attempt to diagnose this complaint in an article which treats only of popular aspects. It suffices to say that such hatred of what is good—and this without having suffered any wrong—looks very much like a suspicion that what is hated ought to be loved, were it not for the inconvenience of such conviction.

This exceptional school of haters may seem old-fashioned. Still there are many specimens which survive. They may, for the most part, be called "historic haters," because they always carry you to history. Nor can half-educated persons, or persons of strong prejudice, be much censured for most firmly believing what they have been always told, and have always *read*, to be true. The historic school of haters has, however, become smaller since the introduction of "The Catholic Revival." Such a vast number of books have been lately published which have disillusioned the English mind about "Popery"; which have taught them not only the truth about Catholic history, but the highly equivocal origin of all Protestantism; that it is pretty generally understood, as to the charge of "papal tyranny" (to quote the words of a Baptist periodical), that "Protestants live too much in glass houses to throw stones at the persecuting Roman Church; it has been six of one and half a dozen of the other; only, Protestants have had less excuse for their tyranny, because they have made a boast of their freedom." This, at least, shows a spirit of fairness. Such a writer as Dr. F. G. Lee, a ritualist clergyman, has wonderfully opened the eyes of all Anglicans to the true story of the Protestant Reformation, and the true story of the Marian persecutions; while the slanders of Dr. Littledale have been as severely taken to pieces by Anglican

as by Catholic writers. The University Presses, the best London publishers, the most popular of the magazines and reviews, have published, and constantly publish, the true version of the historic episodes which have furnished Protestants for two centuries with "grounds of hate." So that the historic haters are almost left of their reason-why. And so, too, of the doctrinal haters—the haters of Roman doctrines—their reason-why has been taken away from them by *themselves*—by their own appropriation of Catholic doctrines. On one point alone are many Anglicans still haters—on the sovereign authority of the Holy See.

Now this surviving hatred—let us call it repugnance,—in even the most advanced of English ritualists, lets out the secret that it is not *doctrine* which alarms the ritualist, but the assertion of a priestly prerogative. To speak plainly, the hostility to the Holy See—that is, the hostility to obeying it—does not proceed from considerations as to doctrine, but from repugnance to submission to authority. A ritualist pleases himself as to doctrine, quite as much as does a low-churchman or a dissenter; the only difference being that a ritualist takes a wider sphere for the exercise of his private judicial mind; including the early Church, as well as the living Church, the Councils, as well as the two Testaments. The ritualist, therefore, "hates" the Holy See (we do not, of course, use the word in a moral sense), because the Holy See would take from him the right of judging everybody; the right of sitting in his private pontifical chair,—or, if this be too strong, of sitting as at least assessor in the final court of appeal as to all truth; the right of determining his own obedience or disobedience to any or all bishops throughout Christendom. The attitude, therefore, of the ritualist towards the Holy See—unlike any of the other attitudes we have sketched—is the attitude of a man who insists on the authority, "the Catholic authority," of his own doctrines; but who will not refer his doctrines to living authority. "My doctrines are infallible," is his argument, "because I pick them up from my own readings of such authorities as I am minded to approve and to accept; the Holy See would take away from me that election; therefore, I reject the Holy See." It was necessary, in concluding, to allude once more to this last development of the many attitudes of the English mind towards the Holy See, because it is the last development, the last possible development, of Protestant would-be-Catholic theology. To have reached the point where, in judging the Holy See, it was necessary (1) to admit the existence of Catholic authority; (2) to admit the duty of Catholic obedience; (3) to affect an authority without obedience; (4) to affect an obedience without authority; and this, before proceeding to build up a house of sand, to be known as the Anglo-Catholic Church, was to have

reached a point where the confusion of the human soul had tumbled into "chaos come again." Nothing so unintellectual had been invented. The baldest Protestantism was a triumph of reason compared to it. Euclid would have given it up, not with a "which is absurd," but as a proposition of which each step denied the other. Yet, such is the attitude of the English ritualist: assuming authority in order to be able to pass judgment, and passing judgment in order to be able to assume authority.

To sum up, very briefly, what has been said: We began with the remark that the social, popular changes in the direction of Democracy *versus* Feudalism, had prepared the English mind to take a democratic estimate of all principles, religious and civil. Hence came "indifferentism," not necessarily from moral sloth, but from an acquired mental approval of the theory that "the Unknowable should be approached with a philosophic reserve." Liberalism, to be wholesale, was made to include the sitting lightly, not only to others' opinions, but to one's own. (2) This led to a certain easiness of loyalty, equally in grooves, religious and political; so that, when the old school of Evangelicalism paled its forces before enquiry, and the new ritualism made authority to appear ridiculous, Englishmen took up with the attitude of a general forbearance from all anathema, and a general polite respect for sincere convictions—"Popery" included. (3) The next point was to show that the new ritualist party—the most learned and the most active of Protestant sects—was quite as bitter against the Holy See as that old-fashioned "low" party, which made Popery-hating the staple of its theology; while, at the same time, the ritualist party had a profound contempt for its own sect, historically, doctrinally, and disciplinarily. (4) The various dissenting bodies were shown to be in accord with the ritualists in their repugnance to the authority of the Holy See. (5) All recent Anglican literature has made for the primary postulate that private judgment takes precedence of *all* authority; because the attitude of every Churchman is, "*I* judge all churches, that is, interpret their orthodoxy for myself; judging the Roman church by the primitive church, and interpreting the primitive church by my own intelligence; and subjecting the Holy See to the terrible scrutiny of my judicial mind as to its authority, its decrees, its mistakes." (6) Society, as distinct from the "clerical mind," was next shown to be respectful to the Holy See, from the archaic or antiquarian point of view; declining to let the Holy See *teach* the truth, but permitting it to *represent* Christian authority. A polite indifferentism has taken the place of the old *odium*; the Holy See has become interesting, not repugnant; earnestness in regard to controversy is now old-fashioned, and the new void is filled with

speculation. (7) The humbler classes, having no motive for antagonism, are better disposed to receive instruction in Catholic truth; wanting only the opportunities which fall to the lot of society to receive what society rejects. (8) The "thinking" class was next referred to, as living always in the clouds; admiring the picturesqueness of the Holy See, but, intellectually, objecting to its authority; and this, too, on the ground that to believe is *not* to obey, but to work out our faith in all sincerity. It was answered that this fallacy—most popular with the highly educated—proceeded from not knowing the actual fact that the intellect of the Catholic, kept fortified by the Sacraments, is more active in the apprehension of divine truths than is the non-Catholic intellect in questioning them. (9) The antagonistic school of thought, the "Pope-haters," was mentioned as exceptional yet eager; while (10) the historic school, or men who always appealed to history, was shown to be weakened by recent literature. Some of the ablest scouters of prejudice being Anglicans,—in the domain of proving "history" to have told lies,—all Protestants may now know, both that the Holy See has *not* been criminal, and that most of the "Reforming" heroes *were* so. (11) Yet the Holy See, though now exonerated from criminal acts, does not receive Protestant filial homage, because in the one offence of being preserved from teaching error, it necessarily obliges all men to believe in it. This last demand, being repugnant to modern thought, is (antecedently) impossible to be admitted. Right or wrong, it is absolutely fatal to speculation; and speculation is the pride of free Englishmen. (12) Finally, the ritualists were again referred to, as the last possible development of Protestant thinking; men who advocate Catholic authority, yet deny it; who insist on obedience, yet refuse it; who even pray for Catholic union, yet will not hasten it; who believe in three churches, each anathematizing the other, yet fantastically called branches of one church; and who turn away from the Holy See because it is the *only* Christian authority which either claims to teach One Truth or to revere it. Thus the ritualists are shown to be the worst enemies of the Holy See, because they prove its divine authority by their disobedience, while recommending obedience as a Catholic duty. Their "Branch Theory," two branches without a root, or a root with three branches of different trees, recalls the words of St. Optatus (which are quoted by Father MacLaughlin as a motto to his admirable book on "Indifferentism"): "*Vivendum est quis in radice cum toto orbe manserit, quis foras exierit . . . In radice manemus, et in toto orbe terrarum cum omnibus sumus.*"

THE CHURCH AND HISTORICAL SCIENCE.

A GREAT change has come over non-Catholic literature of late years. Its tone towards the Church and things Catholic has lost much of its bigotry and bitterness. The race of the Knoxes and Foxes is extinct, with the exception of a few interesting survivals. Even the oracles of Exeter Hall and of the Knights of the Dark Lantern, have moderated their abuse. It is hard to recognize the Scarlet Woman of Babylon and the bloodthirsty sons of Belial denounced by the Pope-devouring saints of Puritan England in the Romanism and Romanists of their descendants or successors. The clarion and drum ecclesiastic of those warlike "reformers" have been cast aside; their wild war-whoop and maddened shriek have given way to gentler strains; with many writers it has become fashionable to avow even a certain admiration of Rome and her Popes. And yet, through these novel and comparatively agreeable strains, we recognize not unfrequently the old *leit-motif*; we are rudely reminded that the sun of truth will have to shine full many a day before it can scatter the last clouds of inveterate prejudice. Very refreshing to the Catholic reader during the past eight or nine years has been the outspoken and hearty recognition of the great qualities of the present Holy Father, of his prudence, his wisdom, his learning, his practical insight, nay, of his single-mindedness, his spotless character, his deep interest in all the arts and sciences, his true and sincere solicitude for the welfare of religion and society. We remember, especially, with what warm commendation the non-Catholic press welcomed the Brief of Leo XIII., opening the Vatican Archives to scholars for the purpose of historical researches. With approval, and almost with enthusiasm many of them dwelt in terms of warm praise upon his words: "The first law of history is to dread uttering falsehood; the next, not to fear stating the truth; the last, that the historian's writing should be open to no suspicion of partiality or of animosity." And yet the old *leit-motif* was not wanting in these comments. Leo's noble aims and merits were ungrudgingly acknowledged, but Leo, it was said, is an exception among Popes; his action is at variance with the traditions of the Church; the step he took is noble and fearless. But the very word *fearless* suggests that the Church has something to fear from historical truth boldly made known, though the Pope himself asserts—that "history, the guide of life and the light of truth, is one of those arms most fit to defend the Church." No doubt most of the comments we refer to were made in good faith;

and many a reader, for that matter many a Catholic reader, unconsciously accepted the truth of these assertions and inuendoes, especially as they came from sources apparently so unbiased. The more wary, perhaps, had their doubts, and asked: Is Pope Leo really the first Pope that furthers the study of history? Has the Church really done nothing to cherish and promote this noble science? It may not be useless to study these questions, to review the field of historical labor, and to inquire what the Church and her sons have done for historical science. To exclude all suspicion of partiality, our witnesses for the most part will be non-Catholic.

Sharp, incisive criticism and unwearied research are characteristic of the modern school of history. The historical student of to-day shrinks from no toil to reach the "sources," the original authorities for the period he treats of. He next investigates every statement with almost microscopic minuteness, compares it with other statements, determines the character and reliability of the testimony, weighs the pros and cons, and finally draws his conclusions. If we are to believe popular writers, these are modern methods; before Niebuhr, we are given to understand, historical criticism was unknown, before Pertz and Von Ranke men did not travel from country to country to ransack archives and libraries, before Pertz's *Monumenta*, no one printed or published the records of the past. Now what are the facts?

By historical criticism is meant the probing of historical testimony; its acceptance, if found to be true, no matter how contrary to the historian's sympathies; its rejection, if false, no matter how strongly it favored his views and theories. To probe historical testimony is to inquire whether documents are genuine or spurious, whether the witnesses are partial or unprejudiced, whether the facts harmonize with or contradict other ascertained facts. In modern historical work, which is based so largely on the study of documents, public and private, state and ecclesiastical, much depends on the character of these documents, or diplomas, as they were called. When they were subjected to close examination it was very soon found that they were not by any means all genuine. In the past, interested parties had no more scruples to resort to forgery than is the case at present, and detection was far less likely then than now. "In order to establish principles for distinguishing the genuine from the forged, treatises were written on the whole subject of diplomas. With a view to establish the credit of those preserved in the original, the Benedictine Dom Mabillon, in the year 1681, produced his masterly work *De Re Diplomatica*—Papebroch the Jesuit having already, in the year 1675, written his *Prophyllum antiquarium circa veri ac falsi discrimen in vetustis membranis*, in the *Acta*

Sanctorum, April, vol. II. In the following century appeared the *Nouveau Traité de Diplomatie* by Dom Toustain (who, however, died before the completion of the work) and Dom Tassin, Benedictines of St. Maur, 6 vols., 4to, 1750-65, treating of the whole subject of diplomas and accordingly entering at length into a minute investigation of the peculiarities and characteristics of writing proper to different ages and countries."¹ "The bibliography of Latin palæography in its different branches is very extensive, but there are comparatively few books which deal with it as a whole. The most complete work is due to the Benedictines, who in 1750-65 produced the *Nouveau Traité de Diplomatie*, which examines the remains of Latin writing in the most exhaustive manner. The fault of the work lies in its diffuseness and in the superabundance of subdivisions, which tend to confuse the reader. The extensive use, however, which the authors made of the French libraries, renders their work most valuable for reference. As their title shows, they did not confine themselves to the study of manuscript volumes, but dealt with that other branch of palæography, the study of documents, in which they had been preceded by Mabillon in his *De Re Diplomatica*."² In these monumental works the Benedictine Monks, therefore, not only laid the foundation of the critical study of Latin historical documents, but almost brought it to perfection. They classified the writing of different periods and countries, thus establishing external tests of the genuineness of manuscripts, and founding the science of Latin palæography. By minute study and careful analysis they also established and set down many internal criteria, such as the wording of titles, the value of geographical terms at different times, and contemporary chronology, which are in some ways even more certain and more serviceable than the external tests. These are dealt with in the science of diplomatics. But the Benedictines were not satisfied with these achievements. What Mabillon and Tassin did for Latin documents and palæography, that the great Montfaucon did for Greek. "The first book," says E. M. Thompson, "which dealt with the subject in an exhaustive manner, was the *Palæographia Græca* of the learned Benedictine Dom Bernard de Montfaucon, published in 1708. So thoroughly well was the work done, that down to our time no other scholar attempted to improve upon it, and Montfaucon remained the undisputed authority in this branch of learning."³ "The *Palæographia Græca*," says V. Gardthausen, the first

¹ Encyclopædia Britannica, art. "Diplomatics."

² E. Maunde Thompson in the Encyclopædia Britannica, art. "Palæography," vol. 18, p. 165.

³ E. M. Thompson in the Encyclopædia Britannica, art. "Palæography," vol. 18, p. 165.

scholar who has attempted to improve upon Montfaucon, "is and will remain one of the most remarkable achievements by which a new science was not only founded, but, as it seemed, also perfected. It is the more remarkable, as Montfaucon had no one to precede him, but created everything from nothing. Even though a few of his statements and illustrations do not satisfy the demands we make to-day of similar works as regards precision, Montfaucon certainly followed the correct method in his work."¹

One of the most useful and reliable ways of checking historical documents, is to compare their statements with ascertained facts, contemporary, prior, and subsequent. If a document claiming a certain date, speaks of events later than that date, clearly the document is misdated, and there is good reason to doubt its genuineness. It may likewise awaken suspicion, if it represents the past as contemporary, or sometimes if it is silent concerning closely related contemporary facts of importance. These considerations indicate sufficiently how important for purposes of historical criticism is a sound, detailed, and systematic chronology. The father of chronology was Joseph Scaliger, a Protestant, who in 1583 published his work *De Emendatione Temporum*. He soon found not only a critic but a fellow worker in the learned Jesuit Petavius, whose book on chronology appeared in 1627 and remained an authority for a long time. But in 1750 was published "the first edition in one volume, 4to., of *L'Art de Vérifier les Dates*, which in its third edition (1818-31) appeared in 38 volumes, 8vo., a colossal monument of the learning and labors of various members of the Benedictine Congregation of St. Maur."² Even to-day historians can ill dispense with this aid to historical criticism.

Thus did Jesuits and Benedictines vie with each other in providing tools for the critical historians. But long before Papebroch and Mabillon, long before Tassin, Petau, and Dom Clement, the principal compiler of *L'Art de Vérifier les Dates*, Catholic scholars had given proof that they possessed both the keenness, the learning, and the impartial love of truth which distinguish the true critic. Perhaps no better proof of this can be given than the story of two of the most famous documents of the Middle Ages, the *Donatio Constantini* and the Pseudo-Isidorian Decretals. On the first many mediæval writers based the temporal power of the Popes, whilst the second was used to fortify many other Papal rights. But scarcely had the Renaissance set in, scarcely had the study of history been reawakened, when Catholic historians, churchmen too, nay bishops and cardinals, began to doubt the genuineness of these two important documents, and finally condemned them as spurious.

¹ V. Gardthausen, *Griechische Palæographie*, p. 5-6.

² W. L. R. Cates in the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, art. Chronology, vol. v., p. 719.

It is well known that Laurentius Valla condemned the *Donatio Constantini* in unmeasured terms; but Valla was a humanist, and a humanist not of the Christian type. "Doubts of the genuineness of this document," says Prof. L. Pastor, "had been expressed years before Valla by the learned Nicolaus de Cusa in his *Catholic Concordance*. Independently of Valla and Cusa, Reginald Pecock, Bishop of Chichester, showed, after careful examination of the historical testimony, the impossibility of upholding this document so long looked upon as genuine. In 1443 Enea Silvio Piccolomini, afterwards Pope Pius II., urged Frederick III. to bring the question of the Donation of Constantine before a council."¹ As to the Pseudo-Isidorian Decretals, the Popes have often been accused of having had them compiled and partly forged to back up some of their pretensions. It is now established that this collection was made in the Frankish Empire between the years 852-7. The then reigning Pope, Nicolas I., did not so much as know of its existence until 864. Subsequently for several centuries this forgery was looked upon as genuine; but even during the "dark" ages, long before Luther, Petrus Comestor, in the twelfth century, doubted its authenticity. In 1324 Marsilius of Padua pronounced it a forgery, and in the fifteenth century its genuineness was not admitted by Gobelinus Persona, Heinrich Kalteisen, Cardinal Nicolas of Cusa, and John of Turrecremata.² These are crucial facts. Two documents, supposed to support strongly certain Papal claims, one a forgery which imposed upon the Jesuit Turrianus even in 1573, were rejected by the critics of the Middle Ages, most of them priests and bishops, before the schism of Luther, and, therefore, solely in the interest of truth.

We pass to post-Reformation times. One of the greatest historical works ever undertaken was the *Acta Sanctorum* of the Flemish Jesuits, the so-called Bollandists. Of their merits in other respects we shall speak hereafter. "Such certainty in historical criticism did they acquire in the progress of their work," says Wattenbach, "and so fearlessly did they proceed, that they were soon attacked on many sides, and the Spanish Inquisition even prohibited the work. An attempt was made to induce the Pope to prohibit it, but it proved futile."³ "Their majestic tomes," says Prof. G. T. Stokes,⁴ "stand as everlasting protests on behalf of real and learned inquiry, of accurate, painstaking, and often most *critical* research into the sources whence history, if worth anything, must be drawn. Of their honesty, which is the essential

¹ Prof. L. Pastor, *Geschichte der Päpste*, i., p. 16 and note.

² Hergenroether, *Kirchengeschichte*, ii., p. 16, notes.

³ W. Wattenbach, *Deutschland's Geschichtsquellen im M. A.*, 2d. ed., p. 7.

⁴ Stokes—*The Bollandists*, *Contemporary Review*, 1883, p. 69, ff.

condition of all true criticism, canon Stokes uses the following language: "This much any fair mind will allow: the Society of Jesus, since the days of Pascal and the Provincial Letters, has been regarded as a synonym of dishonesty and fraud. From any such charge the student of the *Acta Sanctorum* must regard the Bollandists as free. In them we often behold a credulity which would not have found place among men who knew by experience more of the world of life and action, but, on the other hand, we find in them thorough loyalty to historical truth; they deal in no suppression of evidence: they give every side of the question. They write like men who feel, as Bollandus their founder did, that under no circumstances is it right to lie. They never hesitate to avow their own convictions and predilections; they draw their own conclusions and put their own gloss upon fact and document; but yet they give the documents as they found them."¹ On the same plane as the great Jesuit work Wattenbach places the *Acta Sanctorum Ordinis S. Benedicti*, in 9 vols., folio, by the French Benedictines of the Congregation of St. Maur, Dom d'Achéry, Mabillon, Germain, and Ruinart, as well as Dom Bouquet's voluminous *Recueil des Historiens des Gaules et de la France*. Wattenbach, moreover, speaks in the highest terms of the works of Ughelli on the ecclesiastical history of Italy (*Italia Sacra*), and of the 21 vols., folio, of Muratori's *Scriptores Rerum Italicarum*. If we come down to later times, every student of English history respects the discriminating judgment and keen critical insight of Dr. Lingard, which have been praised, perhaps, even more warmly by non-Catholics than by Catholics.

That Catholic historians should thus be eulogized by the learned for their critical honesty and critically correct judgment and sound critical principles, will surprise no one well acquainted with the principles taught young men in Catholic institutions of learning. The canons of historical criticism laid down in almost every elementary work on philosophy used in Catholic colleges and seminaries are essentially the same as those followed by the most approved historians. In treating of the value of human testimony, and therefore of historical documents, Catholic philosophers unanimously teach that to carry conviction, the witnesses to any fact should be ocular,—therefore, in the case of past events, contemporary—disinterested, truthful, intelligent, self-consistent in their testimony, and, if possible, many. Apply these rules to historic documents, deduce their logical consequences, and we have the very canons of modern historical criticism. On one point only do they differ from the canons of some modern historians. When

¹ Stokes, l. c., p. 8.

the fact in question is miraculous, rationalist historians reject it as impossible; the Catholic writer examines his witnesses, as if he were dealing with an ordinary event. If the fact falls under the senses, if it has been witnessed by many, intelligent, truthful, disinterested witnesses, competent to distinguish reality from illusion, he sees no reason why he should reject such testimony. He has no *a priori* prejudices for or against it. Of course, orthodox Protestant historians who believe in Biblical miracles, must take the same view.

The multiplication and publication of ancient documents is not an invention of the eighteenth or nineteenth century; it began even before the "Reformation." "Several of our best historical authorities," says Wattenbach, "just as many of the classics, are preserved in copies made in the fifteenth century, and these manuscript copies were soon followed by printed reproductions. As early as this period, before the year 1474, and probably at Augsburg, was printed the *Historia Frederici I.*, which is only a part of the *Ursperg Chronicle*."

"Above all, the Emperor Maximilian I. not only encouraged in every way the investigation of German history, but took an active part in the work himself. Everywhere documents and chronicles were searched for at his bidding, and every discovery found its reward." "Commissioned by him, Ladislaus Suntheim, of Ravensburg, travelled in southwestern Germany, from 1498 to 1505, to gather the materials for a genealogical history of the House of Hapsburg and other German princely families." "In 1501 Conrad Celtis performed a real service for the mediæval history of Germany, by publishing the works of the nun Roswitha, found by him in the convent of St. Emmerand; at the same time he discovered the famous Tabula Peutingeriana, the remarkable Roman road-map of the third century, preserved with later additions in a copy of the thirteenth century, now in the court library at Vienna." Conrad Peutinger, the learned patrician of Augsburg, to whom Celtis willed this curious document and after whom it is named, "in 1496 discovered the Ursperg Chronicle, which he had printed for the first time in 1515; at the same time appeared editions prepared by him of *Jordanis de Rebus Ceticis*, and the History of the Lombards by *Paulus Diaconus*; these works were well edited, whilst the edition of Paulus published at Paris in 1514 by Gulielmus Parvus and that of Luidprand were very defective." "In the year 1515 Maximilian's learned physician and archivary, Spiesshammer, who called himself *Cuspinian*, together with the imperial historiographer Stabius, published at Strassburg, an excellent edition of Otto of Freising, with his continuator Ragewin. As

¹ Wattenbach, *Deutschland's Geschichtsquellen*, p. 2.

early as 1508 Gervasius Soupher of the Breisgau had published at the same place the *Gesta Henrici IV.*" "In 1521 there appeared at Cologne the works of Einhard (the biographer of Charlemagne) edited by Count Hermann of Nuenar, and at Mainz the Chronicle of Regino edited by Sebastian von Rotenhau."¹

But in the work of advancing the cause of history the Pope was not behind the Catholic Emperor. "Historical documents," says Prof. Pastor, "were copied by order of Nicholas V. The Vatican Library still contains many of them. For instance, I found in Cod. Vati., 4167, the acts of the Council held at Rome under Martin V., copied by order of the Pope by Piero de Godi, in 1453."² The same great humanist Pope, and some of the contemporary Italian princes, were equally if not more active in furthering other branches of historical science. "The knowledge of Greek history, until then derived only from *Compendia*, was promoted at the same time as the knowledge of the Greek historians. Thucydides, Herodotus, Diodorus, Polybius, Xenophon, Plutarch, Arrian, Appian, Strabo, and others, were translated either entire or in part about the middle of the (fifteenth) century."³

These works were the works of men born and bred in the Catholic Church; for they appeared, some before Luther's birth, all before he burnt the Papal bull at Wittenberg. But a few years had passed since the invention of printing, and already Catholics brought up in Catholic traditions, the product of the Catholic Middle Ages that were just passing away, devoted their means and their talents to hunt up and publish the historic records of their ancestors and antiquity. The aim and motive of the editors were wholly unconnected with religious controversy. They were inspired by patriotism, the love of literature, the desire to make known the past glories of the German empire, and the wish to promote historical knowledge. Immediately after the birth of Protestantism, "its champions," says Wattenbach, "took up these endeavors with especial zeal," but "they found among these writings arms against the papal claims,"⁴ in other words, they regarded them as means of theological controversy. When Ulrich von Hutten in 1520 published the attack of Waltram of Naumburg on Gregory VII., he intended not so much to further the cause of historical science as to assail the Church and the Papacy. This was the beginning of a period when historical studies were no longer cultivated for their own sake but as means of religious controversy. In the second half of the sixteenth century, the Magde-

¹ Wattenbach, l. c., pp. 3 and 4.

² Pastor, *Gesch. der Paepste*, I., p. 413.

³ Pastor, l. c., I., p. 410.

⁴ Wattenbach, l. c., p. 4.

burg Centuriators, Flacius Illyricus, Wigand, and others, impelled by this spirit, published their *Church History* in thirteen folio volumes, a gigantic controversial pamphlet in behalf of Protestantism. Still it contained considerable historic manuscript material "which is valuable even to-day." To this work Cardinal Cæsar Baronius opposed his *Annales Ecclesiastici*, "which derive great value from the documents drawn from the Vatican archives and other sources."¹ But whilst this controversial use of history to some extent advanced historical research, it did but little service to historical truthfulness, impartiality, honesty, not to speak of intelligent criticism. Historians who write to support a doctrinal thesis, too often cannot see the truth, even if it stares them in the face. Luckily, Catholicity, being essentially a positive doctrine, and not built up in a spirit of negation, resorts to controversy only as a matter of necessity and a means of defence. Hence even whilst the religious battle was raging with the greatest fury, Catholic learning and piety turned again to the positive side of historical research. Among the earliest printed works had been legends and lives of the saints; and now in the midst of the sixteenth century the Carthusian Surius (died 1579), taking up the work which had in reality never been given up, published a collection, *Vitæ Probatorum Sanctorum*, "which first brought to light much useful historical matter; and though the Latin style is somewhat too elaborate, this hardly touches the subject matter."² Still all "monkish" legends were in those days denounced as fables, and in truth criticism had not at that time in many cases separated fact from fiction. So the Jesuit, Heribert Rosweyde, determined—not to uphold fiction and fact alike, not to furnish food for piety at the expense of truth, but—to sift critically all the enormous mass of material bearing on the lives of the saints, mercilessly to sacrifice the false, and thus to save the truth. He, having edited the *Martyrologium Romanum*, his brother Jesuit, John Bolland, was induced to undertake the *Acta Sanctorum*, the lives of all the saints, ancient and modern, arranged according to the Catholic calendar. The first volume appeared in 1653, and Bolland himself published five further volumes; then Daniel Papebroch and Godfrey Henschen took up the undertaking, and their work was especially successful. They were followed by other Flemish Jesuits, who formed a company called the Bollandists, that continued the work until the suppression of the order. During the present century, after its re-establishment, the Belgian Jesuits considered it a matter of honor to continue and complete the vast task begun by their brethren of old, and the whole work published to the present time numbers sixty-four folio volumes. Such was

¹ Wattenbach, l. c., p. 6.

² Wattenbach, l. c., p. 7.

the first great work of historic research published by Catholic scholars. But the lives of the saints, it may be said, comprise but a small and a very one-sided part of human history. So it would seem, at first sight. The Bollandist work shows that, treated in a large spirit, the lives of the saints include a great part of the history of the world since the establishment of Christianity, and especially during the middle ages. "I regard the *Acta Sanctorum*," says Prof. G. T. Stokes,¹ "as specially valuable for mediæval history, *secular* as well as ecclesiastical, simply because the authors, having had unrivalled opportunities of obtaining and copying documents, printed their authorities as they found them, and thus preserved for us a mine of historical material which otherwise would have perished in the French Revolution and its subsequent wars. Yet it is strange how little the mine has been worked. We must suppose, indeed, that it was due to the want of the helps enumerated above [alphabetic tables of contents, registers of names, etc.], that neither of our own great historians who have dealt with the middle ages, Gibbon and Hallam, has, as far as we have been able to discover, ever consulted them."

To prove how valuable a mine of secular and ecclesiastical history are these same *Acta Sanctorum*, Canon Stokes cites the titles of some of the critical treatises contained in the part of the work published before 1750. There we find dissertations on "the Byzantine historian Theophanes," on "Ancient Catalogues of the Roman Pontiffs," on certain mediæval "Itineraries in Palestine," on the "Patriarchates of Alexandria and Jerusalem," on the "Bishops of Milan to the year 1261," on the "Mediæval Kings of Majorca," and no less than three treatises on the "Chronology of the Early Merovingian and other French Kings."² In his essay on "The Introduction of the Arabic Numerals in Europe," Papebroch maintains, on the authority of a Greek manuscript in the Vatican Library written by an Eastern monk, Maximus Planudes, about 1270, that while the Arabs took their notation from the Brahmins of India about 200 A. D., they only introduced it into Eastern Europe so late as the thirteenth century."³ He thus anticipated some of the results of the most modern research on this interesting theme. In the essay on the "Antiquity of the Carmelite Order," Papebroch rejected the claims of the Carmelites, "who traced back their origin to Elijah, the Tishbite. This piece of skepticism brought down a storm upon his devoted head, which raged for years and involved Popes, nay, even princes and courts in the quarrel."⁴

¹ "The Bollandists." G. F. Stokes, in *Contemporary Review* for 1883, I., p. 69, ff.

² Stokes, I. c., p. 78.

³ Stokes, I. c., p. 80.

⁴ Stokes, I. c., p. 83.

All this lore was not gathered without much toil and much expense. The Bollandists ransacked not only the libraries in the monasteries of their own country, but travelled throughout Europe to collect new facts and documents. In 1659, for instance, they went to Rome. "The Bollandists" [Papebroch and Henschen], says Stokes, "proceeded up the Rhine and through South Germany, making a very thorough examination of the libraries, to all of which free access was given: the very Protestant town of Nuremberg being most forward to honor the literary travellers, while the President of the Lutheran Consistory aided them even with his purse. . . . At Venice they found the first rich store of Greek manuscripts and thence also they despatched by sea to Bollandus the first fruits of their toil. From Venice they made a thorough examination of the libraries of Northeastern Italy at Vicenza, Verona, Padua, Bologna, whence they turned aside to visit Ravenna."¹ The journey so described seems to be the counterpart of some made by our modern historical explorers, a Boehmer for instance, a Mommsen, or a Ranke. It is well to recall the researches of the older historians, that they, too, may receive some of the praise so justly lavished on our modern scholars.

We have dwelt at some length on the gigantic work of the Bollandists, but not because they were the only laborers in the field of history; it was gratifying to lay before our readers a picture of their devoted zeal for historical truth and learning, drawn by a generous admirer, a dignitary of the Church of England, a picture, too, which faithfully portrays the spirit and the labors of so many others that followed in their footsteps.

"Alongside of the Jesuits," says Wattenbach, "the French Benedictines, after their order had taken a new and exceedingly vigorous start in the Congregation of St. Maur, undertook a similar work. The study of the history of their order soon became one of the chief aims of the congregation, and for many years its librarian, Dom Luc d'Achéry, aided by the entire community, gathered for this purpose invaluable materials. To help him work up this material, Dom Jean Mabillon was deputed in 1664, and he in turn was assisted by Germain and Ruinart. Between 1668 and 1701 they published the *Acta Sanctorum Ordinis S. Benedicti*, in nine large folios, that reach to the year 1100 and are of the utmost importance for history."² But the Benedictines by no means restricted themselves to the history of their order, and the elucidation of general history, which this work included. In 1676 Colbert, the famous minister of Louis XIV., had conceived the plan of making and publishing a systematic collection of documents illus-

¹ Stokes, l. c., p.

² Wattenbach, *Deutschland's Geschichtsquellen im Mittelalter*, p. 8.

trating the whole history of France. This work was to replace the incomplete collection, in five folio volumes, made by Duchesne (1636-49). "Colbert's plan, however, was not carried out until later, when the monks of St. Maur undertook this task also. After these industrious and learned monks had rendered the most extraordinary services to the history of their order and the Church, and in various collections had made accessible unlimited historical material, they began in 1738 to publish the *Recueil des Historiens des Gaules et de la France*, by Dom Bouquet and his successors, a collection the publication of which has been taken up again quite recently and which at present consists of twenty-one folio volumes."¹

In Italy the great number of states into which the country was split up, as well as their changing fortunes, made the historian's work doubly difficult. But Italy was the home of the Popes, and included Rome, the capital of Catholic Christianity. "The history of the Roman Church, written by Cardinal Baronius, embraced the whole Christian world, and in it every nation found the most important information regarding its own past from the treasures of the Vatican archives. Many original documents, relating to the history of Italy, Ughelli first brought to light in his great work, *Italia Sacra*, which was improved and enlarged by Coleti."² At the same time flourished Ludovico Antonio Muratori, who, with the most comprehensive learning, never-resting industry and untiring activity, laid the foundations of Italian history, on which modern historians continue to build to the present day. His *Scriptores Rerum Italicarum*, in twenty-one folio volumes, 1723 to 1757, are the first comprehensive systematic collection of the documentary history of any country, and to this day the only one which has reached completion."³

Whilst in Flanders, France, and Italy, Catholic monks and Catholic priests, unaided by the State, relying on their own means and their own toil, were scouring the continent for historical material and placing it at the disposition of the scholars of the world, Germany presented a far less inspiring spectacle. "True," says Wattenbach, "their example (*i. e.*, that of the Bollandists and Maurines) roused to imitation, but all attempts failed, partly because of the indolence of the monasteries that were sunk in wealth and luxury, partly because of the jealousy of the princes who thought it dangerous to allow their clergy to come in contact with their brethren of other States. This was the experience of the brothers Pez at Melk, who endeavored to infuse new life into the

¹ Wattenbach, l. c., p. 9.

² Ughelli's "*Italia Sacra*" comprised nine volumes, and was published 1644-62, whilst Coleti extended it to ten volumes in 1717-1721.

³ Wattenbach, l. c., p. 9.

old Benedictine order; but they failed in founding a congregation, which might have united the forces at hand and used them systematically for a common purpose, as in France.” Still the brothers Pez, German Benedictines, unaided and unencouraged, did their own duty manfully, and between 1721 and 1745 published nine volumes of historical documents illustrating the history of Austria and other parts of the German Empire. But before the appearance of these volumes efforts had been made to form a society of the learned to further learning in the Empire, and especially historical learning. This plan was conceived by John Christian von Boineburg, the councillor of the Catholic Elector Bishop of Mainz, the friend of the great Leibnitz. The latter, great in philosophy, great in mathematics, great in science, was equally great in the field of history. He not only gathered immense quantities of material for German history, but earnestly endeavored to instil into others his own devotion and enthusiasm. He was himself a Protestant, but among the foremost of his assistants was Ekkard, a convert and afterwards councillor to the Bishop of Augsburg. Ekkard was not only an enthusiastic collector, but “no one pointed out with more intelligence and keenness the lack of discrimination and systematic choice that characterized the older collections, even that of Leibnitz. Unfortunately his own work, the *Corpus Historicum Medii Ævi* (1723), was liable to the same charges.”²

Up to this time, outside of Leibnitz's work, nothing had been done by Protestants that could be at all compared with the great collections undertaken and in part so creditably carried out by Catholics. The latter had been leaders, not laggards, in the cause of historical progress. “It was the existence and rich endowments of the great monasteries,” says Canon Stokes, “which explains the publication of such immense works as those of the Bollandists, Mabillon, and Tillemont, quite surpassing any now issued, even by the wealthiest publishers among ourselves, and only approached, and that at a distance, by Pertz's ‘*Monumenta*’ in Germany.”³ Surely this is glory enough, but it is not all. When Protestant Germany at last felt called to take part in the movement, of which to-day she is the leader, “the example of Muratori in Italy and the Maurine Benedictines in France invited to imitation, but every wish and every attempt was foiled, as were the first beginnings just mentioned (those of Leibnitz and his scholars) by German divisions, by the impossibility to secure the co-operation of many, by the lack of sufficient means.” It was only after the great Napoleonic wars, when a new national spirit arose among

¹ Wattenbach, l. c., p. 9-10,

² Wattenbach, l. c., p. 13.

³ Stokes, l. c., p. 73.

the Germans, that the efforts of Arndt and Grimm, and especially of Von Stein, after many disappointments were crowned with success. Not till 1819 was it possible to found the Society for the Study of Old German History. It is not the purpose of this paper to write the annals of the struggles and disappointments which tried the souls of its pioneers. One incident, however, related by Wattenbach, so strongly illustrates the attitude of the Papacy to this and all undertakings for the promotion of historical studies that we must record it. G. H. Pertz was the man who carried out Stein's plans; by his self-sacrifice, his learning, and his judgment he showed what a man of intelligence and vigor could do, and effectually laid the foundation of all its subsequent success. His first journey, in 1820, led him to Rome; while elsewhere in Italy he met with not a few disappointments, "he secured from the Papal Regesta alone 1800 unprinted letters."¹

The French Revolution and the movements consequent thereon have swept away hundreds of monasteries from the face of Europe. Jesuits and Benedictines have been robbed of the wealth they so worthily used in the cause of historic and other learning. Their means have shrunk, but not their love of knowledge, their zeal to promote it. In the nineteenth century De Backer and his brethren in Belgium have continued the work of Bolland and Papebroch. Elsewhere the plundered monks cannot vie with the Mabillons, the Ruinarts, and the Bouquets. Still, even in England, where revived Catholicity is yet a young and tender plant, the monk and the priest have already done their share to lay more firmly and more broadly the foundations of English history. The Jesuit Foley has published eight thick volumes of Records of the English Province of the Society of Jesus. The value and excellence of his work have been recognized by the most competent English authorities; in the opinion of the Athenæum it has laid forever the spectre Jesuit that for centuries was a bugbear to the English nation. To another Jesuit, Father Morris, we owe a collection of three volumes on the "Troubles of our Catholic Forefathers, told by themselves," which has thrown much light on the history of Catholic England during the days of the penal laws. Quite recently a Benedictine, Dom Gasquet, has published a work on the suppression of the monasteries by Henry VIII., which has revealed the unparalleled wickedness of that measure of Henry's agents and their methods. In Germany scarcely a year passes without bringing us documents and monographs on the doings and sufferings of Benedictines, Franciscans, Cistercians and other orders, both before and since the "Reformation"; in France, where the monks of St. Maur have done so much for early French history. As to history in general,

¹ Wattenbach, l. c., p. 16.

earnest toilers do not neglect what they have left to be done. The name of Cardinal Pitra reminds us of the debt history owes to his toil and learning. Montalembert's "Monks of the West" is not only a work distinguished by eloquence and a brilliant style, it is the fruit of much honest and laborious research. His "St. Elizabeth" and the works of Ozanam and Rio are studies of mediæval history worthy of all praise. For years back the pages of the *Revue des Questions Historiques* and the *Correspondant* have published historical monographs, distinguished alike for industry, learning, and keen criticism, and shedding floods of light on the most abstruse and difficult historical questions. The records of the National Society of French Antiquaries register papers after papers presented by French priests. In Spain, among the most distinguished archæologists is the Jesuit Padre Fita. In Hungary, whose bishops retain much of the great income with which Catholic princes, nobles, and burghers had endowed the Church, not a little of these revenues is devoted to publishing documents throwing light on the history of the nation. In our own country what name is more respected among historical scholars than that of Dr. J. Gilmary Shea? Relying chiefly on his own enthusiasm and indomitable energy, he has hunted up documents and scarce printed works illustrating the early history of our country and the glorious work of the Catholic missionaries; he has published, or republished, and translated them, until his published works amount almost to a library. And now he crowns his noble career by his monumental "History of the Church in the United States." In Italy itself, distracted as Rome was by Carbonari agitation and revolutionary movements manifold in kind and origin, hindered in her action and cramped in her revenues, long before the accession of Leo XIII. the purse of Gregory and of Pius was always open to encourage the noble work of the two De Rossis and their predecessors. Salaried and aided by the Popes, the two Theiners delved into that mine of history, the Vatican archives, and no one will charge them with being Papal Janissaries; many have taxed them with being hardly fair to the Catholic Church. And now comes the thirteenth Leo; with characteristic energy and enlightenment he not only opens the Vatican archives to all genuine students, he calls on the deepest and most active Catholic historical scholars, a Hergenroether, a Pitra, a Balan, a Denifle, to explore their wealth, to discover their treasures, to publish the results honestly and impartially. Truly Leo is a genuine lover of historical science, but this love of history is not peculiar to him; he has inherited it from the Church of the past, from the Church of Baronius, of Bolland and Papebroch, of Mabillon, Ruinart and Dom Bouquet, of Muratori and De Rossi.

THE RIGHT OF INDIVIDUAL OWNERSHIP—DOES IT SPRING FROM THE NATURAL OR THE HUMAN LAW?

UNDER the above title we propose to fairly and squarely put before our readers the two prevailing opinions in Catholic schools as to the right of individual ownership.

The first maintains that the origin of that right must be sought in a formal or presumed agreement among the nations of the earth. It was generally held by those authors who wrote during that period which embraces the latter part of the Middle Ages, down to the first half of the eighteenth century.

The second opinion insists that the right of individual property is derived from the natural law. This, with hardly any exception, is the opinion of all modern Catholic writers on the subject.

Before entering upon a detailed explanation of each of the two systems, we deem it necessary to say a few words by way of introduction, in order to render the problem easier and more intelligible to our readers.

In the first place, it is to be observed that whatever may be the opinion held by the authors of either system as to the origin of individual proprietorship, they all agree that the fact which brings into existence such a right is *human activity*, which either apprehends a certain object and appropriates it; or exercises itself upon a certain object to produce a change in its form. The first is called Occupancy, the second, strictly speaking, Labor.

Again, the objects which may be appropriated may be either substantially permanent, whatever be the use to which they may be put and whatever change of form they may be made to undergo; or they may be perishable by use. It is agreed by the writers of both contending opinions, with few exceptions, that the right of individual property in things perishable by use is derived from the natural law. "As all things," says Cardinal Gerdil, "which the earth produces, fruits, vegetables, roots, plants, domestic as well as wild animals, are so fitted to the necessities, use and advantage of human life, that reason cannot fail to see that they were not made by accident, but, as the philosophers themselves acknowledged, designedly given to mankind by a most beneficent God; and, on the other hand, as God has gifted man with intelligence and free will and other faculties in order that he might dispose of all things, and appropriate them to his own use, it follows that by an *institution of nature and in force of the natural law*

man may make use of all exterior things for food and raiment, and the preservation and enjoyment of life; and thus to have a real dominion over these things." (Gerdil, *Theol. Moralis*, Cap. 4, Prop. 2.)

But how with regard to those goods which are permanent, and which human personality by its activity may occupy not only to apply to his own profit those fruits which they spontaneously yield, but also in order to exert its own activity upon them, to increase and to multiply their productiveness and their value?

Here the divergence of the two opinions begins. The first maintains that both the right to occupy and to appropriate permanent goods, such as the earth and the fruit it naturally produces, and the right to own what is produced by human activity exerting itself upon those goods, are derived from a *human positive compact creating and sanctioning such a right*. For the sake of brevity and clearness we will call the upholders of such opinions Compactists.

The second opinion holds that both rights, the one which comes from the part of occupancy, and that which comes from human labor, spring necessarily from the natural law. We will designate the defenders of this second opinion by the name of Naturalists.

But as it is evident that human activity cannot exert itself upon nothing, and that all possible exercise of men's powers presupposes the occupancy and appropriation of a permanent object, prominent among which must be reckoned the earth, it follows that the question about the right of individual proprietorship finally and in the last analysis must be reduced to the right originating in the occupancy of the earth.

The problem, being thus narrowed down to land, may be put as follows: Does the right of private ownership in land originally springing from occupancy arise from the natural law or from the purely positive law of a human agreement?

At the commencement of man's history the earth was unoccupied and common to any one who might chance to be cast upon it. Gradually and insensibly we find the same earth cut up into parcels of different sizes, and appropriated by certain individuals, families, or nations.

Now it may be asked by what law was the earth divided and appropriated by individuals, families, or nations? Was this partition made and the appropriation effected by a right inherent in man's nature and wants, or was it done and effected by a mutual agreement among the nations, and therefore by a purely human positive law, perhaps reasonable, but none the less arbitrary? Here we may as well define what is meant by natural law, and what is understood by merely positive human law.

The natural law is that which results from the necessary intrinsic and essential relations of things. For instance, we desire to ascertain what is the law governing the free action of man in respect to his God. We have recourse to the essential and necessary relation of things, and we ask, what are the essential intrinsic relations of man with regard to God? And by studying the terms of the relation, their respective natures, the bond which unites them together, we find that man stands to God in the relation of a creature to his Creator, and therefore in the relation of absolute dependence upon Him in everything, his nature, his existence, the preservation of his existence, etc.; and we conclude that the law which should necessarily govern man's free action as to his Creator is to theoretically and practically acknowledge this relation of dependence with all the powers and faculties of his nature. The natural law, therefore, is that which emanates and is derived from the intrinsic and essential relations of things; and a right originating in the natural law is a moral faculty to do, or to have, certain things resulting from the necessary and essential relations of things.

The purely and simply human positive law is a rule of action, by no means resulting from the necessary relations of things, but made and enacted purely by the will of man; and a right springing from such a law is a faculty to do or to have certain things, deriving its existence and force simply from the will and authority of man.

The differences between the two rules of action referred to are too obvious to need much elucidation. The things commanded or forbidden by the natural law are called good or bad because they are so of their own nature; whereas the things commanded or forbidden by the positive law are called good or bad, not because they are such indeed considering their nature, but because they are commanded or forbidden.

The second difference is that the natural law obliges all at all times and in all places. The merely positive human law binds only those for whom it is made, in the place and time specified.

The third difference is that the natural law, the relations of things remaining the same and unaltered, is immutable; whereas the positive law can always be changed.

From the differences we have pointed out it is apparent that the natural law and the merely positive human law differ in almost everything in their source—the former originating in the essential relations of things, the other in the arbitrary will of man; in the extent of their obligation—the one binding all in time and space; the other obliging some in a certain locality and for a time; in the nature of the obligation—the one being necessary and immutable;

the other changeable at will. There is only one point of contact between them, but it is a point of the highest importance. It is this: that a merely positive human law, to be a law, and to have an obligatory force, must have the sanction of the natural law.

This may be understood in a twofold sense, in a positive as well as in a negative sense. A human law is said to have the sanction of the natural law in a positive sense when it is really and directly conformable and agreeable to the natural law. A human law is said to be sanctioned by the natural law in a negative sense if, when considered in all its circumstances, its source, its nature, its comprehension, its permanence, its effects, it does not conflict with the natural law. The positive sanction of the natural law is not at all necessary to the human positive law; because a thing commanded by a human law may be altogether outside the province of the natural and necessary relations of things, and nature may be absolutely unconcerned about it; for instance, that such and such a tax, ordered by the government, should be paid on such a day, at such a time and place. But the sanction in the second sense is absolutely necessary to a human positive law; the moment such a law conflicts and is in opposition with the natural law, that moment it ceases to be a law and loses all binding force; for no law is possible, no matter by what positive authority it may be enacted, if it contravenes the precept of the natural law and therefore runs counter to the essential and necessary relations of things.

Between the natural law and the merely positive human law is to be ranked what is called the *jus gentium*, of which we must give an idea to complete our preliminary remarks.

All authors agree that the *jus gentium* is something between the natural law and the merely positive human law. "Having explained," says Suarez, "the natural law, it is but proper that we should, at the end of the book, treat of the *jus gentium*, inasmuch as it partakes of the nature of law; not only for its affinity with the natural *jus*, which is so great as to have caused many writers to identify it with the natural *jus*, but also by the manner in which it differs from it; it is nearest to it and almost medium between the natural and the human *jus*." (Suarez, *De Legibus*, I., b. 2, ch. 17.)

There are several opinions as to the nature of the *jus gentium*, but the principal may be reduced to two. The first maintains that it is a conclusion of the natural law, necessarily resulting from the essential relations of things, a conclusion drawn by the human intellect, at all times and in all places, the moment it reflects on the natural law. "*Sentiunt (aliqui theologi) jus gentium habere intrinsicam necessitatem in suis præceptis, solumque differri a naturali, quia jus naturale sine discursu innotescit, jus autem*

gentium per plures illationes et difficiliores colligitur." (Suarez, *ib.*, par. 8.)

Others opine that the *jus gentium* is not the same as the natural *jus*, or implied in it as a consequence is included in its premises; but, properly and strictly speaking, it is nothing more than a real positive human law, since its enactments do not emanate from the necessary relations of things, but are introduced by the consent and pleasure of men in view of their fitness and utility.

"*Jus gentium non est idem cum jure naturali proprie et stricte sumpto, nec sub illo continetur, sed sub positivo.*

"Probatur. Jus naturale est absolute et ex natura rei necessarium, independenter a concursu hominum; jus positivum, contra; atqui *jus gentium* non est absolute et ex natura rei necessarium, sed secundum utilitatem et congruentiam ex hominum beneplacito et consensu introductum." (Billuart, *De Just. et de Jure*, D. III., 1 Art., 3).

According to the advocates of the opinion just enunciated, the differences between the natural law and the *jus gentium* are very important.

The first is that the affirmative precepts of the *jus gentium* do not imply and suppose a real necessity of the thing demanded, as in the case of those of the natural law which are deduced from the nature of the thing, by an evident conclusion from natural principles.

"*Jus gentium non infert necessitatem rei præceptæ ex sola rei natura per evidentem illationem ex principiis naturalibus, quia quidquid hujus modi est, est naturale.*" (Suarez, *ib.*)

The second difference is that the negative precepts of the *jus gentium* do not prohibit a thing because evil in itself and of its own nature, but the prohibition causes it to be considered bad.

"Simili modo præcepta negativa juris gentium non prohibent aliquid quia per se malum; nam hoc est etiam mere naturale, unde non prohibet mala quia mala sunt, sed prohibendo facit esse mala." (Suarez, *ib.*)

The third difference is that the *jus gentium* cannot be considered immutable and unchangeable, in the same manner as the natural *jus*; because immutability has its origin and source in the necessity of the thing; and that which is not equally as necessary as the things commanded or forbidden by the *jus gentium*, cannot claim the same immutability.

"*Jus gentium non potest esse tam immutabile sicut naturale; quia immutabilitas ex necessitate oritur; ergo quod non est æque necessarium non potest esse æque immutabile.*" (Suarez, *ib.*)

Fourth difference: Strictly speaking, therefore, the *jus gentium* must be considered a simply and merely human law.

“Unde tandem concludi videtur *jus gentium* simpliciter esse humanum et positivum.” (Suarez, *ib.*)

From the statements just made we must conclude that the *jus gentium* is changeable inasmuch as it depends upon the consent of men, and this corollary must be understood not only of the affirmative precepts of the same, but also of the negative. The reason is simply that that which is commanded or prohibited by the *jus gentium* is not at all intrinsically necessary, but only expedient, convenient, more agreeable, and therefore its precepts, either negative or positive, draw their binding force, not from any imperative natural necessity, but from human authority and consent, and as such may be changed by the same authority. (Suarez, *ib.*)

Having premised these few notions on the different kinds of *jus*, and to which we must necessarily refer in our discussion, we proceed to state the opinion of those theologians and writers whom we have denominated Compactists.

We will exhibit their theory under a number of statements.

First.—They all agree in teaching that the partition of the earth and the appropriation of its several portions by the different nations, families, or individuals are sanctioned by the natural law, at least in a negative sense, inasmuch as they do not conflict in any way, nor are in opposition, with the natural law.

“*Communitas rerum tribuitur juri naturali, non quod jus naturale illam præcipiat; sed quia non jubet distinctionem possessionum et permittit communitatem rerum; adeoque proprietates seu possessionum distinctio non est contra jus naturæ, sed juri naturali ut quid magis conveniens superadditur.*” (Bill., *De Jure*, Diss. 4, Art. 1.)

There is only one doctor, to our knowledge, who opposes this common opinion of the Compactists, that is, Duns Scotus, who, as Suarez remarks, holds that the natural law prefers the communion of goods, but allows the division and partition in case of necessity. (Suarez, *De Opere Sex Dierum*, Lib. 5, Ch. 7, parag. 17.)

Second Statement.—All Compactists are agreed that, on the supposition of man having preserved his innocence, and transmitted it to his posterity, the community of goods and possessions would have prevailed, because in that happy condition and high state of harmony and good fellowship there would have been no need of any division. (Bill., *ib.*)

Third Statement.—They are unanimous in holding that in the present state of fallen nature the division of goods and possessions is not only lawful, but most expedient and beneficial. (Bill., *ib.* See also Laymann, *De Jure et Just.*, Lib. 2, Tract 1, Ch. 5.)

Fourth Statement.—That, limiting ourselves to what is really necessary, such division was not demanded by the natural law,

since the natural *jus* is absolutely indifferent as to either mode of holding the earth; nor was it prescribed by any positive divine law, as we have no evidence of such law having been proclaimed, either in Holy Writ or in Tradition; that therefore such partition was authorized by the *jus gentium*, inasmuch as men, taking into account the corruption of nature, and the grave evils occasionally resulting from the community of possessions, by an explicit or tacit consent, introduced the division of goods. (Billuart, *ib.*)

Fifth Statement.—All Compactists concur in considering the *jus gentium*, and therefore the consent, formal or tacit, of mankind as the source and the origin, not only of the right to privately own those permanent objects which may be obtained by occupancy, such as the earth and other durable things; but also of those goods or values which may be created by human activity, so that if a man before the division agreed upon by mankind had worked the earth and multiplied its fruits, if he had used the staple material spontaneously yielded by the earth, and worked it into something of much greater value for the use or pleasures of life than it had before, that something would not have been his own, it could not have been his individual property, but the community's, and every one could have taken and used it without scruple. Billuart, with others, freely admits the consequence. "You will say, suppose Abel by his skill and industry had painted a beautiful image, would it not have been a theft in any one who should have deprived him of it? I answer that before the division the taking of that image would no more have been a theft than the taking away part of the harvest in a field." (Bill., *De Jure et Just.*, Diss. 4, Art. 1.)

Sixth Statement.—Likewise all these Compactists concur in saying that that which gives force and validity to any title in individual proprietorship comes from the consent of men, as understood and modified by the civil laws of each particular commonwealth. (Gerdil, *loc. cit.*)

Seventh Statement.—Finally, all Compactists agree in holding that the property of private individuals is subject to the authority and laws of the commonwealth, so that the right of such individuals is absolute in regard to other individuals, but not so in relation to the authority of the Commonwealth, which possesses the *altum dominium* over all private ownership, so as to be entitled, should the common good require it, to take it away from its owners without any compensation whatever. (Gerdil, *loc. cit.*, also Billuart, Diss. 4, Art. 3, Parag. 11.)

The reason which is alleged in support of this *dominium* of the commonwealth over all private ownership, a *dominium* called *altum*, and which entitles the state, for the common good, to alienate private ownership, or to take it altogether for the common

good, without any compensation, is that the very same power which gave the property to private owners can take it away from them. (Billuart, *loc. cit.*, also Contenson.)

Such is the complete theory of those writers whom, for the sake of clearness and brevity, we have styled Compactists. Among them may be mentioned Duns Scotus, Suarez, Molina, the Salmanticenses, Lessius, Sanchez, Bannez, Cunniliati, Contenson, Gerdil, Laymann, Schmalzgrueber, Reiffenstuel, and all those schoolmen and theologians who maintain that the *jus gentium* is a purely positive human law introduced by the consent of mankind, either actually expressed or presumed to have been given in some other way.

Before proceeding to state the theory of those writers whom we have called Naturalists, we will set forth the objections which modern Catholic writers have raised against the opinion just explained. And to put them in a clear light, we recapitulate the theory of the Compactists. We find everywhere, and at all times, men holding objects not consumable by use, and especially the earth, as individual property, to the exclusion of all others. Did the natural law authorize them to divide these objects and to appropriate them as their own? The answer of the Compactist is: The law of nature is perfectly and absolutely neutral as to either mode of holding such objects, either in common or in private. Private ownership, found to prevail everywhere and at all times, is the effect of a new *jus*, purely and merely human and positive, created by the consent of mankind.

This is the substance of the theory. But, in the first place, modern authors beg to know where is the historical foundation for such supposed consent of mankind to establish a new *jus* as an accessory to the natural law? When and where, and under what circumstances, was it given or taken for granted? Was it given contemporaneously by all the peoples of the earth, or did it take its rise from among one particular nation, and from it gradually spread among all the rest of the human family? And if the latter, what lucky nation can lay a claim to such a momentous discovery and invention?

Then again, if we suppose a real *bona fide* consent expressly given by mankind, we know that such an event never happened, according to all historical documents within our reach. "If," says Rosmini, "an explicit consent, given by all men in the first formation of civil society, is made to intervene to account for individual proprietorship, such a thing is not only a vain hypothesis, but a downright chimera. To be sure, we do not deny that men, not on one, but on many occasions, have divided lands among themselves, either by means of private contract or by laws almost agrarian in

their nature; but such enactments only regulated, and did not create, individual property."—(*Filosofia del Diritto*, Vol. 1, Lib. 2, Ch. 2, Art. 2.)

But suppose we turn to a tacit and presumed consent of mankind, what proof is there to warrant such supposition? The only plausible argument that could be urged in favor of such supposition is the fact that, as a rule, individual property is found generally and invariably at all times and among all nations. Now such a fact must be accounted for, and what reason more simple and natural could be alleged than that men almost spontaneously and instinctively consented to have it so? The argument would be good if there were no other hypothesis possible, the only case where a hypothesis can have any real logical value. But in our case there is the hypothesis of the Naturalists, who hold that individual proprietorship is the necessary outcome of the natural relations of things; there is the supposition of the Socialists and Communists, who say that it was a usurpation. The fact, therefore, of individual proprietorship cannot be accounted for by the hypothesis of a tacit consent of mankind.

In the second place, modern authors would beg to know whether, at the time when the division of the earth was made and private ownership introduced, mankind was divided into nations organized under some kind of civil government, or was as yet in a rudimental primitive state and condition without any kind of organization?

If we suppose that mankind at this epoch of its history was already divided into several nations, each one distinct from the others, organized under a certain form of government, then, we would ask, how is it possible to conceive a nation and a civil government without presupposing the right of individual proprietorship? The very fact of a nation, strictly so called, distinct from all other nations, implies a certain territory occupied and exclusively claimed by a certain race of men. For what other idea do we form of a nation?

The fact of individual proprietorship must necessarily precede the formation of distinct nationalities, and could not, therefore, be supposed to originate in the consent, expressed or presumed, of civilized nations. On the other hand, if we assume mankind to have given their consent before the division and distinction of races and of communities, the supposition is flatly contradicted by history; since the oldest historical record in our possession, the *Genesis* of Moses, represents the first two sons of Adam as being the possessors of individual property, and the early patriarchs owners of extensive tracts of land and of all other kinds of property. The only refuge left to the Compactists, who insist on this tacit or formal consent of mankind to account for the very first individual

calling a thing really his own, is the hypothesis of Rousseau as to the primitive state of man, that is, to have recourse to a remote early period of man's existence located beyond all historical record, when, like a perfect savage, he roamed about free and uncontrolled, without language, without shelter, without any social instincts, and perfectly happy in such a state, as most agreeable to his nature, until some one established individual proprietorship, and found others simple enough to agree to it, at which time civil society was really created. "He who denies the origin of private ownership" from the civil laws, says the *Civiltà Cattolica*, "supposes that the primitive or natural life of men, as its upholders are pleased to call it, was unsociable and savage, *pecundum more*, and that from such a state they must have passed to civil society. But such opinion naturally supposes the other opinion of the positive community of goods in the savage life. Moreover, against such opinion is found history, which exhibits the Patriarchs as private owners possessed of extensive domains, and as such recognized, though they did not live in any civil commonwealth, but only in a domestic state. Tradition, also handed down to us in the different codes of laws, teaches that private property was among all nations invariably held as a sacred right, and as an institution already existing, protected indeed, as it is to-day, by the laws, but not created by them."—(Civ. Catt., Series 8, vol. 9, pag. 436.)

Moreover, modern Catholic authors inquire of the Compactists if it be reasonable to suppose a consent of all mankind in establishing and sanctioning private ownership on such terms as are alleged by them. Is it within the limits of reasonable belief to maintain that mankind agreed to the division of the earth and other permanent goods, and to their exclusive appropriation by individuals on terms of such remarkable disparity, that some few should have large domains, others very small tracts, and the vast majority none at all? If individual ownership of such goods were not derived from a natural law, from an intrinsic justice of its own, but its lawfulness and morality depended on the arbitrary consent of men, is it not more agreeable to common sense to suppose that these would not have given their consent except upon better terms for themselves; that is, on condition that such goods should be evenly and equally divided among all? Is it not an absurd thing to imagine that the poor should be willing and pleased that the rich man should have and retain his vast domains, filled with all kinds of other permanent goods, whilst they would not have enough ground under their feet on which to build a modest hut to shelter them? It is evident, then, that men would not willingly and deliberately give such consent to establish a new *jus* on the terms proposed by the Compactists.

Nor does it improve the matter to put forward the hypothesis of a tacit and implied consent. For, in order reasonably to take for granted that a man has tacitly and validly consented to a law or custom which must needs be created, strengthened and made valid by that same consent, it is absolutely necessary that he should, at least substantially, be fully aware of the whole import and extent of that law or custom, and also that he should be at liberty to give or to refuse that consent, and whilst thus free from any kind of compulsion, should cheerfully and of his own accord accede to that law or custom.

Now, will the Compactists affirm that the majority of mankind have sufficiently reflected upon the comprehensiveness and extent of the law of individual property, that they have formed and passed an internal judgment and verdict as to its utility and advantage? Is it not true, on the contrary, that men have merely taken things as they found them, and, without any reflection or consideration, have adapted themselves to the condition of things in which they were born and brought up? How, then, in the name of logic, can they be supposed to have given an intelligent and free consent to an institution which purports to have been created and supported and maintained by such assumed agreement?—(Rosmini, *Fil. del Diritto*, *loc. cit.*)

But conceding this consent, formal or tacit, on the conditions alleged by our friends the Compactists, we may inquire further into the reasons and motives which induced mankind to consent to such a division and appropriation, and ask on what ground both were allowed to be introduced? Not certainly on the ground that they were imperatively demanded by the intrinsic nature of things, as in such case they would take their rise in the natural law; for what is imperatively demanded by the necessary relations of things springs from the nature and essence of things, results from the natural law, and is obligatory and binding independently of the consent of any one.

This is freely admitted by the Compactists, who teach that the division of goods and private ownership commend themselves very strongly to human reason, as a better, easier and safer mode of deriving from those goods all possible advantage on behalf of the individual and of society; but they insist that both would never have been introduced, nor commanded respect, nor be obligatory, without the consent of mankind. Modern authors, therefore, conclude from this that, if private ownership was introduced, it was simply because men were willing to yield their own rights, if any, for the sake of deriving those advantages supposed to accrue to all from individual ownership.

But did such right exist? Had those who entered upon this compact any such claim?

Certainly not, on the principle of the Compactists. Their principle is that the natural law neither countenances the possession of permanent goods in common nor in private; that it keeps an absolutely negative, unarmed neutrality between them. Now it is asked by our modern authors what possible right, in the face of such principle, could any individual of the human race claim in the earth or in any other permanent object? The answer must be that in force of the natural law (and at the period we are alluding to there was no other law to go by), any individual of the human race, every person constituting the human family, could claim no other right in these permanent goods than such a temporary precarious tenancy and use of them as would be consistent with that perfect indifference of nature's law proclaimed by the principle. A logical consequence of this is that men in consenting that the earth and other goods should be divided and private ownership of them introduced, were giving away a right which they never had or could have, and went beyond all reasonable powers. If by the natural law they had no other right to the earth or other permanent goods than the mere temporary occupancy and use thereof, and that not absolutely and exclusively, but for as much and as long as their present wants required, it is evident that they could yield no more than what they had, and that a *jus gentium* establishing individual proprietorship in those objects is as vain and futile as the right of those who are presumed to have set it up. The trite axiom, *Nemo dat quod non habet*, applies, to the very letter, to this case. In agreeing expressly or by implication to sacrifice their own individual right, the contracting parties consented to make over what they did not possess, and stepped beyond the limit of their authority.

But suppose they did go beyond their power and created the right of individual proprietorship by the *jus gentium*, would such a *jus* exhibit that essential condition to every human law, the sanction of the natural law? On the fundamental principle of the Compactists such a *jus* would have no sanction of the natural law, nay, it would be in positive conflict with it.

This fundamental principle is, as we have so often remarked, that the natural *jus* in the matter of holding the earth and all other permanent goods is absolutely and perfectly neutral; it neither sanctions the possession of such goods in common nor the appropriation of them by individuals. It has no preference for either. This, of course, must be understood in the limits of strict natural necessity; in other words, suppose it is asked which of the two means is simply and absolutely necessary to man's life and welfare, considering him either individually or collectively, in the family or in society, the holding of permanent goods in

common, or their division and apportionment to distinct individuals to be held and administered as exclusively their own?

The natural law proclaims loudly—neither the one nor the other is simply necessary. *Divisio rerum facta est non jure naturæ; quia jus naturæ neque eam præcipit, neque ad eam inclinât ut quid simpliciter necessarium.* (Bill., *loc. cit.*). But it should be added that our friends the Compactists have no choice in this matter; they must hold on to the supreme indifference of the natural law on pain of having the whole of their theory scattered to the four winds of heaven. Let them give up this fundamental principle of the indifference of the natural *jus*, and the whole system falls to the ground. Suppose they should say the natural law *demand*s the communion of goods; then it would follow that individual proprietorship is in flat contradiction with the natural law, and therefore unjust and immoral. On the other hand, imagine them asserting that individual ownership is imperatively *prescribed* by the natural law, then it would follow as a necessary inference that private property takes its rise in the natural law, and not in the consent of any human will. Whichever way they turn, by the logical necessity of their system the Compactists must necessarily maintain, as the foundation principle of their system, that the natural law, so far as prescribing any necessary means is concerned, neither commands the division of goods nor is inclined towards it, but is simply neutral.

But if such a principle is a necessity of their system, we ask by what right, by what natural justice or equity is this indifference of the natural law practically abolished to introduce a partisanship of the most odious kind, that of dividing the earth and allotting the different portions thereof to certain individuals to the exclusion of others for all future time? What has become of the neutrality of the natural law? In other words, either this boasted neutrality and indifference of the natural law is true and real and a *bona fide* neutrality, or it is not. If it is not, the Compactists must give up their theory; if it *is*, then what right have any number of men or the whole human family together to abolish this neutrality, to do away with this indifference by setting up arbitrarily and without necessity a *jus* which can only be defended on the assumption that there is no such theory as nature's indifference in this matter? For whatever the Compactist may assert to the contrary, this boasted indifference and neutrality is absurd, as it would render the possession of permanent goods impossible, either by the community or by individuals. If these goods were in common, one might ask, by what right do you hold these goods when nature neither demands nor countenances such manner of possession? If, on the other hand, they were held in private by distinct individuals, one might inquire

by what reason or title do you hold in private as your own these goods, when nature neither prescribes nor leans towards any such means of possession? The principle, therefore, is absurd, and whilst theoretically admitting it as a dire necessity of their theory, the Compactists practically deny it. For it is evident that they unconsciously assume the very opposite principle, whilst they are insisting on this indifference of the law of nature as to either means of possessing permanent goods; the real principle underlying their theory being that mankind collectively understood really and positively owned those goods in common according to the natural law; and that is the very reason why in that supposed convention, real or imaginary, they considered themselves authorized to agree to divide them and to set up individual proprietorship.

Without that assumption they could do nothing, because on the principle of indifference they positively and really had no right by the natural law either to own those goods in common or to possess them in private. Therefore they could not, according to the same law, enact any *jus* introducing either the one or the other.

But mankind, say the Compactists, did not introduce the holding of these goods in private as necessary; they did not enact a peremptory and imperative law; they introduced it simply as a means which commended itself to their common sense as the best to improve the resources of the earth, to enhance its value, and to draw from every individual all the good he can produce, and also as the most expedient means to avoid litigations, quarrels and difficulties of every kind. Strange contradiction of the Compactists! To maintain that the right of private ownership originates in a supposed consent of mankind, and not in the natural law, first they must start with admitting the absurd principle that the natural law is negatively indifferent as to either mode of possessing; then, being pushed into a corner by their adversaries, that, even admitting such a principle, men had no right to abolish it practically, because when they set up private ownership in those goods they practically did away with the neutrality of the natural law; and at this stage of the proceedings, to get over the difficulty they assert another strange theory, that the consent of mankind did not command or prescribe private ownership, but simply introduced it as a more advisable means. What is the logical consequence of this? That such a *jus* so introduced, as simply more expedient and advisable, is by no manner of means obligatory and imperative, that it has no binding moral force whatever, and that no one is morally bound to respect or maintain the institution it created. And it is what Socialists and Communists have said and proclaimed loudly for the last two centuries. As individual proprietorship, they say, originates in human authority, in a *jus* supposed to have been created by a real or im-

aginary consent of mankind, in contravention of the indifference of the natural law ; as that *jus* did not even proclaim private ownership as a simply necessary means, but as something more expedient and more admirable, we insist that no one is bound to pay any attention to it, to respect it ; we affirm that the whole thing is a usurpation, a violation of the rights of all, a fraud and a theft. *La propriété, c'est le vol.*

This naturally introduces the other remark which modern writers make against the theory of the Compactists, which is to the effect that stealing in that system is no longer an act really and intrinsically evil, as the Church has always believed, but simply an action evil because forbidden. According to their theory, to own anything in private, to the exclusion of all other men, does not originate in the natural, intrinsic, essential relations of things, but simply in human authority. I own a piece of ground. On what authority do I own it ? On the authority of the natural law ? On the strength of the essential relations of things ? Certainly the contrary ; otherwise the right of individual proprietorship would be derived from the natural law ; I own it, therefore, on the authority of the *jus gentium*, which all Compactists admit to be purely and simply human law. If any one, therefore, by fraud or violence takes that piece of ground from me, he violates a human law, breaks a human enactment, goes counter to human authority, but does not contravene the natural essential relations of things. To steal, therefore, in the system of the Compactists, cannot be but a violation of a human law, a thing bad, to be sure, because prohibited by a human law, but not bad *in se*, of its nature, because conflicting with the essential relations of things ; so much so that if the prohibition were removed or were to cease, it would no longer be evil, but either an indifferent or a praiseworthy action, according to circumstances.

Billuart is aware of the consequence resulting from his principles, and endeavors to get over it, with what success we leave our readers to determine. He proposes the objection, and it is of the simplest nature. "He who steals contravenes the natural *jus*. Therefore, he who owns anything does so by virtue of the same *jus*. Qui furatur peccat contra *jus naturæ* ; ergo alter possidet *jure naturæ*." (De Modis Acquirendi Dom. Diss. 4.) The author very summarily dispatches the whole difficulty by denying the consequence of his *entimema*, and insisting that from the fact that stealing is contrary to the natural law, it does not follow that the right to own private property must spring from the same law. We have already proved that *it does*. Comprehending under the word stealing all kind of injury done to a man's property, we may define it to be the taking or the keeping away from a man, against his

own reasonable will, by occult means or open violence, that which belongs to him.

Now, by what right does a man call an object his own? By the natural right? Certainly not, according to our opponents. In consequence of certain natural relations which may have arisen, owing to a certain fact, between man's personality and the object? For instance, suppose a man paints a beautiful image on a piece of wood, the example given by Tournely; owing to that fact a natural and essential relation has arisen between him and that object, should he by force of that relation of cause and effect, of activity and of its term, *own* that picture? Certainly not, reply the Compactists; before the division of the earth and of all permanent objects, and the setting up of private ownership by the *jus gentium*, that painter would not *own* that picture or call it his own property, in spite of his activity and labor, so that any one could have taken it from him as any other product of the earth. Then whoever owns anything does so, exclusively speaking, on the strength of a human law. Therefore, if I deprive him of it I break and violate a purely human law, but do not contravene any intrinsic relation of things; my natural liberty to do or to omit that action is restrained and limited, not by the nature of things, but by a pure human command; should that cease, no reason founded on the essence of things could any longer limit my natural freedom.

Billuart contends that though the title to private ownership comes from the *jus gentium*, a mere human law, yet stealing is a violation of the natural law, because the natural law forbids the taking away from another what belongs to him, no matter what jus or right or title has secured it to him. "Quia jus naturæ prohibet rem auferre alteri quovis jure illam possideat."—(Bill., *ib.*) By a slight inadvertence the good Billuart fails to see that he is begging the question, the very question under discussion, and which modern authors are testing. Is it contrary to the law of nature to take away from a man that which he owns solely and exclusively on the strength of a human law?

That is the question. Billuart and the Compactists answer in the affirmative. Modern authors answer in the negative, and prove their negative answer as follows: Then and then only would stealing be contrary to the law of nature if it violated some natural intrinsic relation between the object stolen and its owner; because, as the law of nature is that rule of action which results from the essential relations of things, only the contravention of these relations can be a violation of natural law. But it is admitted by the Compactists that no natural essential relation binds the owner with the object he possesses, not even when the object derives its value in the greatest part from the owner's activity and

labor. Therefore stealing cannot be a violation of the law of nature.

The example brought forward by Billuart is a sorry quibble unworthy of the gravity of a theologian of his stamp. "A man possesses his wife through human choice, yet adultery is contrary to the law of nature."—(Billuart, *ib.*)

The answer is too obvious not to present itself to the minds of our readers. Marriage, as many other things, is one of those natural contracts, the essential nature and conditions of which are established by the law of nature and cannot be altered by any human power. All that the contracting parties are at liberty to do in the matter is to make choice of the persons or acts which realize the contract and cause its existence. This done, the contracting parties must submit to the inevitable conditions flowing from the essence of the thing. The man, then, who chooses a wife, and the woman who agrees to take him, cause the contract of marriage to exist in concrete, and in this particular instance; but their choice and consent do not affect or establish the essential laws of marriage already determined by nature. Therefore, anyone offending against them breaks the natural law, even if both parties should consent to the violation. But the case is different as to the present question. It is admitted and strenuously contended by the Compactists that nature and the natural *jus* do not give existence and origin to the right of individual proprietorship; that such a right springs simply and solely from human law, that without this human law it would not exist, that if such a law ceased the right itself would cease, and that that which was unlawful during the continuance of the human law forbidding it would be lawful and right the moment the law discontinued to be in force. Therefore to violate such a right can be nothing more than a violation of a human law.

Gerdil and Carriere agree with Billuart, but have no better reason to allege in favor of their opinion. Lessius makes a better attempt. He argues that the right to own property comes from a human law, yet stealing must be held as a violation of the natural law, "because the natural law forbids the taking anything from a man against his inclination, whatever may be the *jus* by which he may have come by the thing."—(Lessius, *De Jure et Jus.*, Sectio Prima, Disp. 3.)

Lessius, then, has recourse to the resentment which one feels when deprived of his own. And we admit that the reason appears to have greater plausibility; but it is only an appearance, since it *is false* that the natural law forbids the taking anything from a man when he objects to it, and when the thing is done against his consent expressed or supposed, and when we may easily suppose

that he will resent it. The law of nature forbids the taking something from a man against his *reasonable* inclination, and not against *his* inclination; it proscribes the doing anything which man may resent, but that resentment must be juridical resentment, that is, a resentment founded on reason and right. Why, if you take from a thief what he has just stolen, he will object to it by every means in his power and resent the action. Does it follow that it is against the natural law to deprive him of it? Certainly not, because his resentment is not juridical or reasonable.

What makes a man a proprietor? A human law. What protects and guarantees him in his property? A human law. Therefore he must be satisfied with that and claim no more.

Should he have recourse to the natural law, the violator might say, I know very well what I am doing; how can I be breaking the law of nature when what you claim as your own comes to you on the strength of a human law?

But I feel bad about it. It is not right, it is cruel and unnatural for you thus to tamper with my feelings. Neither is it right for you, would the law-breaker answer, to tamper with mine. The law of nature made all things neither for you nor for me in particular, but for all. What you own has come to you through an arbitrary human law. If I take something, is it not enough for you that I am breaking a positive law and am ready to abide the consequences of my violation, without your dragging in the law of nature, which has nothing at all to do with your being a proprietor.

But suppose the *jus gentium* to have created private ownership and the contemporary generations perfectly satisfied with the arrangement because the new *jus* was founded on their own consent expressed or implied, would such an arrangement have any binding force on future generations?

Certainly the contrary, on the principles of the Compactists. The thing did not originate in the natural *jus*; it was not strictly necessary, but was commended only as expedient and beneficial; it was founded on a compact of the generations who freely entered upon it. How, then, can future generations be morally bound to respect and to abide by it? This mutual agreement, says Signorello, could bind none except those who freely entered upon it; those who came after them could not surely be held by it except it were founded on the natural law. (Philos. Moralis, Par. 2, Ch. 2, Art. 4.)

"I would like to inquire," says Liberatore, "by what reason this compact could take the force of *jus* and oblige all future generations who never gave their vote for it." (Jus Naturæ, Par. 1, Ch. 4.)

A recent writer has attempted an answer to this argument by saying that the essential character of man's nature, which rendered

the division necessary, especially after the Fall, not being changed, but remaining the same, must weigh equally with future generations as it did with those who established individual property. Besides, the blessing and law of the increase of population render their distribution more and more indispensable as generations succeed to generations.

This assuredly is a sorry defence of the pretended compact, and not at all calculated to recommend it to future generations. What does the defence amount to? To this, that, especially after the Fall, the division was rendered necessary by the essential character of man's nature, and that future generations should hold it sacred and inviolate because the essential character of their nature, not being changed, demands the same division; the necessity of which is made more indispensable and imperative in proportion as generations follow each other and become more and more numerous by reason of the law of increase.

We would beg of the common sense of our readers to decide whether this kind of reasoning, instead of demonstrating the necessity of any pretended compact causing individual proprietorship, does not, on the contrary, put in the best possible light the truth that such a right flows from the law of nature. What is necessary to the essential character of man's nature, what is indispensable to it, what becomes more and more exacting and imperative every day as generations of men succeed each other, is assuredly natural and not arbitrary, and must be derived from a law of man's nature and not from an imaginary compact which never existed, and which, considering that dire necessity, men would not have been at liberty to withhold, if ever called upon to offer an opinion.

Finally, the last reason against the Compact theory urged by modern writers is its liability to be changed or abolished on the same authority which established it. The right of changing or abolishing altogether that arrangement which set up private ownership entered upon either by means of a formal or tacit agreement must be conceded to every generation of man, and to the same generation as often as they deem it just or expedient to exercise it. For if one generation could convene and establish by a common consent individual proprietorship in permanent objects, why could not another generation come together and sweep away at one stroke all private ownership? Surely the early generations had no more power than the present one now has; therefore the latter can overthrow by an explicit or implied consent what the former set up by the same means. Billuart, the theologian, so much quoted and so much relied upon by the recent defenders of this theory, freely and cheerfully admits the consequence. In his "*De Jure*," Diss. I, art. 3, he says: "The natural *jus* is absolutely

and of its own nature necessary, independently of any human consent; the *jus gentium* is not absolutely and of its own nature necessary, but has been introduced by the good will and consent of men in view of its usefulness and expediency. This is proven by the example of those things which are admitted to originate in the *jus gentium*, such as the division of land, private ownership, etc. These and all such things are not absolutely and of their own nature necessary to human life, but have been introduced simply as useful and convenient by the will of men, so that they can be abrogated by the same will.

The power, therefore, of abrogating the division of land and of individual ownership *must* be conceded to all generations of men, present as well as past. And who can fail to perceive the fearful and pernicious tendency of such a theory? Who can fail to see the tremendous weapon which is put in the hands of Socialists and Communists by saying to them, "You can at your pleasure, if you see fit and the majority consent to it, overthrow the whole social fabric and set up another on purely socialistic and communistic principles most agreeable to yourselves?"

They (the Compactists), says the *Civiltà Cattolica*, have concluded that the division of possessions was a positive institution, having its foundation in a primitive contract, in the civil law, or in the will of the State. If they thought to have strengthened private ownership by such means, they were sadly mistaken. The Socialists have made better use of such opinion for their own cause. And, indeed, on all such theories every right of property must always be precarious. Do you suppose it is based on a contract? Why, the contract can be rescinded. You maintain that it is founded on laws; the laws may be repealed at the pleasure of the legislators. Do you hold it to depend upon the will of the state? That will can vary at pleasure. Therefore, in consequence of the possibility of change, all sorts of property are shaken, vacillate, and remain uncertain for to-morrow. (Series 8, Vol. 9, page 437.)

The same writer quoted above argues against this conclusion by saying that what has been arbitrarily gotten up cannot always be pulled down without injustice. We can only reply by saying that the writer, in giving such an answer, evidently shows that he has not considered fully the import of his theory, nor worked it out to its remote consequences. Because, on the theory of the Compactists, which he so valiantly defends,—and it requires no common skill to make such an absurd opinion plausible,—the word injustice has no sense as applied between those who set up the *jus gentium* with regard to property and those who benefit by it. How stands the theory? That the title to all kinds of individual proprietorship, the property which comes from the occupancy of permanent ob-

jects, as well as that which is the result of human industry, labor, and exertion of every kind, is founded on, and receives its value from, the consent of mankind, which formally or tacitly agreed to create such a right and title. This is the very substance of the opinion of the Compactists. Then what is the inevitable consequence of such a principle? That those who established and set up the right may pull it down; that those who gave value and force to the title may take it away from it. And could any one complain of wrong and injustice? No; because the title to any kind of property has no justice or injustice of its own inherent in nature, resulting from the necessary relation of things, but derives all its force and value and significance from the *jus gentium*. The *jus gentium* made it, and the *jus gentium* can unmake it; and nobody is wronged, no natural relation is contravened, no essential connection is broken. Therefore, if mankind to-day were to agree to abolish individual proprietorship and to substitute Communism in any one of its forms, no intrinsic wrong would be done to any one. Private owners might feel chagrined at it, the thing might be done under circumstances which might make it a sin to do so, but never a wrong and an injustice, and the change would have to stand.

Those who understand the theory of the Compact, and have worked it out to its remotest consequences, do not shrink from admitting them. We will cite Molina, assuredly one of the best and most strenuous defenders of the theory, and held in such high esteem by the writer himself of the article we are commenting on.

In his great work, "De Just. et de Jure," Vol. I., Tract. I., Disp. 5, asking the question whether the *jus gentium* is subject to dispensation or abrogation, and answering in general in the affirmative for the reason of its having been introduced by the human will, he comes to discuss in particular the *jus gentium* with regard to the division of goods, and says: "With regard to the division of goods, if it were totally abolished, so many evils would result from it that it would undoubtedly be a mortal sin entirely to abolish it. But if it were done, I have no doubt that the thing would hold. The reason is that, as the human will was the sufficient cause of the division of goods, so must the human will be the sufficient cause for abolishing it."

Our readers will remark that Molina, with deliberation and with complete calculation of the terrible consequences and evils which a total abolition of all private property would entail, calls such an abrogation a mortal sin, but not an injustice, a wrong, and discards all idea of reparation or restitution, as he maintains that, if the thing were done, he has no doubt but it would hold.

However, with regard to the evils and disorders which would result from the abolition of private ownership, and which the afore-

said writer endeavors to make capital of to show that it would not be proper for mankind to annul the institution, we would beg to observe that society, and society alone, must be the sole judge of the expediency of the measure and of the amount of good expected from it, even making full allowance for the inevitable evils which must necessarily accompany a change of such vast proportions, and the uprooting of an institution which has sent forth its roots far and wide for so many generations.

In the second place, the evil, to be sure, would fall mostly on those who have experienced the fruit and the result of the first compact, that is, on all property owners who have enjoyed their wealth by the good will of society, and they may well put up with some suffering and privations at the hands of their own benefactor.

Thirdly, Socialists and Communists contend that no evil or disorder can compare with the terrible and unutterable woes, misery and wretchedness which have been entailed on mankind by the pernicious and iniquitous compact setting up individual proprietorship and maintaining it against all efforts to the contrary—a compact so infamous, so contrary to the laws of nature and humanity as to allow a few to nestle in the lap of luxury and comfort whilst the great majority of mankind are shivering with cold and hunger and dying of want. What possible reason can prevent these Socialists and Communists, should they ever be in the majority in any nation, from rooting out such a pernicious institution so as to give to their system a thorough and sufficient experiment?

We conclude the argument of modern Catholic authors against the theory of the compact. The alleged compact must be looked upon as a pure and unmitigated fancy and figment of the imagination, because—

1st. A formal convention of mankind, establishing by common agreement the division of the land and of all other permanent objects, and setting up the right of individual proprietorship, according to all known history, never took place.

2d. Because to account for such a convention unknown to history, it must fall back on a primitive state of man preceding all historical records, when he roamed about like a wild and untamed animal.

3d. Because, for want of historical proof testifying to the fact of any such real convention having taken place, it must suppose a tacit and presumed consent of mankind in the institution of private property on terms and conditions such as would never have been acceded to by the worst idiots.

4th. Because, on the supposition of such a convention, formal or tacit, in setting up the right of private ownership, the contracting parties would have gone beyond their right and their powers.

5th. Because such an agreement would have been in conflict with the natural law as a practical abrogation of the principle that the law of nature neither sanctions the right of holding property in common, nor the right of possessing it in private; and to abolish the former, to set up exclusively the latter, would contravene such law of nature.

6th. Because this presumed agreement, being the sole source and fountain from which the right of individual property is derived, would render stealing an indifferent action, evil if forbidden by human law, good if allowed.

7th. Because such an agreement would have no binding force or authority on the generation that never voted for it.

8th. Finally, because, as the early generation by a common agreement established private ownership, every succeeding generation must be allowed the power and authority to change, to modify, to abrogate, or to annul such agreement, and hence all property is shaken to the very foundation, all confidence gone, and the best possible weapons put in the hands of the enemies of property and social order.

Having explained and rejected the opinion of the Compactists, we come now to unfold and discuss the second opinion.

This has been held, as a rule, by all those writers who came after the French Revolution, and who had their attention forcibly called to the question of the origin of the right of property by the errors of Socialism and Communism. These, whom we have called Naturalists for the sake of brevity, maintain that the right of individual proprietorship originates in the natural law, and springs from the inherent essential, necessary relations of things.

The theory of the natural source of the right of property has been held by the best and the highest among the *élite* of Catholic writers. Besides St. Thomas¹ we may mention Cardinal De Lugo, who is *facile princeps* among moral theologians. "The natural *jus*," he says, "may be taken in two senses: as that which is common to man and to inferior animals; and in this sense the division of goods and dominions does not spring from the natural *jus*. In the second sense it is taken to mean a law binding independently of all positive commands which may be added to it. In this sense the division of goods and dominions, taking the latter in a generic signification, appertains to the natural *jus*. When, therefore, it is said that the division of goods and dominions was introduced by the *jus gentium*, this must be understood of the division generically considered, and not of this or that particular mode of

¹ See our pamphlet: The Doctrine of St. Thomas on the right of Property and of its Use.

acquiring dominion; and then the *jus gentium* spoken of is that which is distinct from the natural *jus* in the first sense, inasmuch as this is common to men and brutes, but not from the natural law understood in the second sense. Nay, Justinian expressly says that the *jus gentium* is that which theologians call the natural *jus*, that is, that which is independent of all precept added to nature's confines." (De Lugo, De Just. et de Jure, Disp. 6, Sectio Prima, Palmé Edition.)

The next in order are Cardinal Francis Toletus and Cardinal Gaietanus.

"The division of things," says the former, "was made by a human *jus*. But observe that the human *jus* is two-fold: the first is the *jus gentium*, which by reasoning and inference is derived from the natural law; the other is the positive, which is established by the human will. This division, therefore, was made by both laws; in general, indeed, by the *jus gentium* as to its imperativeness, that is, the *jus gentium* teaches that the division should be made. In particular, however, that this should belong to this one and that to another was done by the human will. And thus the aforesaid doctors¹ explain, and also Gaietanus, though they call the *jus gentium* itself natural because it is derived from the natural law." (Toletus, in Summa, 2a 2æ, Quest. 6, Art. 2.)

The next is Soto, who maintains that natural *jus* and the *jus gentium* are the same thing; and that the only difference between them is that the natural *jus* is that which is perceived by the human mind without reasoning or discourse, whereas the *jus gentium* is that which is elicited by the human reason from natural principles without any human convention and without long consideration. (Soto, De Just. et de Jure, Ques. 5, Art. 4.)

To these must be added the great Bellarmine and all those schoolmen and theologians who hold the doctrine that the *jus gentium* is a consequence of the natural law.

"*Jus gentium* est quasi conclusio deducta ex jure naturæ per humanum discursum." (De Controv. de Laicis, Ch. 6.) And in the work "De Bonis Operibus in Particulari," the same Bellarmine, Lib. 3, ch. 10, in refuting the opinion of those who contended that the evangelical law does not permit private property, concludes: "Who can believe that the evangelical law, which is most perfect and which does not destroy but adorns nature, would take away the advantages which accrue from the division of things, and entail all those inconveniencies and absurdities which arise from Communism and confusion?"

Bergier, in his "Droit des Gens," says: "C'est ce qu' une nation

¹ Gabriel Medina and others.

peut exiger d' une autre en vertu de la loi naturelle." (Dictionnaire Theologique, art. Droit des Gens.)

Tournely holds the same opinion. "Individual proprietorship of goods, and consequently the division thereof, must be attributed to the natural law." (De Just. et de Jure, Pars Secunda, Art. 4.)

Coming down to recent times, we venture to say that all Catholic writers in every department of science, theologians, canonists, philosophers, publicists, historians, orators, agree in holding the right of private ownership to have originated in the natural law. Among them we will mention, as representative, Dr. Brownson, who says explicitly: "The state does not create the right to property. The right to hold property is prior to civil society, and is one of those rights called the natural rights of man." (Works, Vol. 12, page 361.) And, highest of all, we have the testimony of Leo XIII., who distinctly affirms that the Church commands the right of property *originating in the nature of things* to be maintained safe and inviolate to all.

The authors we have referred to, in spite of a few accidental differences as to the details of their theory, unanimously agree in maintaining that the right of individual proprietorship in land or all permanent objects originates in the natural law; and, as Portalis expresses it, it is in the very constitution of our being,¹ and, as Troplong puts it, it is so inseparable from human nature that it is impossible to conceive man living and preserving his life without this inborn consubstantial right.²

As we have done with the theory of the Compactists, we will lay down the salient points of the system of our modern writers.

First Principle.—The earth was created for the good of all, and to be owned by mankind in common, in a negative, but not in a positive sense.

What is meant by a thing being possessed by a collective number of men in common, in a negative, but not in a positive, sense, they explain as follows: A thing is said to be owned in common by a body of men in a positive sense when it is possessed by them exclusively in their collective capacity, and in no sense whatever in their individual capacity, so that, though owned by all collectively, none of them, individually considered, can lay any claim to it, and much less appropriate it. For instance, a public building, say a town hall, is owned in common by the people in a positive sense, because they really and truly own it

¹ Le principe de ce droit est à nous; il n'est pas le résultat d'une convention humaine ou d'une loi positive. Il est dans la constitution même de notre être, et dans nos différentes relations avec les objets qui nous environnent. *Exposé des motifs.*

² De la Propriété. Ch. III, page 16.

in common as a body; but no individual of that body, considered as such, can appropriate or lay a claim to it as his own.

A thing is said to be common to a collective body of men in a negative sense, because when actually unoccupied or unappropriated, every individual of the multitude has a right to appropriate it wholly or in part, and none can be excluded from such right; but when once appropriated it ceases to be common and becomes individual property. Briefly, a thing is held positively in common by a body of men when they really and exclusively own it as a body in their collective capacity. It is said to be held in common in a negative sense when they as a body really and truly do not hold it except in the sense that whilst the thing remains unoccupied by any of them, each one has a right to make it his own, to the exclusion of everybody else during the occupation; should the thing be given up by that individual, the right of all would revive until a new occupation occurred. (Costa Rossetti, loc. cit.; Signorello, loc. cit.) It is in this latter sense that modern writers contend the earth to be common to mankind; that is to say, that really and truly men in their collective capacity do not possess the earth except in the sense that whilst unoccupied and unappropriated any individual of the race has the right to make part of it his own; but once occupied and appropriated, it becomes the property of the individual who occupied it, to the exclusion, during the occupation, of every one else. Should the occupation cease, the right of all the others revives until a new occupation takes place.

The import and significance of this principle of modern authors is in this, that it clears the ground, and removes all obstacles which might be raised against individual property.

Second Principle.—Man has an inborn, inherent right, arising from his very essence and from the constitution of his nature and faculties, to make some external permanent object his own.

Third Principle.—Such right has its root and origin in man's natural and imperative necessity to maintain and to develop his physical, intellectual, moral and social life; a necessity which impels him to exercise his free authority, to unite to himself external permanent objects to be part and parcel of himself, and, as it were, the extension and radiation of his personality.

Fourth Principle.—That the natural, primitive, juridical means to unite land or any permanent object to one's self is that peculiar exercise of man's free activity called occupancy or appropriation.

Fifth Principle.—That such an act, to be juridically valid and in conformity with the natural law, must be invested with the following conditions:

1st. The permanent good to be occupied must be absolutely *res nullius*, entirely free from any claim of previous occupancy, yet having reasonable value.

2d. That the person occupying it should by an act of his intellect and will select and set apart that object exclusively for himself, and actually consider it as such.

3d. That he should by his personal activity impress upon that object an external sign indicative of the occupancy and appropriation.

4th. That, supposing the occupancy to regard land, the extent of land one can occupy must necessarily be measured and limited by his natural wants, not understood in the sense of strict and absolute physical necessity, but in a liberal sense, taking into consideration man's intellectual, moral and social wants and other circumstances.

That these conditions are reasonable and derived from the intrinsic nature of things, is manifest upon the slightest consideration. Suppose a number of sailors after a long voyage spy an unknown island. Glad of the chance to stretch their limbs, they land and find it entirely unoccupied; after passing a few hours, they join their ship. Does that temporary physical occupancy of that island give them any right to it? Certainly not. To acquire such a right, they should in intention have set apart that island for themselves and resolved to take it forever.

But how would new-comers know of such intention and determination, since the acts of the mind and of the will are invisible and cannot be known except by their external results? If these sailors, therefore, intended to occupy that island juridically, to acquire the right to own it, and to cause that right to be respected by others, they should have impressed upon that land some durable sign of occupation.

Writers, indeed, are not agreed as to what such a sign ought to be. But the better and greater part are of opinion that it should be some act of human activity impressed upon the land itself, no matter how slight or incipient in its nature, provided it would serve the purpose of pointing out a human occupancy. This results from the very nature of the thing. If the sign of occupancy were easily effaced or removed, the right which would follow from it would be precarious; the moment other men would perceive no sign of previous occupancy, they would have a right to conclude that the land was unoccupied and free from all lien or claim. On the other hand, if a long, laborious exercise of human activity were required, the right could never be juridically acquired; because, whilst the first comers would be working it up to the required condition, others might come in greater force and with

greater activity, and accomplish the task much sooner, and thus acquire the right, to the exclusion of the first comers.

Finally, the last condition set upon occupancy by the natural law is manifest. A man has a right to make a parcel of ground his own by occupancy. On what plea? To satisfy his reasonable wants, physical, intellectual, moral and social. Then by the law of nature he can occupy as much land as, by the aid of his own personal exertions, will reasonably satisfy those wants. If he occupies more, he does so without any reason or ground, and cannot, therefore, acquire any right upon it. The consequence cannot be wider than its premises, nor the effect greater than its cause. If man's natural wants, understood in the sense we have explained, are the reason and the ground for the right of occupancy, the moment these wants are reasonably satisfied the wants cease, and, therefore, the right.

From these conditions modern authors conclude that the right of human activity to appropriate land is necessarily limited; whereas the right of human activity to production and its results can be and is unlimited.

Sixth Principle.—The right of individual property in land originates and takes its rise in the natural *jus*, and the primitive division of the earth was but an exercise of that right.

Seventh Principle.—Civil authority, whilst acknowledging theoretically and practically the right of private property in land or as a result of man's labor and exertion, can regulate its exercise by just and equitable laws, in view of the common good of the social body, but always maintaining the right of private ownership safe and inviolable.

Eighth Principle.—That which is called the right of *eminent domain*, vested in the State, is not the right of property or a real *dominium*, strictly speaking, on the property of all the members of the State, but only a right of prescribing what is wanted for the general good, to levy taxes on the property of individuals, to inflict fines and penalties, to make assessments, and to appropriate for the general good and use whatever private property may be necessary, provided it gives the private owners a proper and suitable compensation. (Gousset, *Theolog. Moralis*, Tom. I, n. 674. See Bishop Chatard's learned discourse on this subject.)

These last two principles are of very great importance in the system of our modern authors.

The Compactist theory attributes to the State and civil authority the right of having created individual proprietorship, and the right of eminent domain in the sense that the State is the true, the supreme and universal proprietor of all the goods and possessions of its citizens; two rights which, if real, would bring about the

worst and most colossal despotism, and abolish from the face of the earth all personal independence and freedom in the citizens, to turn them into the most abject slaves.

The naturalist theory, on the other hand, resting on the last two principles above explained, whilst rejecting those two pretended rights from the State, attributes to it enough power and authority to prevent most and the greatest of the abuses which might originate in the right of individual ownership in land or otherwise. It is urged, for instance, against the natural origin of the right of property arising from occupancy, that it may be abused and that the land-grabbers might usurp too much to the exclusion of others. Whilst admitting the natural right of occupancy, and with the best purpose to maintain it, the civil authority may regulate the amount to be occupied, the conditions under which it may be occupied, and so forth, and thus remove the difficulty.

Again, one might come to possess too much land by other titles than that of occupancy. The civil authority, whilst recognizing these titles and the right resulting from them, may define and limit the amount to be owned by each individual.

Moreover, speculators may acquire land by just titles, and may conspire together to hold them, in an unimproved condition, to enhance the price of the same to satisfy their own covetousness. The civil authorities, again, whilst maintaining their just rights, may make laws regulating the period of time during which it will allow land to remain waste and unimproved, etc. It is in this sense that the old theologians, such as Cardinal Tolet and others, say that the *jus gentium*, that is, the natural law, necessarily prescribes the division of land, and that the positive law distributes it.

If it be asked, whence do all these rights come to the State? we answer, that they flow, as a necessary consequence, from the nature of the social condition to which man naturally tends, and in which he must live and attain his end.

Having given a sufficiently complete idea of the theory of the Naturalists, we come to put forward the proofs they allege in favor of their system. And among these we will choose only those arguments which are supplied by the theory and admissions of the Compactists themselves.

We premise that in speaking of the earth we intend to include all kinds of permanent goods and objects. Now the principal argument upon which the whole Compact theory rests may be put as follows:

It is evident that man, the family, society, must be supplied with all the means necessary for the maintenance, growth and development of their lives; it is also manifest that these means must originally and radically be drawn from the earth, which, therefore,

must be tilled and worked to its utmost capacity. But if the land were held in common, all that would be drawn from the earth could hardly supply those necessities so much and so imperatively needed, owing to the fact that, his nature being fallen and corrupted, man is prone to indulge in the love of self and to neglect others, he is a slave to envy, covetousness, ambition, and self-indulgence, prone to seek his own ease and comfort, and to avoid all exertion and labor. The *better*, therefore, to provide for wants so exacting, so various, and so pressing, and to avoid other grave evils, men, either by an engagement expressly entered into, or by a tacit consent, introduced the partition of and individual proprietorship in land. (Bill., loc. cit.)

All other Compactists agree with Billuart. We will cite among others the Salmanticenses: "That the division of the earth, supposing man's condition, was necessary, is evident from the fact that after the fall, man bursting with pride and cupidity, made torpid by indolence and neglect, every one would have sought all things for himself; every one would have desired to domineer and have power over others; everyone to be master, and none servants or laborers; hence daily disputes, quarrels and strife without number. And as none would attend to or take care of that which is common, but would turn all his anxiety upon what is his own, the fields would remain untilled, all giving way to indolence and sloth. That the fields might be worked, that all might lead a life of tranquillity and peace, it was most expedient to distribute something to each one, in order that every one might know what was his own, and thus would not cease to work, but eat his bread by the sweat of his brow." (De Jure et Just., Ch. 2. Punctus Primus.)

Upon this fundamental argument of the Compactists modern authors remark, 1st, that it is built on a false and gratuitous supposition; 2d, that if it proves anything, if it has any logical force, it demonstrates the absolute necessity of attributing the origin of the right of property to the natural law.

And, first, the argument is built on a false supposition. It takes for granted that if man had persevered in the state of original justice, he could have had all things in common with his fellow-men, because in such a state he would have been absolutely unselfish, and not have loved himself in preference to others; he would have sought nothing for himself, but have been most anxious for the good and welfare of others; in one word, would have been a model Communist.

Now, suppose we grant all these virtues, does it follow that men in that state would have possessed everything in common, and that individual ownership would not have been introduced? Certainly not. To warrant such a conclusion the Compactists would

have to prove two things: 1st. That in that state God intended men to possess everything in common. Now, they can never prove this intention of the Creator; first, because there is no positive revealed indication of such intention; and secondly, because the real and actual differences among men, as to qualities of mind and body, on which private ownership is radically founded, point to a different conclusion, and indicate that the Creator meant the very opposite. Even Billuart concedes that, supposing men to have remained in original justice, most probably private ownership would have been established in view of the social wants of men. (Bill., *De Just.*, Diss. 4, Art. 1.)

The first supposition failing, the second also vanishes. It assumes as conceded that, in the original state of justice and according to the intention of the Creator, man would have felt more love for others than for himself, and would have cared much more for the common good than for his own private interests. Now, by the very fact that a man is a personality distinct from another, a personality whom God Himself respects and treats with all possible regard and consideration, and even with reverence, as the Scripture has it, he must have for himself and his personality a legitimate and proper regard, a reasonable care for the preservation and progress of his physical, intellectual and moral life; in one word, a paramount consideration for the welfare of his personality and of those who are connected or whom he joins by his voluntary and free acts with the weal or woe of his individuality. It is not necessary to add that all this is man's bounden duty. To say that in the original state man would not have been *sui amans, alieni negligens, cupiditati et ambitioni serviens*, is to talk the sheerest nonsense. An irregular and inordinate love of himself, an illegitimate desire for the goods of this earth, a restless and unbounded ambition, might not have been found in that happy state, on the supposition of man's perseverance in original justice and righteousness. We say, "on the supposition," because, as it is clear, man could have fallen at any moment, and his temporary perseverance in original justice was no guarantee that he would have continued in it forever. Given human liberty and the state of trial and probation, man could have fallen at any time as Adam did, as far as we can conjecture, soon after his creation. If man, therefore, had remained in the state of original justice, he would not have yielded to an unruly love of himself and of all belonging to him, he would not have nourished in his bosom covetousness, envy, ambition, and lust after domination and supremacy; but he would certainly have yielded to the natural, sacred love of himself, his personality, his physical, intellectual, moral and social welfare, and that of all depending upon and connected with him, in preference to any

single individual or community. "Every one," says Aristotle, "loves himself much more than he loves others; hence we must not condemn all kinds of love of self, but only the immoderate love of self." (Polit., Lib. 2, Ch. 3, Art. 1.)

If love for one's personality, therefore, if a legitimate desire for one's interests and those of one's family, be the motive which prompted mankind to introduce private ownership, such motive would have existed and prevailed just as well in the primitive state as in the present; and individual proprietorship would have been the necessary consequence. Suarez, who is a great advocate of the Compact, freely admits the result. It is to be remarked that men in that state might have tilled the earth, and perhaps sowed a part of it. The necessary consequence would be, that after one had cultivated a certain portion of the earth it would have been *unjust* in another to have deprived him of the use and *almost of the possession* of it, because natural reason and order demand this. (De Opere Sex Dierum, 15, Ch. 7, n. 18.)

The division of the earth and private ownership, therefore, would have been necessary either in the state of original justice or in that of fallen nature. But what is necessary to man in any state must spring from the aspirations, cravings, and wants of his being and faculties. Therefore, private ownership is a natural right and not an arbitrary or gotten-up law of man's will and pleasure.

This remark introduces us to the other part of our demonstration, which is the very essence and marrow of the question, to wit, that if the reasons alleged by the Compactists in favor of the *jus gentium* have any value, they prove the natural origin of the right of property.

Modern authors reason as follows: Either individual proprietorship is a necessity imperatively demanded by man's nature to satisfy all the wants he feels in his capacity as individual, as family, and as social being, or it is not at all demanded, but is only an expedient and a better and easier means, a more convenient way to procure man's welfare in all those respects. If the former be admitted, then it is owned that individual proprietorship originates in the natural law; because what is imperatively necessary to man's nature is natural and not artificial or arbitrary, according to Billuart's criterion. If individual proprietorship is claimed not as at all necessary, but as a better expedient, a greater convenience, an easier way of managing and supplying the wants and aspirations and cravings of men and of society, then it follows that, absolutely speaking, man's wants, those of the family and of the body civil, can be provided for, the social order and welfare maintained, and all social progress and advancement obtained in the state of Communism.

The upholders of the Compact freely acknowledge this consequence. "I maintain," says Billuart, "that even supposing the corruption of nature, the division of goods was not at all simply and absolutely necessary for the social life and administration of possessions; because, absolutely speaking, all these things could be attained, though with greater difficulty, under the community principle; but the division is much more suitable to these ends." (Bill., Diss. 4, Art. 1.)

The evident consequence of such principles is that neither the possession of goods in common nor the holding of them in private is necessary to the existence, life, and progress of man, of the family, of society; that man, the family, society, could get along under either form of holding possessions; only, under the communistic form, with a little more difficulty. Should men prefer to get along more peaceably and more expeditiously, they had better cling to the compact made for them by their ancestors.

Modern authors, in the first place, beg to know from their opponents whether, according to reason and common sense, a means acknowledged to be the best, the speediest, the easiest, and the most convenient to the attainment of a certain end, is not the proper legitimate natural means as compared with another which may attain the same object, but only with much greater difficulty.

In the second place, they most emphatically deny what Compactists take for granted and, without the least suspicion to the contrary, look upon as something well proved and put beyond the possibility of a doubt, that man's wants can be satisfied, and that all that he requires for his physical, intellectual, moral, and social existence, development and progress, can be obtained nearly as well by Communism as by private ownership.

This arbitrary, gratuitous assumption is absolutely contradicted. How do the Compact defenders prove such an assertion? What! all the means which man requires for the maintenance and preservation of his individual life in all orders, physical, intellectual, and moral; all the means which he requires to create and establish domestic society, to provide for all its wants and necessities, to defray all expenses needed to educate and train the family; all that is demanded for the establishment and preservation of order in the State; for the maintenance of tranquillity and peace among citizens, for the avoiding of strife and quarrels, for the prevention of endless disputes and litigations, and for the settling of them according to law and order; all that is imperatively required for the guidance of the State toward a continual development, progress, and civilization, by the amelioration of the conditions of all classes, by the promotion of all legitimate, bold, and successful enterprises, —all these grand objects can be procured, all this multitude of the

most necessary as well as beneficial results can be obtained nearly as easily by Communism as by the partition of the earth and all permanent goods and their distribution among individuals? Are the upholders of such a stupendous assertion prepared to substantiate it? For if they do not and cannot, they must yield up their theory as absolutely groundless.

In plain English, the Compactists maintain that mankind can get along nearly as well under a communistic form of possession and government as under a government having for its basis private ownership. They must maintain that, or their theory vanishes as a bubble. Why did it require a convention and a compact to divide the land and to establish private ownership? Because the right of private ownership is not proclaimed as necessary by the natural law, men being well able, strictly speaking, to have all their wants supplied by a system of Communism.

Neither Communism nor private property is at all a necessary and indisputable means. Either of them will do. One is nearly as good as the other. Let, then, Compactists prove that assertion before urging their imaginary and mythical compact and convention, and if they cannot prove it let them forego their absurd system.

Modern writers, on the other hand, having established that Communism in every possible and imaginable form is contrary to all the ends for which the material world and the earth were made, having proven that the wants of men cannot be supplied by such a system, having demonstrated that it could not exist for a moment without trampling under foot the most legitimate inborn, sacred rights of human personality, conclude that private ownership is a sheer necessity, an imperative, exclusive sole means of satisfying man's wants and of respecting his rights, and that, therefore, the right of individual proprietorship is an inborn, inherent right, resulting from the very essence and nature of human personality.

THE REUNION OF CHRISTENDOM.

ON the 1st of March of the present year there was presented to the Archbishop of Canterbury, and the Bishops then assembled in conference at Lambeth Palace, an address from the "Association for the Promotion of the Unity of Christendom," to which the attention of Catholics may well be invited.

The address begins by stating that "the object of the Association is to induce Christians of all confessions to join in prayer for the restoration of unity, but it does not bind its members to any special theory as to the mode of such restoration." It then renders thanks for the gracious manner in which a similar memorial was received by the Lambeth Conference in 1878, approval having been given to the annual observance of a special day of prayer for the unity of Christendom, and it attributes to these intercessions the constantly increasing desire for that unity which, it says, has been manifested on all sides during the ten years that have since elapsed. After instancing various evidences of this in Europe, in America, and even in the far East, the petitioners continue:

"The manifest advances thus apparent on all sides call for more earnest prayer, lest by precipitate action or by any false step the great work to which God is evidently calling His people may be hindered."

Three principles, which seem to be fundamental with the Association, are then laid down:

"In the midst of our divisions we must never forget that the truths we hold in common are more numerous, and of greater importance, than the points on which we differ; and that there can be no complete and final reunion of Christendom which does not embrace all who are fighting in the name of Christ against Atheism, Infidelity and Sin; but, on the other hand, that mutual tolerance is not unity, and must not be confounded with it;" which last principle might profitably be pondered by our Evangelical Alliance and Church Congresses.

After adducing, as reasons for encouraging reunion in every possible way, the increase of Atheism and Rationalism and the persistence of Heathenism and Mohammedanism, it alleges a reason of telling significance for all who have read the Comedy of Convocation, or have meditated on the facts it treats of:

"The danger of fresh heresies arising from attempts to obviate the apparent collisions between science and religion, *without the guidance of a competent spiritual authority.*"

Apparently without suspecting that there was a sting here, under which their lordships would be apt to wince, the petitioners go on to pray that, in their lordships' deliberations:

"The great principles of the undivided Church may be given the prominence that is due to them, and that nothing may be done that would involve any uncanonical interference with the Ecclesiastical authorities existing by Divine appointment."

And, as if still unconscious how unpalatable such advice must be to prelates hopelessly committed to nationalism and hopelessly fettered by Erastianism, they go on:

"We would further venture to suggest that, in regulating missions to the heathen, antagonistic missions may be discouraged, so as to lessen, as far as may be, the presentation of a divided Christendom; that the independence of national churches within due limits may be upheld; and that, in whatever is done, the necessity of obtaining the judgment of a true and legitimate General Council, as soon as it can be had, may ever be borne in mind."

The memorial concludes by praying that God's Holy Spirit "may lead us to look to the removal of misunderstandings, and to rejoice in our points of agreement, until we accept, in all its fulness, the 'One Lord, one Faith, one Baptism.'"

It is not difficult to imagine the effect of this memorial on the Lambeth Conference. With profound respect they are petitioned to pray, and to ask the prayers of their flocks, that Almighty God would undo that work of separation so determinedly accomplished by their predecessors, and so strenuously maintained by them for centuries, that He would deign to obliterate all that is distinctively characteristic of their position as Bishops of the Church of England. With affectionate and unsuspecting candor they are requested to reprobate that reprobation of Rome which, says Newman, "was the palmary, the most effective argument of the Reformers, . . . and is the received teaching of Anglican bishops and divines from Latimer down to Dr. Wordsworth." With ingenuous simplicity they are exhorted to ignore that supremacy of the State over "Ecclesiastical authorities existing by Divine appointment," whose observance is their primary obligation as officials of the Church by law established. From keen-witted Frenchmen or Italians, such a petition would be a piece of the broadest sarcasm; but, coming from a source whence humor would be unimaginable, it has to be taken as seriously and reverently meant. Consistency demands that it should receive the same courtesy as in 1878. So the secretary is, as a matter of course, instructed to return an answer of paternal kindness, the intrusive incident is passed over, and the Conference moves on in its staid old-time groove.

But the incident is not forgotten by them all. There are men

among them in whose minds those thoughts have been fermenting ever since their university days. Those yearnings are an emanation of one of the most glorious epochs of Oxford, and their spirit lingers there still, and tells upon every honest and earnest young student of Divinity. That memorial from "The Association for the Promotion of the Unity of Christendom" conjures up memories of great-minded and God-loving men who have carried those very thoughts and aspirations to what, they well know, is their only logical conclusion, and have taken to their heart the pearl of great price, cost what it might. These memories are unwelcome spectres to men situated as they are, and it is not pleasant to have them recalled by the petition of these devotees.

Then, too, the present situation of things is so very uncertain. Disestablishment is in the air, and it is sure to alight before long. Shall they, therefore, bravely go forth to meet the inevitable, cast off the shackles of Erastianism, and rise to the level of what they think they are—Bishops of the Church of Jesus Christ? Or shall they rather act more cautiously than ever and seek to delay the blow which is so rudely to set them free? Surely men are to be pitied who are placed in so embarrassing a dilemma and do not find in themselves the spirit of heroes and martyrs to duty.

While the Anglican clergy must naturally, to a great extent, feel their sympathies and their action restrained by the considerations which hamper their bishops, it cannot be reasonably expected that these aspirations after the reunion of Christendom will find large acceptance, even among the laity of the Church of England. They may not be withheld by the temptation which is obvious in the case of the clergy, but hereditary prejudice sways them with tremendous power. We have little, if any, more reason to hope now than Newman had in 1871, "that ecclesiastical courts, university authorities, mobs and vestries, will ever lose their keen scent for detecting popery, and their intense satisfaction in persecuting it."

In the fraction of the English people, and of the adherents of Episcopalianism everywhere, who profess High-Church views, the association in question indicates a craving and a conviction drawing them towards the Catholic Church, but halting short of what that drawing implies and demands. It presents the touchingly sad spectacle of a large number of good and pious souls in whom the Spirit of God is resisted by the clinging of human traditions and attachments, who are united in praying for what is logically impossible on the terms which, consciously or unconsciously, the great bulk of them implicitly propose to Almighty God. We must hope that the Father of Mercies will regard the spirit of the prayer rather than its mistaken conditions, and that He will lead, if not the Church of England, yet many of these yearning souls,

into the unity for which they crave. Some, especially among the leaders, "though," in the words of Newman, "they see or suspect their own tendency to be towards Rome, may put this suspicion aside and remain where they are, in the confidence that, if they are but patient, they shall ultimately succeed in bringing over their whole communion to their own views." Many, not given to thinking deeply or logically, will keep on contentedly in a system which soothes them with its spiritual views, its liturgical observances, and its religious æstheticism. Not a few, logical by nature, will, as the same enlightened observer testifies, "be thrown by a reaction into rationalism. When the opening heart and eager intellect find themselves led on by their teachers, as if by the hand, to the See of St. Peter, and then all of a sudden, without good reason assigned, are stopped in their course, bid stand still in some half position, on the middle of a steep, or in the depth of a forest, the natural reflection which such a command excites is, 'This is a mockery; I have come here for nothing; if I do not go on, I must go back.'"

But it is well to bear in mind that this is a problem whose solution does not depend only on human wits and wills. It is one in which the will of God is greatly concerned, and that surely must count for much in the final issue. While we write, the lessons of Holy Week are ringing in our ears and in our hearts. Holy Thursday brings to our minds the prayer of Our Lord at the Last Supper: "That they all may be one, as Thou, Father, in Me, and I in Thee, that they also be one in Us, that the world may believe that Thou hast sent Me." On Good Friday, the prayer of Our Lord echoes back from the heart of His Spouse. "Let us pray," she exclaims to her children, "for all who are in heresy and schism, that our God and Lord may deliver them from all errors, and may deign to recall them to our Holy Mother, the Catholic and Apostolic Church." And then she implores Him "who saveth all and wisheth none to be lost," that He would mercifully bring them back to the unity of His truth. On Holy Saturday again, inspired by the prophecies of her universal motherhood, comforted by the assurance of the tender mercy that is ever mingled with God's justice, and encouraged to boundless hope by that wonderful vision of the dry bones that strewed the plain raised up again to life and strength, she implores the God of infinite power and light eternal to be mindful of the mystical unity which He has promised to His Church, and of all that is needful for the salvation of the human race, "that the whole world may behold the things that have been cast down lifted up, and the things that are worn out renewed, and all things brought back again to unity in Him from whom they have received their origin?"

Thus the prayer of these poor erring souls is only a feeble echo

of the prayer of Our Lord and of His Spouse. Who can doubt that such a united supplication will, in God's time and way, lead to abundant and blessed results? The flood-tide which at one time seemed to follow in the wake of the splendid minds that headed the homeward movement has ebbed, indeed, and no expectation can reasonably be entertained of any great corporate return to the Church in either England or America. In all such calculations there probably was too much dependence on mere human ability and influence; and human plans and ways are often far from God's. But God's plan is sure to move on in God's way. That plan is salvation through unity in Christ; and when wandering souls are thus craving for salvation and unity, and the craving is becoming so wide-spread and so organized, one need not be an optimist to hope that the Divine plan will be largely realized even in our day. When the response to the Divine call was first heard, it was noticeable how much there was in it of clinging to erroneous ideas, of obstinacy in mistaken ways, how much of human pride and self-assertion. But time and reflection and the mercy of God are evidently fast eliminating those pernicious elements, which stood up resisting the grace that was asked for; and now it is reasonable to hope that the reaching out for unity, which thus far has been mostly groping in the dark, will more and more be enlightened from on high and attain its object.

Trusting, then, that the mercy of God will be with these poor strayed children of the Church, helping them back to reunion with the Body of Christ, it behooves us Catholics to consider what must be our dispositions towards those who by right should be our fellow-members in that unity. We cannot ignore the movement as not concerning us. If we have the charity of Christ and the spirit of His Holy Church in us, it must concern us deeply; the yearning in our hearts must be at least as strong as it is in those who know the blessings of unity only from the misfortune of having lost it. Still less may we entertain any hostility or aversion towards them, on account of wrongs done to the Church by them or their forefathers. Of the evil things said or done against us by most of them we can assuredly say with our Lord: "Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do." Least of all may we allow race antipathies to bias us against them. That would be to fall most shamefully into the same evil for which we rightly blame them, of allowing considerations of nationality to decide in questions of religion. It would be to prove false to our faith in the Church's catholicity, and to go directly counter to the spirit of the Heart of Our Lord. Between us and those who are painfully groping towards the blessing of Christian unity there must never be any "waving of the bloody shirt."

Clearly, then, it is our duty to help on the movement, at least

by the co-operation of our prayers. The supplication for peace and unity, which is the first of the three prayers before Communion in the Canon of the Mass, should become habitual with us. The cry that goes up from the Heart of Our Lord and of His Church in Holy Week should be re-echoed by every Christian soul all through the year. Surely we ought not to allow ourselves to be surpassed in this sacred duty by the poor children of error, nor desist from the prayer because we hear it on their lips. God's Providence makes much to depend on our prayers, and especially has Our Lord declared this in regard to the gathering in of the harvest of souls. It will not do for us to run risk of thwarting His merciful designs by failure to do our part. Daily prayer for the reunion of Christendom ought to be a serious duty with every Christian.

But while praying that God may lead back our erring brethren, it is well for us to consider in what guise they will see us standing to receive them. It would hardly be consistent to ask them back and to meet them with volleys of musketry. The circumstances of the times have so long compelled Catholics to maintain the attitude of controversialists that it is no wonder they should instinctively assume it when facing Protestants; yet daily experience shows that controversy does very little good to either Catholics or Protestants. The "*odium theologicum*" is an impulse which seems to be as common as it is powerful; yet all agree that it is unlovely and repulsive. Earnest souls are naturally prone to indignant and combative zeal, like that of the Sons of Thunder or of Peter smiting with his sword in the garden; yet we know that on both these occasions it was severely reprimanded by Our Lord himself. Provocation there has been indeed, and plenty, and signally so in this very movement for Christian reunion. We have not forgotten that Dr. Pusey's "Irenicon" was so violent and abusive that he was well reproached with having "discharged his olive-branch as if from a catapult"; and we know that some of the most insidious and insincere misrepresentations that have ever been leveled against the Catholic Church have emanated from persons standing high in the very Association whose memorial we are now considering. But while blaming them for such egregious inconsistency we must not ourselves be inconsistent. Our olive-branch must be extended in the charity that "is patient, is kind, . . . is not provoked to anger, . . . beareth all things, believeth all things, hopeth all things, endureth all things."

There is all the less reason for us now to meet them as controversialists, seeing that the very logic and forward impulse of the movement is fast dislodging its advocates from the false premises to which its first leaders clung so tenaciously. This we see virtually, if not explicitly, acknowledged in their successive utterances.

We remember how strenuously they at first insisted that Christian unity consisted in union with Christ the Head. But so plainly have they been shown that union with the Head implies the unity of the Body, and that union with the one Head is impracticable without membership in His one Body, that scarcely any one speaks now of Pusey's "Christian bodies" as a substitute for the Body of Christ. So plainly has it been demonstrated that this position was identical with that of the Donatists, which St. Augustine demolished fourteen centuries ago, that no one can now seriously think of maintaining it. In their effort, then, to vindicate to themselves a share in the unity of the Body, they still cherish the grain of comfort that they seem to find in the Branch theory. But even this they now put forward with a lack of enthusiasm which shows how their confidence in it has weakened. He who made the most desperate fight of all for the Via Media, before he was compelled in conscience to surrender it, has written :

"The 'Branch Theory,' that is, that the Roman, Greek and Anglican communions make up the one visible, indivisible Church of God which the Apostles founded, to which the promise of perseverance was made, is a view which is as paradoxical, when regarded as a fact, as it is heterodox when regarded as a doctrine."

And this he and others have proved with arguments so unanswerable, and the practical absurdity of the notion is so palpable, that further refutation of it by Catholics would be a work of supererogation, and they who still seek shelter behind it seem more than half conscious that it is untenable and ridiculous. Instead, therefore, of yielding to the natural inclination to give the *coup de grace* to a vanquished adversary, it is better to imitate Him who "breaketh not the bruised reed, nor quencheth the smoking flax," and to hold towards them, not the weapons of controversy, but the arms of the Good Shepherd.

Instead of wasting energy in a bootless warfare on ramparts that are crumbling of themselves, it will be far more profitable, as well as nobler and pleasanter, to win them from their false position by the beauty and power of truth. Our object must be, not to silence and confound, but to persuade and attract. The magnet can attract only what is kindred to it, and we can best attract them to the fulness of truth through the truth which they already hold in common with us. It is no want of loyalty to the fulness of the truth to acknowledge and honor any portion of it wherever it may be found. Truth is the light of God, and we should love and welcome any twinkling ray of it that has penetrated or lingered among those who have wandered from its full radiance. The heart of a true Catholic, enamored of the treasure which, through the mercy of God, he possesses, must rejoice at any particle of it, wherever found; and the more he compassionates the spiritual poverty of

those not privileged like himself, the more must he thank God for any, even the least, part of the heavenly gift which His Fatherly compassion still preserves among them. Satan indeed seeks to abuse the lingering blessing, by persuading them that it is all they need ; but we are not therefore to denounce it, but, on the contrary, by their appreciation of what they have, to win them to the fulness which they ought to possess and of which they have been robbed.

And this is assuredly the policy of practical good sense, as well as of truth and charity. No man is apt to come to meet you in agreement, if you begin by asserting that there is no common standing-ground between you. To tell him that he is simply an outside barbarian, is to tell him to give up all hope of understanding your language or accepting your position. That argument is naturally the most telling whose premises are found in the convictions of your opponent. The memorialists were not far astray when they wrote: "The truths we hold in common are more numerous, and of greater importance, than the points on which we differ." When this yearning for reunion with the Church first began to manifest itself, and carping critics, as is their wont, assailed it with sneers, insinuations, and cheap logic, Cardinal Wiseman, with the nobleness of heart which always characterized him, publicly recommended that the basis of negotiations for reconciliation should be the points of agreement between the doctrines held by Anglicans and the teachings of the Council of Trent. And he adduced the exactly similar advice given by Bossuet, when consulted by the Pope concerning the best way of treating with the followers of the Augsburg Confession. This does not in the slightest degree imply a minimizing of Catholic truth or duty, but only the rendering of all possible justice to the convictions of those we have to deal with, which is simply fair play. This we ought, in simple justice, to do even with an avowed enemy ; how much more with those who long to be our friends and brethren. It might be more heroic in them to begin with an absolute and sweeping act of self-condemnation. But heroism is not to be calculated on, and still less to be exacted. Nay, it would be an extreme that would not be commendable ; for what constitutes their Protestantism, their error, forms but a small part of the sum of their religious convictions, and the wheat is wheat though the tares are tares. We are in danger of stretching to unjustifiable lengths the dictum : *bonum ex integra causa, malum ex quocumque defectu*.

The genuine spirit of the Good Shepherd and of His Church will never incline us to deal harshly or hardly with those who are longing to return to the fold. It makes us rejoice at their desire ; it impels us to smooth the way for their return ; it makes allowance for mental habits resulting from the misfortune of their exile and which no mere act of volition can at once eradicate ; in matters

not of faith or obligation, it has no procrustean bed to which every variety of individual or national temperament must adapt itself; it is quite willing to wait, in all patience and gentleness, for time and grace and Catholic influences to unmake the inclinations or disinclinations which time and hereditary training have naturally formed. Nay, it is willing to hear patiently the charges they make against us, and to bear charitably and humbly their being scandalized at us in some things. The Church does not need, and does not wish, that we should claim to ourselves impeccability, or resent the complaints of those who find things among us that ill befit the household of God. The integrity of the Spouse of Christ is guaranteed by her Lord; but her children, in high or low degree, may often be a grief both to Him and to her. Few are the epochs, if any, when there is not need of the reforming zeal of a St. Philip Neri, of a St. Charles Borromeo, or of the Council of Trent. Wherever there exists among Catholics a spirit of worldliness in the upper classes, a want of sobriety, of law-abidingness, of honesty or truth or chastity in the lower classes, a lack of spirituality in the manners or lives of ecclesiastics, an absence of charity and fraternal union in general, there is no wonder that our separated brethren complain of scandals and hindrances; and then it is our duty, instead of indulging in silly indignation or still more silly and injudicious self-vindication, to honestly and sorrowfully deplore the evils and zealously strive to correct them. "For the time is that judgment should begin at the house of God." That our invitation to the erring may be efficacious, we must offer them all the truth they profess, and a great deal more besides, and all the moral virtue, too, that they profess and a great deal more besides.

There is one other requisite for the efficacy of our invitation, which is no less evident than these others, but the mention of which may to some appear not quite disinterested in us, considering the special task which the Providence of God has lately imposed upon us. Still, as a matter of simple duty to the great cause of Christian unity, we will ignore this personal consideration, and state this point as frankly as the rest. If we are bound by the very nature of the Church's vocation to offer them all the truth they have and more, and all the moral virtue they have and more, we are also bound by the nature of the world and the age in which the Church has to live and work to offer them all the intellectual aids, all the educational advantages they have, and more besides. Thus far we must humbly acknowledge we have been, in English-speaking countries, unable to do this. We can offer them elementary schools and intermediate colleges that will compare with those they can find outside the Church; but we have had no university to offer them. We have nothing to compare with Oxford and Cambridge in England, with Harvard and Yale in America. It is a terrible disad-

vantage which we cannot deny or ignore. We can give very good explanations of the fact, and amply prove that what is the result of spoliation and penal laws is in no way to the Church's discredit. But the fact remains; and while it is no discredit, it is unquestionably a great disadvantage. Nay more, while it would be easy to show that it is no discredit that we should have been deprived of it in the past, it would be quite a different matter to attempt to prove that it would be no discredit to continue without it in the future. Thanks be to God, we are no longer under the yoke of coercion and penal laws, and we have in our country to a large extent shaken off their consequences. The responsibility for the fact becomes, therefore, henceforth our own. And it is one that we cannot afford to assume. The demand and the need for higher education are universal, are and always have been a concomitant of a developed civilization. The Church has always and everywhere met the need by establishing and fostering universities, in which the various sciences, like the orbs in the firmament, are held in their places by the central sun of Divine truth. She must, in order to meet the needs which pre-eminently exist in the age and the country we live in, do the same in America. The desire to supply the need is shown in the various Catholic institutions which already bear the name of university, but which are frank to acknowledge that they are far from the ideal which the name implies, that it is the expression of an aspiration and a wish rather than of a reality. Its full realization is now undertaken by the Hierarchy of the country, and the glorious Leo XIII. spurs them on to its accomplishment with all the earnestness of his soul. His great mind and heart have done much towards preparing for an epoch of universal reconciliation and harmony; and believing that our cosmopolitan country is to be its chief home, he longs to have before the eyes and in the very heart of our people an embodiment of Catholic truth in all its fulness, in all its beauty and power, in all its far-reaching relationship and adaptability to all humanity and to all knowledge. That is why he has so blessed and urged the establishment of the Catholic University of America, and so approved of its being situated at the very capital of our country. It will remove a serious disadvantage under which the Church here labors, in an age which measures things by the standard of intellectual pre-eminence. It will give to our Catholic people what they have a perfect right to demand, a system of Christian education fully equal to what those outside the Church possess. It will be for many turning towards the fold the removal of a difficulty and a stumbling-block. It will be to all an exemplification of the Catholicity and unity of truth, which must naturally give powerful aid to the yearning for unity and Catholicity. It is a work that

calls for the active co-operation of every one in whose heart that yearning finds an echo.

May the mercy of God restore peace and unity among Christians. May it be our happiness to behold the realization of our Saviour's prayer, and our privilege to contribute in some degree to its fulfilment. May we, who possess the fulness of truth and grace as our birthright, prove ourselves worthy of the treasure, and be magnanimous in offering it to those who have been too long deprived of it. May it be our united endeavor to "make the crooked ways straight and the rough ways plain, that all flesh may see the salvation of God."

GOLD FIELDS AND OTHER UNWORKED TREASURES OF IRELAND.

THE superiority of an abstract sentiment over a material reason as a sustaining power for a long and arduous struggle, is apparent in the case of Ireland. "To be free" has ever been the dream and the national cry, not "To be wealthy," though the promise of native riches and prosperity which Ireland holds out might well have appealed to the cupidity of her people.

But the time has come when Ireland's material resources demand consideration. When they are fully known, the outer world, judging in its nineteenth century way, will cease to wonder why Irishmen have kept up a national fight, without compromise, for seven hundred and twenty years, when the whole new world, in both hemispheres, tempted them to fresh and teeming lands. The truth will be made clear that Ireland, so long the poorest and most unhappy country, can easily become the richest nation of its size on the earth.

Ireland's geographical position is in itself an assurance of prosperity. She is set down in the high stream of the world's commerce. Her westernmost position in Europe will make her the place of entrance and departure for even English ships passing to and from the Atlantic. Sailing vessels leaving the western ports of Ireland (that are numerous, extensive and safe) often reach America before ships sailing from English ports on the same day

have beaten out of the dangerous and fatal English channel. No matter what wind is blowing, vessels from the west coast of Ireland obtain an offing at once. When the Irish shall have cut the ship canal through their country from Galway to Dublin, so long proposed, but defeated by English selfishness, it will save three or four days' sailing and two days' steaming, for English vessels to and from Liverpool and Milford Haven (which is to be the great English port of the future).

This consideration led Benjamin Franklin, writing to Sir Edward Newenham in Ireland, in 1779, to say: "I admire the spirit with which I see the Irish are at length determined to claim some share of that freedom of commerce which is the right of all mankind; but which they have been so long deprived of by the abominable selfishness of their fellow-subjects. To enjoy all the advantages of the climate, soil, and situation in which God and nature have placed us, is as clear a right as that of breathing, and can never be justly taken from men but as a punishment for some atrocious crime."

The unchanging elements of national prosperity, together with native government, are, first,—intelligence and aptitude in the people, which Ireland possesses abundantly; secondly,—geographical position; thirdly,—fertility of soil; fourthly,—mildness of climate. All these Ireland has in a specially favorable degree. Then follow the possession of extensive minerals, particularly iron, coal, clay and stone; intersecting rivers, with copious water-power; rich fisheries, sea and river; and abundance of fertilizing substances.

Matthew Carey, of Philadelphia ("Vindiciæ Hibernicæ," 1819), said, after thorough study of the subject: "There is probably not a country in the world, which, for its extent, is *one-half so abundantly supplied with the most precious minerals and fossils, as Ireland.*"

The following summary of Ireland's mineral treasures is from official surveys and reports (corrected to the latest issue), the figures prefixed to the minerals denoting the number of counties (there are thirty-two counties in Ireland) in which they have been discovered:

2. Amethysts.	2. Garnets (decayed	4. Pebbles.
6. Antimony.	granite used in	2. Petrifications.
15. Coal.	porcelain).	1. Porphyry (great ex-
7. Cobalt.	11. Granite.	tent).
17. Copper.	1. Gypsum.	4. Glass-sand.
1. Chalcedony.	19. Iron.	3. Silver.
8. Crystals.	2. Jasper.	16. Slate.
19. Clays of various	16. Lead.	4. Soapstone.
sorts.	12. Manganese.	1. Spars.
5. Fuller's earth.	19. Marble.	5. Sulphur.
6. Gold.	15. Ochres.	2. Talc.
	2. Pearls.	

These minerals are at present nearly all buried in mine and quarry : none is being worked, except to an insignificant extent.

Nearly all the minerals used in Ireland to-day, and for over eighty years past, have been imported from England and other countries. The people cannot get possession of the mineral lands; the landlords will not work them; there are no railroads to bring the ores to market or the sea-coast, or to move fuel for manufacture; and where railroads do exist, they are controlled by English capital that deliberately charges a death-rate to Irish industries; and lastly, as will be seen later on, the policy of the government has been to smother and prevent the growth of all mineral industries in Ireland.

Yet so vast and varied are the riches of many of these Irish minerals, notably of iron, copper, lead, marbles, porphyry, glass-sand, potter's clay, sulphur and slate, that the development of these alone would (technically, not merely digging and exporting) make Ireland a prosperous country.

But to follow a single subject, it is necessary to use severe restraint in treating of Irish resources, so enticing and extraordinary is the field. Let us set out at once for the gold-fields, and perhaps return to the others by-and-by.

The extensive existence of gold, with the governmental policy of suppressing the working of it, is an epitome of the entire British treatment of Ireland.

The most ancient Celtic annals agree with the latest geological authorities in declaring Ireland to be exceedingly rich in native gold.

In the ancient Book of Leinster, and also in the Book of Lucan, it is recorded that Tighernmas, son of Ollaig, first "boiled" (or smelted) gold in 1500 B.C., in the forest south of the Liffey. Here is this first Irish record of using the gold of the Wicklow valleys, 3000 years ago, when in the "involute delightful place of Ucadon, the artist of Cualann":

"The gold was first *boiled* in Erinn;
Upon his woody sportful lawn
Long, capacious bellows were blown
By the man of unebbing fame,
In the forests south of the Liffey."

The Book of Leinster, a superb MS., dating from the year 1150, when it was transcribed from ancient MSS., is preserved in the library of Trinity College, Dublin. On folio 246 there is another record of the ancient knowledge of gold in Ireland: "The reason why the men of Leinster are called 'Lagenians of the Gold' is this, because in their country gold was first discovered in Erinn."

In A. D. 706, according to the Annals of the Four Masters, the

relics of Ronan, son of Bearach, were placed in a shrine of gold and silver.

In 1151 Turlough O'Brien took with him to Connaught "ten score ounces of gold," recorded in Sir William Wilde's "Catalogue of the Royal Irish Academy."

This work of Sir William Wilde is an invaluable collection of authorities on Irish antiquities. The student will find in almost all the ancient Irish MSS. and other records descriptions of the golden ornaments of the primitive Irish. "A greater number and variety of antique articles of gold have been found in Ireland," says Sir William Wilde, "than in any other country of Northwestern Europe. . . . Our museum (of the Royal Irish Academy) is rich in golden objects, containing more than five hundred specimens. Pins, fibulæ and brooches having been discovered in Ireland in immense quantities and variety, some of which are unsurpassed for design and workmanship. . . . Those magnificent specimens of silver and gold found in Ireland of late years had reached a degree of perfection which modern art can with difficulty imitate."

Fortunately for Irish art, it cannot be confounded with that of any other country. The forms of many Irish brooches and pins are identical, for instance, with those found in Scandinavia; but those of Scandinavia are all of bronze, while those of Ireland are of gold and silver, and are ornamented with the unique involved spiral or serpent coil, called by Kemble the *Opus Hibernicum*, which is the antiquary's sure test to distinguish national from imported work.

In the Preface to the translation of Keating's "History of Ireland" (London, 1727) is engraved a beautiful cap or crown of gold, elaborately ornamented, which was dug up in 1692 at Barnanely, county Tipperary. It was found ten feet under ground, at the bottom of a dried bog, by workmen who were digging peat. The crown weighs about five ounces, and from the decoration (which is without the Cross, a sign almost invariably used on the royal insignia of Ireland) it is presumed to antedate the conversion of Ireland in the fifth century.

In 1169 (Wilde's "Catalogue Royal Irish Academy Museum") Donough O'Carroll died after bestowing 300 ounces of gold on clerics and churches.

In Dr. Keating's "History of Ireland" (p. 526, edition of London, 1727) we read: "Turlough O'Connor [who became king A.D. 1130], King of Ireland, did not long survive this battle (Moinmore), but died in the sixty-eighth year of his age, and was interred with great solemnity near the great altar of Ciaran at Cluain Mac Nois (Clonmacnois). This prince left to the clergy of the kingdom 540 ounces of gold, 40 marks of silver, all his jewels, plate, horses, arms, bows, quivers, arrows and all his military equipage."

After the Norman conquest of England (see Deslarnes's "History of Caen") that country paid an annual tribute of 23,740 marks of silver to the Treasury of Caen, while from Ireland were exacted *400 marks of silver and 400 ounces of gold*, an enormous sum of money for those times.

Giraldus Cambrensis, writing of Ireland in 1200, says the country "abounded in gold."

"The quantity of antique manufactured gold ornaments dug up in Ireland, even in recent times," says Sir William Wilde (essay on "Antiquities of Ireland"), "has been estimated as exceeding half a million of money" (two and a half million dollars); and he adds: "As much more may be lying beneath our feet, for every year as new cuttings are made for railroads, or bogs are drained, deposits of gold ornaments come to light. Two or three years ago a deposit of massive gold bracelets, in value nearly £5000, as bright and beautiful as if just finished, was dug up in Carlow; and still more recently several antique gold frontlets were found by a laborer while digging, who, unconscious of their value, threw them to his children." Sir William Wilde rescued these frontlets (which the man was cutting up into nose-rings for his pigs), and they are now in the Museum of the Royal Irish Academy. The form of the ornament is beautiful and classic—a half-moon diadem, resembling closely some seen in Etruscan sculpture.

It was stated at the time of this discovery that these and other antique ornaments found in Ireland were not native, but imported; but the Royal Irish Academy was patriotic enough to have these and other ancient ornaments tested, and the analysis proved that the metal was identical with the gold abundantly found in the County Wicklow.

In Hunt's "British Mining" (p. 902) we find these figures: "In 1852 Ireland produced 32,220 ounces of silver; in 1883, 2910 ounces." In "Mineral Statistics" (1883) it is stated: "Since 1796 from £35,000 to £60,000 worth of gold has been found in Wicklow, including nuggets of 24 ounces and 22 ounces." These figures are enormously understated, there being no official record of the amount of gold found. The fact is, there has been and is to-day a constant search for gold going on by the people in the neighborhood of the auriferous valleys and hills, but their "finds" are kept secret, as the British Crown claims the ownership of all gold-mines in Ireland.

According to Sir William Wilde there are seven assured gold-bearing districts in Ireland, by far the most important being those of the County Wicklow. This county is extraordinarily rich in minerals. In the Ballinvalley stream alone, a scientific authority, Mr. William Mallett, found the following minerals:

Gold.	Topaz.
Platina.	Garnets (2 varieties).
Tinstone.	Micaceous iron.
Magnetic oxide of iron.	Red iron ochre.
Titaniferous iron.	Hydrous peroxide of iron.
Wolfram.	Ironstone.
Manganese, oxide of.	Molybdenum (sulphuret).
Copper pyrites.	Prase.
Galena.	Augite.
Feldspar.	Zircon.
Mica.	Quartz.
Sapphire.	Chlorite.

Mr. Arthur G. Ryder, A. I. C. E. I., manager of the Ovoca Mineral Company, testifies to the existence of the above minerals in the County Wicklow, and adds the following, some of which have been quite recently discovered: Cement, zinc, antimony, arsenic, brick-marl, coal, cobalt, slate, paving-sets, and marble, silver and sulphur in abundance.

Mr. Ryder says:

“There are at least two mining districts in the county; in the more northerly, the mineral belt is about nine miles long by four miles wide; the local rocks are principally granitic; and the principal mineral found is argentiferous lead, containing about 70 per cent. lead and 6 ounces of silver to the ton. Here are situated the famous Luganure Mines, which have been more or less worked for sixty years, have yielded as much as £7000 profit in one year, have produced £138,756 worth of minerals in twenty years (1834-53), and in which were found, in 1861, 2850 ounces of native silver (capillary) associated with black sulphuret. Formerly five hundred miners were employed here. To-day the number is about thirty-five. No gold has yet been discovered in this district. The second, or Ovoca mineral district, is about 16 miles long by two miles wide, and comprises Gold Mines Valley, Ballymurtagh, Ballygahan, Tygroney, Cronebane, Connorree, Stroughmore, Kilmacoo, Kilmacrea, and Ballycapple Mines. . . . Vast reserves of iron pyrites exist, containing from 30 per cent. to 40 per cent. of sulphur, and in some cases over six ounces of silver to the ton.”

Gold has been found in the following places in Ireland: In a quartz vein at Bray Head, County Wicklow; in the pyrites lode, Ovoca, County Wicklow; in a quartz lode at Ballymanus, County Wicklow; in a copper lode at Dhurode, County Cork; in the mountain of Crochan Kinshela, Wicklow (an ancient and most valuable field); at Moyola river, Londonderry; in Connorree and Kilmacoo, Wicklow; in the mountains of Limerick, and other places. In Kilmacoo the result of working (in 1885) was half an ounce of gold per ton in the ochreous cap of the bluestone lode.

In the Ballinvalley stream, in 1770, a man named Byrne picked up a nugget of pure gold weighing 22 ounces. Thinking it was copper, he used it as a weight for sixteen years, when a peddler purchased it from him and resold it in Dublin for a large sum. This discovery created such excitement that hundreds of women and boys assembled to look for gold. In six weeks, according to

Graham, these poor people washed out 2666 ounces of gold (Sir William Wilde says £10,000 worth) by the most primitive methods. The government then sent soldiers to clear the valley (on the ground that the people were assembling for "treasonable purposes"), and assumed the control of the auriferous stream.

Here may be asked and answered the pregnant question: *Why are these Irish gold-fields not worked?*

Before the Parliamentary Committee on Irish Industries (on May 21, 1885) this question was asked of Professor Edward Hull, LL.D., F.R.S., Director of the Royal Geological Survey of Ireland and Dean of the Faculty of the Royal College of Science—certainly a person well qualified to give an intelligent and unbiassed answer, at least an answer unbiassed in favor of Ireland. Professor Hull, referring to the Wicklow district, where these poor people found the gold, answered as follows:

Question: You see no reason why that gold-mining industry could not be worked at a fair profit?

Prof. Hull: I think it is very likely that it could. It is said that very large quantities of gold were got there in former times, before it was under the Government.

Question: Before 1796 or 1797?

Prof. Hull: Before the Government took it up. It became Government property, and then it fell off. The peasants, in a fortnight, made over £3000 worth of gold, and then the Government took it and the search was abandoned."

Then Professor Hull was asked whether he thought it likely that the source of the gold could be discovered, and his answer was: "They have failed to discover the source of the gold in the old rocks, though no doubt that is the source. . . . I think that it is an industry well worth working up. . . . I have no doubt there is a great deal of gold to be got in the same locality that it used to be got in, upon the west of the mountain called Crochan Kinshela. There is a valley there in which the gold was obtained by washing from the alluvial materials; and there is no reason to suppose that there is not as much gold in the alluvial material which has been left behind as there was in that which has been washed."

When the British Government drove the peasants out of this Wicklow Valley, the step was taken, of course, "according to law." The law was made, as usual, for the occasion. An Act of Parliament was passed to enable "the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury to conduct the working of a gold-mine in Wicklow;" and the Government appointed as their agents Messrs. Weaver, Mills, and King.

We learn from this Weaver (Trans. Royal Geological Society, vol. v., part 1), that these agents were instructed to "endeavor to collect all the gold deposited, and thereby to remove every tempta-

tion for the assembling of mobs"; and they continued accordingly to work on the auriferous drift "*until the depth of covering had become sufficiently thick to preclude the hope of gain from individual trials, conducted without order or regularity,*" or, in plain words, until they had buried the gold too deep for the people to dig out. While the militia were thus employed, the peasants were occupied in prospecting the neighboring streams; but, naturally, any finds thus made were kept secret. In 1798, the rebellion having broken out, the troops were transferred to Rathdrum Barracks, which they fortified with the mining plant. Up to this time their operations had resulted in a large profit, the washing of the sand left by the peasants having afforded 555 ounces of fine gold. After the rebellion, however, the agents devoted most of their time to a search for the *source* of the drift gold in the neighboring hills. There were then, as there are to-day, many cogent reasons for adopting this plan, the principal being the frequent occurrence of nuggets with adherent quartz, which proved the existence somewhere of an auriferous quartz lode. Fortunately the Government failed to discover this lode, and the troops were withdrawn, after having taken £3675 worth of gold from the valley.

"Since the departure of the English troops from the valley," Mr. Arthur G. Ryder, manager of the Ovoca Mineral Company (Paper read before Parliamentary Committee, 1885), says: "The peasants have found at least £25,000 worth of nuggets in the same stream, and three separate attempts have been made to discover the lode, but without success. . . . I am, therefore, convinced that the gold district of Crochan Kinshela now presents a most promising field for the profitable employment of capital, and I know that employment is everywhere urgently needed by the impoverished population of Wicklow."

Mr. Ryder says in relation to the auriferous lodes of Connorree, Kilmacoo, etc.: "I have found gold in no less than 15 different ores, clays, etc., from these mines, using the Readwin amalgamation process. . . . As to the stream or placer gold of the district, I am satisfied that *did such streams exist in any other country than Ireland, they would soon be heard of all over the world.* From part of one small rivulet at least £50,000 worth of gold has been washed in recent years. Even in its present bed, nuggets of 24, 22, 19, etc., ounces have been found; but the dry gulches have never been explored. The lower part of the principal river-course, to which all the streams contribute, is still virgin ground; yet the lower a miner prospects down an auriferous stream, the greater, as a rule, is his success. The whole district is known to be auriferous; yet an infinitesimal portion only of the 'black sand' has been uncovered. None of the improved processes for winning

gold have ever been adopted here; yet the greatest advances have of late been made in the direction of more effective machinery. Only where the valley is wide and flat and the gold much scattered, have trials been made; yet in its lower course the stream flows through a narrow chasm, where the nuggets are probably concentrated. Both water and fuel are available on the spot, and labor is cheaper, perhaps, than at any other gold-field in the world. The sands of the Rhine are washed for gold, although but one part of gold is found in eight million parts of sand."

Professor W. K. Sullivan, Ph.D., M.R.I.A., President of the Queen's College at Cork, and member of the Senate of the Royal University of Ireland, testified before the Parliamentary Industrial Committee of 1885, in reference to the Ovoca gold-fields: "The working of the streams by the peasants is most unsystematic, but they get an annual sum; it is very difficult to ascertain how much it is exactly, because they do not either like you to see their operations or to give you the gold, for fear it might be seized by the Crown. . . . Gold-mines in Ireland are the property of the Crown. . . . I have seen the peasants washing for gold and have got specimens of the gold along with the tin which accompanies it."

Mr. G. Henry Kinahan, member and Vice-President of the Royal Geological Survey of Ireland, M.R.I.A., author of "The Geology of Ireland," says: "I think there is amply sufficient ground for exploring the Wicklow gold-fields. There are many places in Ireland where I believe there are gold-mines. There ought to be deep placers at Wooden Bridge. There has never been any attempt made to work deep placers on the different gold-streams. There are the Gold Valley stream and the Darragh Water, both of which are known to contain placer-gold. Those streams meet at Wooden Bridge, but there never was any trial made there, unless there might have been prehistoric works."

Mr. Kinahan ("Geology of Ireland") says that in all probability the river bed down to the seaboard may be found to contain gold, and there are many considerations which justify this opinion. He says: "It is very desirable that researches of this nature should be encouraged, since discoveries of gold-bearing rocks usually lead to a knowledge of the existence of deposits of other useful metals."

The bed of this Wicklow gold, in the quartz, has never been discovered. All the workings are "placers," or washing process. Mr. Kinahan says: "A lode or quartz reef exists somewhere in Wicklow, because the gold there has always been, more or less, attached to pieces of quartz." And, he adds: "I strongly suspect that the reef exists about where the Government was asked

to make a trial some time ago." This trial, of course, was not made.

Mr. William George Strype, Civil Engineer, Managing Director of the Dublin and Wicklow Manure Company, and Director of several mines in Wicklow, says: "It is a well-known fact that there is a considerable quantity of gold in Wicklow, but no one has, up to the present, succeeded in extracting it with advantage."

Professor Hull says: "There is gold in alluvial deposits in several valleys in the County of Wicklow, as the stream at east base of Croghan-Kinshella, Knockmiller, Clonwilliam, Ballintemple, and tributaries of the Aughrim river. Till recently it has been worked in placer mines in Gold Mines Valley."

The placer gold is said, by Gerard Boate, to have been found prior to 1652, in the Moyola river, County Derry. Other gold is said to have been found, before 1820, in the sands of the streams of Slieve-an-Orra, County Antrim; Ballinascorney Gap, County Dublin; Barony of St. Mullins, County Carlow; in the County Wicklow, at Greystones; and in the Vale of Ovoca, with its tributary valleys.

Mr. Kinahan (Royal Geological Survey) says of the Government workings in Wicklow in 1797-8: "All these were shallow workings; *the orders given to Weaver, the principal engineer, being to work only to such a depth as would prevent the country people from working them.* Since then all workings have been shallow, none exceeding 30 feet in depth, while most of them were only from 12 to 15 feet deep."

Mr. Arthur Ryder says. "Gold is disseminated throughout the whole of the Ovoca district and has been found in large quantities in Gold Mines Valley. I have worked 17 samples of local ores, clays, etc., by the Readwin process, and in 15 of these I found gold, ranging from a trace up to 6 dwts. per ton. I have read of a foreign mine where ores holding 3 dwts. per ton are profitably worked. The "rotten quartz" of Connorree, containing 6 dwts., can be raised for 2s. per 21 cwts. Silver is found in the bluestone and in some of the iron pyrites, and varies from .009 per cent. to .036 per cent. American ores which are worked run as low as .001 per cent."

With regard to the workable silver in Wicklow, the following comparison is made from "Mineral Statistics," an English publication:

	Lead. Per cent.	Silver, per ton. Ounces.
Bluestone from Morfa Dhu Mine, } 12		7
" " Anglesea, Wales. } 13		3
" " Mona Mine, . } 22.55		10
Bluestone from Kilmacoo, Wicklow,		

In the year 1753 five hundred miners were employed at Cronebane, Wicklow, where a discovery of bluestone was made, and the Rev. Dr. Henry, F.G.S., in his report to Earl Cadogan, writes in that year: "Beneath this (*i. e.*, the bluestone) lies a rich rocky silver ore, which sparkles brightly and yields 75 ounces of pure silver out of a ton of ore, besides a great quantity of pure lead." It is but reasonable to conclude that similar conditions still prevail at Kilmacoo, where, according to Mr. Ryder, C.E., about 800 tons of bluestone are now in sight.

Elsewhere throughout the County Wicklow, according to various authorities, alluvium gold occurs in the higher shallow alluvium of the valleys (placers), in the lower deep alluvium of the valleys (deep placers), in the alluvium of the beds of the high, now dry, supplementary streams of the ancient or primary valleys (dry gulch placers), and in the shelves, or high level flats, on the sides of the valleys (shelf, reef, or bar placers).

In modern times in none of the valleys of the County Wicklow has gold been worked, except in the shallow and dry gulch placers.

"The experiments and calculations made," says Mr. Kinahan, speaking for the Royal Geological Survey of Ireland, "suggest that gold probably exists in the following places: Three miles of untried deep alluvium in the Coolbawn Valley; over a mile of deep alluvium in the Gold Mines Valley; about eight miles of alluvium along the Darrah Water, from Tomnaskela to the Lower Meeting of the Waters; six miles of the Valley of the Ow; three miles of deep alluvium along the Macreddin stream; and from the Ovoca mines to the sea of Arklow, six miles of deep alluvium. Besides the foregoing deep and shallow placers there is the probability of the existence of dry gulch and bar or shelf placers. In connection with the south branch of the Gold Mines Valley, one or two dry gulches were worked by Weaver, who got in them 'large gold.' Elsewhere they, or the bar placers, have not been looked after; yet, in many places there is a possibility, if not a probability, that such golden relics may exist. There are other places in the County Wicklow, such as Ballinglen and the Tinnahela stream, in which gold has not been tried for, although the indications would suggest its existence. Attention, therefore, may be called to them."

Every other mineral treasure in Ireland, and many are unexcelled in the whole world, is in the same deplorable condition as the gold fields. The few hundred landlords who own the country are too idle, too ignorant, or too deeply mortgaged to make the proper investigations or begin practical developments. And where, as in some strange instances, men are found willing to

begin, they are soon crushed by the dogged opposition of pro-English railroad managers and other carriers or distributors.

The only industries flourishing in Ireland to-day are distilleries and breweries, and a few chemical works in which the inexhaustible supply of sea-weed of all kinds is reduced to substances like iodine, or some form of manure.

"There is not a shovel or a knife made in Ireland," was the testimony of an authority before the Parliamentary Committee on Irish Industries (1885); and yet Ireland possesses exhaustless quantities of the best iron in the world, with abundance of coal and peat for smelting and manufacture. There is not a police barrack or other government building in the country that is not slated with Welsh slate, though Ireland has vast quarries of superior slate, which cannot reach a market. There is not a yard of broadcloth worn by the Catholic clergy, for instance, made in Ireland; it is imported from England, where it is made from Irish wool. And so runs the whole shameful story of neglect and deliberate suppression.

A land that the Almighty made to teem with milk and honey, a land of rich fields and gentle airs, of sweet waters and lovely prospects, untainted by one poisonous breath of noxious reptile or deadly plant; a land of gold and silver and marble, and every precious element of glory and beauty; and on the surface of this paradise a population driven to despair by poverty, subserviency, and profitless, hopeless toil!

The latest British official who reports for Ireland is the Irish Registrar-General, showing, in the words of the Dublin *Freeman's Journal*, "that since May, 1851, the awful number of 3,197,419 men and women of Irish birth (the young and strong ones) have fled their birth-place to find in most cases death in foreign lands, and each year is adding to the terrible national drain." And, in addition, this leading Irish journal says that 2,500,000 Irish people died in their own country, in the same period, of hardship and starvation.

"What name is to be given to wholesale extermination like this?" indignantly asks the Rt. Rev. Dr. Bagshawe, the revered Bishop of Nottingham, himself an Englishman. "It is carried out by the bayonets of the troops and the constabulary;" and the Bishop adds: "The same murderous work is going on at the present hour with horrible malignity."

Ireland ought to be the home of a thousand industries. Her children once possessed skill of head and hand to raise her wonderful products into shapes of use and beauty for all the world. But there is hardly a wheel turning in the desolate country. The metals and marbles are covered with earth. The rivers of match-

less water-power pour inutile into the sea; the people fly from the land of their love as from a plague-stricken region.

Never before in human history has a highly-civilized, brave, industrious, religious race suffered from conquest so dreadfully as have the Irish people. In the twelfth century they had laid the wide and deep foundations of a splendid nation. Their great schools had then been filled with students for centuries; they had covered their lovely island with abbeys and churches of surpassing beauty, as the skeletoned ruins testify to the present traveller; they had, alone of all European nations except Greece and Rome, codified a noble system of native law, fitted to the complexities of the highest social order; they had established profound respect for religion, letters and music. Had the Ireland of the twelfth century proceeded uninterrupted into the nineteenth, there would have been an Irish national history rivalling, if not surpassing, the most luminous pages of Hellenic glory. But the growth was invaded from without. The fair structures were thrown down; the learning, law, art, religion were banished or trampled into the earth. The whole country was given to a handful of the conquerors to do with it as they pleased; *and they own it still.*

"The landlords," says Bishop Bagshawe, "are but a handful of the population. Less than 300 persons own one-third of Ireland; half Ireland is owned by less than 800; and two-thirds of it by less than 2000. The whole number of landlords does not exceed 10,000."

"In Ireland alone," says John Stuart Mill, "the whole agricultural population can be evicted by the mere will of the landlord, either at the expiration of a lease, or in the far more common case of their having no lease, at six months' notice. In Ireland alone the bulk of a population dependent wholly on the land cannot look forward with confidence to a single year's occupation of it; while the sole outlet for the dispossessed cultivators is expatriation."

Remedy? The object of this article is diagnosis, not remedy. Diseases in the individual may be cured by medicines, and individual wrongs by the patchwork of legislation. But the moral affliction of an unjust social order cannot be cured by law.

The cruelty or injustice of a strong nation is its disease: it has only one Physician, and He works through the consciences of good men who have opened their eyes to the iniquity.

PROTESTANT INTEREST IN PATRISTIC LITERATURE.

A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church, edited by Philip Schaff, D.D., LL.D.

Vol. I. The CONFESSIONS and LETTERS of St. Augustine, with a Sketch of his Life and Work. Buffalo: Christian Literature Company. 1886. Large 8vo. Pp. 619.

Vol. II. St. Augustine's CITY OF GOD and CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE. Ibid. 1887. Pp. 621.

IT is a wholesome sign of the times that the Fathers of the Church are beginning once more to attract the attention of students and readers. They have never, at any time, been neglected by the Catholic scholar. For to him they are witnesses of the truth; and his theology must be learned from the Scriptures not as interpreted by the caprice of private judgment, but by the authority of the Church. And, though she defines her doctrine in councils or by the voice of Peter speaking through his successors, yet it is through the holy Fathers, who are her chief theologians, that she develops and explains her teaching.

Hitherto, generally speaking, the Fathers have not been regarded with much favor by non-Catholic divines. At the beginning of the religious revolution which, near four hundred years ago, destroyed the unity of Catholic faith in good part of Europe, some effort was made by the partisans of the new errors to enlist the Fathers on their side. The breach between the Old and the New, between the Church, with her hereditary faith of fifteen centuries, and the novelties preached by those of the "new learning" or "new gospel," as they called themselves,—bad priests and renegade friars, as the people knew them to be,—was so clear and so startling that it became a matter of necessity to make some attempt to show that this total change of creed, polity and ritual was no radical innovation, but simply a giving back to Christendom of her old religion in its first purity. For this the Fathers were paraded as a court of appeal, and passages from their works were quoted, or misquoted rather and shamefully distorted, to lend some color to the desperate attempt. But it was such a wretched failure that the majority of Protestant divines, including many even of the "Reformers" themselves, seeing that no artifice availed to drag the Fathers into the service or extort from them anti-Catholic testimony, gave up in disgust the wearisome task imposed on them by

controversial necessity, and found it more expedient to decry and denounce the witnesses they had summoned to their own confusion.

Hence the vile language in which Luther speaks of them. In this he is imitated by his disciples; and by Calvinists too, on the continent of Europe, in Great Britain and America. It may occasionally happen that they quote approvingly a passage or two from some holy Father or Catholic Doctor. But it is not out of reverence for his character or his acknowledged position in the Catholic Church. It is because they imagine they have discovered in his pages something that lends countenance to a pet error of their sect or some partial remnant of truth which commends itself to the approval of their private judgment. It is in this way that the Calvinist and Jansenist love to use or misuse St. Augustine, the Anglican Sts. Ignatius and Cyprian. So, too, the Puritan, John Milton, when he unwisely steps down from Helicon to dabble in theological strife, condescends to praise the Fathers, when he thinks they side with his loose notions of divorce, but in the next breath reviles them like a common scold, when they chance to run counter to his Calvinistic prejudices.

Since Protestantism, like the old Kronos of mythology, has taken to devouring her offspring, and has been swallowed up in turn by Rationalism, to a great extent in Germany and partially at least amongst English-speaking peoples, the hereditary feeling of ill-will and contempt for the Fathers seems to have given way to a better sentiment, more respectful and more just to those venerable worthies of the early Church. Amongst German savants, even divines nominally Lutheran or "Reformed," the works of these holy and learned men are edited, annotated and studied with zeal and diligence, as writings of great, good men and representatives of the thought and talent of their epoch. This may not be much; it may be nothing more than what they do for Plato or Josephus, Kalidasa or Yayadeva. But it is something after all, especially when we contrast it with the vulgar abuse and ribaldry of Martin Luther and John Milton. It is, we hope, a higher motive that in England and America begins to lead so many to the reading and study of the Fathers. At all events, nothing but edification and real advantage can come of this newly awakened desire for patristic literature. Honest men will learn at last to recognize them as echoes and exponents of the great truths which the Catholic Church has taught from the beginning and teaches at this day, and which in an evil hour men were led by demagogues and false "Gospellers" to reject as human inventions, not consonant with truth and primitive Christianity.

We have spoken before of the first volume of St. Augustine's

works, in which are contained the Confessions and Letters of the holy Doctor. Of the Confessions, that enduring monument of Christian humility, and of the manifold testimonies they bear to Catholic doctrine and practice, we have said enough. The Letters contain a little over five-eighths of what may be found under that name in the Maurine edition, the principal omission being of those letters that touch on the Donatist and Pelagian controversies. The latter, being on subjects of somewhat abstruse character, are not so necessary as those of an historical nature. Hence their absence is not so much felt, especially as the anti-Pelagian treatises of the Saint are fully given in three volumes. But the letters relating to the Donatist schism are so few that they need not have been sacrificed to gain a trifle of space. Besides, they are almost indispensable to give the reader an adequate idea of the mild, amiable character of St. Augustine, breathing as it does intense charity for those who had separated themselves from Catholic unity, and at the same time sternly urging the necessity of visible communion with the Church, which if one knowingly reject, no good works, no austerity of penance, no outward show of holy life can avail him to salvation. We do not even hint that this may have furnished any ground for the omission of the Letters. But we can feel how unpleasant it must naturally be for a Protestant editor to translate and publish for the instruction of his fellow-religionists, as the distinct, unmistakable teaching of Augustine and the Catholic Church of the third and fourth centuries, what he bitterly resents as uncharitable dogmatism when uttered by Leo XIII. and the Catholic Bishops of our day.

The translator of the Letters is Rev. J. F. Cunningham, and though his version is not always literal, it is (as far as we can judge), on the whole, sufficiently faithful. The Index is wholly inadequate. It ought to have been far more complete. For, had all the other works of St. Augustine become the prey of Vandals in Africa or barbaric Goths in Europe, his Letters alone, if they but survived, would sufficiently reveal to posterity the life, character and thoroughly Catholic doctrine of the great Bishop of Hippo. The meagre character of the Index not only offends good taste and propriety, but is occasionally misleading. It is headed "Index of Subjects," and is preceded by another, ample enough, of the persons to whom the Letters are addressed. Yet of the subjects, which he treats so fondly, so fully and so eloquently, how many are passed over without a single word of mention! The Index has not failed to remind us of Augustine's "Ignorance of Hebrew," of what he thought of "Scripture" and the "Epicureans" (three references for each topic), of Anaximenes, Anaxagoras and the Cutzupitæ—a kind of Donatist heretics who lived in Rome

under Numidian jurisdiction, precursors of the Anglicans who live there now under the rule of Queen Victoria and her so-called Bishop of Gibraltar. But of his magnificent praises of the Catholic Church, her wonderful unity, her divine authority, the deadly sin of schism or voluntary separation from her communion, and like themes, on which so earnestly, so fondly, so frequently, he loves to dwell, not one word of reference! The "Catholic Church," indeed, is quoted once, but whether the reference be meant as a joke or a sneer, is not so clear. We find "Catholic Church, the," Vol. I., pp. 411-415 (of Clarke's Edinburgh edition, pp. 388-390 edition of Buffalo), where the saint speaks of having altered his views as to the policy of allowing the Donatists to practise their religion and by their immoral conduct to defy the civil and criminal law of the empire with impunity! Indeed, the true spirit of the index-maker would have been honestly and truthfully disclosed to the reader had he labelled his item "Catholic Church, the; essentially and on principle a persecuting church," pp. 388-390. His *animus* would seem yet more clearly revealed further on in another heading, where the same pages are quoted, "Persecution, later views of Augustin on, pp. 388-390."

There is, speaking of the same Index, another heading which is, to say the least, reprehensible for its ambiguity. Under the word "*Feast*" we read: "Feasts in honour of martyrs, censured, pp. 239-241; abolished at Hippo, 253-256." Now, since *feast*, in English, may mean two things, festival or banquet, the addition of the words, "in honor of the martyrs," would rather incline the reader to think that festivals were meant. But this would be a serious mistake. It was not the festivals instituted in honor of the martyrs that St. Augustine and the Church of Hippo condemned, for he extols such commemoration of the martyrs as good and useful. It was the banquets given on those days in the cemeteries, which in their beginnings were commendable enough, being intended to honor the Saints by almsgiving to the poor, but which, by degrees, degenerated into scenes of unseemly revel and riot—that were censured and abolished at Hippo. As long as they did honor to the martyrs, they were retained and respected. It was only when they became a dishonor and insult to God's Saints that these excesses were denounced and condemned by St. Augustine and his fellow bishops. He himself says distinctly¹ that what was sinful and unworthy was abolished, while the commemoration of the martyrs, which was "a pious and honorable act of religious service," was retained. Rev. Mr. Cunningham was indebted to the Maurine editors for the reference, and

¹ Ep. xxii., ad Aurelium, § 6.

they use St. Augustine's own word, *convivia*.¹ They speak, too, of the banquets being given, not "in honor of the martyrs," but on the "anniversary of their martyrdom," or, as the Church loves to call it, their *birthday*.² Hence, it would have been fairer to use plain English, that would admit of no misconstruction. We make no charge of bad faith against the Rev. compiler, or index-maker, for he may be innocent of evil intent. We only mention it to show that a Catholic is not without reason cautious, suspicious, and even, like the Tyrian Queen, *omnia tuta timens*, when he sees the wonderful way in which our books, whether Scripture, Holy Fathers, or even petty devotional treatises, are edited, interpreted, annotated, and nicely indexed, too, *si superis placet*, by those outside of the Church.

Another blemish in the translation of St. Augustine's Letters, and one that applies to the subsequent volumes likewise, is the wilful perversion of his Biblical nomenclature. He is made by his translators to say, Melchizedec, Zion, Zephaniah, Hagar, Terah, Tobit, Haggai, Elisha, and the like, instead of what he did say, viz., Sion, Melchisedec, Sophonias, Thare, etc. In other words, the translator has taken upon himself to correct the spelling of the Saint, or rather of the Septuagint whom he closely follows, by the standard of the English Protestant Old Testament. Even if the heterodox spelling were correct, which no amount of learning can ever prove it to be, it would still be taking an unwarrantable liberty with the Saint's text, and wholly indefensible on philological grounds. The translators of King James had faithfully respected the Greek form of names preserved by the New Testament; and it was only the late Revisers who, with unpardonable presumption, attempted to teach the Apostles and Evangelists that they had erred in not spelling by the infallible rule of King James's translation from the Hebrew. It is unjust to any writer to correct his spelling without being able to substitute something better; and most of the time it is unwise and improper for philological reasons. Rosenmüller is more than once guilty of this inaccuracy in transcribing, with direct quotation and inverted commas, portions of St. Jerome's commentaries on the Sacred Books. He puts under the Saint's pen more than once the letters *z* and *tz* where the great Doctor had used sharp *s*. For this is invariably the way in which this most learned of interpreters is accustomed to transliterate the Hebrew letter *ssade*.

The second volume of the Buffalo edition contains the famous twenty-two books on the City of God ("De Civitate Dei"), the

¹ They use also, what is more expressive, *epulæ*. See Index in Maurine ed, under the words *Convivia* and *Martyres*.

² *Convivia in natalitiis martyrum*.

noblest and most comprehensive apology ever yet written on behalf of the Church, which in Augustine's mind is identical with Christianity. It is a magnificent Philosophy of History, as far above the modern infidel or anti-Catholic works that pretend to the name as the sun is above the clouds and mists that seek to darken his brightness. And never can history be worthily written, never can it be a mirror of the truth, the guide and light of life, unless the historian keep ever before his eyes the lofty views and great principles that Augustine followed in developing the history of the two rival cities, Jerusalem and Babylon, the two hostile kingdoms upon earth of God and of the world. And the Christian believer will find there refuted in advance all the vain sophistry with which the Church is daily assailed by those who cry out that she is a hindrance to the temporal prosperity of nations, that it is only by casting aside her doctrines and maxims that a people can be elevated and enlightened, that progress is proportionate to the decrease of her rule, and that perfect independence of her control is essential to the life and well-being of the nations. No impartial, Christian-minded student of the Saint can fail to see that those "emancipated" nations who have flung off their allegiance to Christ's Church might as well bow down at once in undisguised homage before Jupiter, Mars and Venus. For what is symbolized by these false gods is the true object of their new worship. And their nominal profession (should they retain it) of faith in Christ and His Gospel is only a mask under which they hide their hearty allegiance to the earthly city of Babylon.

The volume closes with the Saint's treatise on Christian Doctrine, a work that has been highly esteemed in every age of the Church. Bossuet says of it somewhere that there is no book in Catholic antiquity that contains in a condensed form more valuable rules and helps for the elucidation of Scripture than this treatise of St. Augustine. The translator is the Rev. I. F. Shaw. No suggestion of ours would be likely to find approval from the translators or editors. But we have an opinion, and may express a hope. We think the books of St. Augustine and the other Fathers do not need much glossing. In matters of pure erudition note and comment would not be out of place. But to ascertain their doctrinal views is very easy, and no commentary is needed, especially when experience shows that "explanatory notes," even if not so intended, have the practical result of confusing, hiding and darkening, rather than elucidating the meaning of the authors. Let them rely a little more on the good sense of the reader, and give us the text, as they profess to do with Scripture, without note or comment.

Lest any one should think there is here some exaggeration, we will give (out of hundreds) an example or two to illustrate those

generally useless, and often silly, attempts to explain the holy Father's meaning, where no explanation was needed; and where, if one be offered, it has every appearance of being offered with the sole view of bewildering the reader, of "throwing dust in his eyes," as the vulgar but very significant phrase has it, of carefully hindering him from getting to know what the Father really meant. It has a very uncharitable look to be always suspecting that under every word lurks fraud and design. But we cannot help it. There is an inexorable logic of facts, in the presence of which Christian charity loses all her resources, and must yield the contest. She may weep, but she can utter no word of defence. She is stricken dumb by the sentence of her own divine Master: "*ex fructibus eorum cognoscetis eos*" (Matth. vii).

In a note to the Buffalo edition¹ we have an elaborate attempt to explain away, or rather divest of all meaning, the pious hope and entreaty of St. Monica on her death-bed, that she should be unceasingly² remembered at God's Altar by her family and friends, in other words, at the Holy Sacrifice of the Mass. There was no word of explanation needed here. It was what Monica had learned in infancy from her catechism, and what every pious mother in the Catholic Church might or does actually repeat on her death-bed at this day in any part of the world. She was perfectly understood by Augustine and his weeping friends, just as the same request would be understood by the Catholic Christian nowadays in Ostia (where she uttered it), in Algiers, in Rome, in New York or Washington. She had lived a holy life, but the scales of divine justice are above our comprehension. She may have had her imperfections, and they can only be cleansed by the prayers of the Church, and above all by the Adorable Sacrifice of the Altar. But this teaching, known to every Catholic child, as well as to St. Augustine, must be kept from the view of the "intelligent" evangelical reader. He might suspect that the saint was bearing witness, not only to the faith of the fourth no less than of the nineteenth century, but also to the doctrine of Christ and His Apostles in the New Testament.

Hence the note begins by gravely informing us that the origin of prayers for the dead dates back, probably, to the close of the second century; that they were originally expressions of hope, and became gradually supplications and prayers, degenerating even into prayers for the unregenerate, until at last there was developed purgatory on one side and creature worship on the other. But Augustine did not believe in creature worship (see his Letter to Maximus). In the Church of England prayers for the dead

¹ Vol. i., p. 141.

² "Wheresoever you may be."

were wisely eliminated from the Prayer Book, because praying for the dead implies a belief in Purgatory.

This is the substance of the Note, which we have faithfully condensed. Who wrote it, matters little. It seems to be an improvement by Rev. Mr. Pilkington on a previous note of Rev. Mr. Watts, the Calvinist divine who translated and edited St. Augustine's Confessions in the first half of the seventeenth century. But whoever wrote it, Dr. Pusey and Dr. Schaff are just as responsible as if they were the writers. What connection is there between the note and the text? Is the reader enabled any better to understand the pious request of Monica and its fulfilment by Augustine, when he is told that prayers for the dead began at such a date or were thrust out of the Anglican Prayer Book for fear they might lead incautious Protestants to believe in Purgatory? The only question that can interest the reader is this: Did Monica and Augustine think the dead were helped by the prayers of the faithful and especially by the Holy Sacrifice, and did they say so? If not, let the note disprove it.

And then the gratuitous information that Augustine did not believe in creature-worship! Who ever accused him of it? Did any Catholic, or Protestant either, to the knowledge of Dr. Pusey or Dr. Schaff, ever make such a charge against the Saint? It was rather unfortunate to quote St. Augustine's letter to Maximus,¹ because from it we learn that the accusation of creature-worship was actually brought against St. Augustine and the Church of his day. And by whom? By Pagans, because they invoked the saints and martyrs, honored their memory and their relics, in a word, for the very same reason that makes heresy at this day charge creature-worship on the Council of Trent and the great world of Catholic believers. When will these good men learn that their accusations against the Catholic Church have not even the poor merit of originality, and that they are nothing more than an idle repetition of the stale calumnies invented against Christianity by the old worshippers of Jove and Bacchus? It does not require a very profound study of the Fathers to discover that there is scarcely—we will not say an argument—but even a lying sneer or jibe directed by the present heretical world against our sacraments, rites and moral teaching, that does not find its counterpart in the wicked insinuations and calumnies of dead Paganism. In the very letter of Maximus, to which St. Augustine replies, there is heathen ridicule of a holy martyr because of his odd name, *Namphanion*; and the very cant name of "dead men," by which Protestants love to call our Saints, seems to have been taught them by this Pagan scoffer. Our

¹ Ep. xvii., ad Maximum Madaurensem.

Saviour taught a different lesson when he reminded the Jews that the true God was the God of the living and not of the dead, and that, therefore, His friends, Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, were not dead, but living. Heresy, however, is so enlightened that it will not listen to Christ our Lord, much less to His Apostles and Evangelists, but it willingly goes to school to the Pagan Maximus of Madaura, to the heretic Vigilantius, and is delighted to learn from them that the Abrahams, Isaacs and Jacobs of the Old Testament, the Peters, Pauls, Clements, Polycarps and Namphanions of the New, are nothing but "dead men," and that they have left behind them only "carcasses" that are worthy of no respect.

THE WEAPONS OF SO-CALLED MODERN SCIENCE.

IN the beginning of the modern era, dating it from the Renaissance, the controversies which the Church had to engage in were carried on with a recognized basis of Revelation. Controversy turned upon the extent and meaning of that Revelation. Protestantism, springing naturally from the Renaissance, began early to empty into its true channel of rationalism, which was widened and deepened by the French Sons of the Revival, who had not chosen to break definitely with orthodoxy until they broke with Christianity. The Bible ceased, conspicuously, to be drawn so much into controversy, as an authority. The bitterest attacks upon the Church were made in the name of Metaphysics. This Metaphysics, that discarded the supernatural, soon rejected the immaterial. The accumulated wealth of material science seeming to store the magazines of war, the basis of the anti-Christian aggression was, at length, formulated thus: Christianity is in antagonism with the material order of the universe. There is a clearly marked scale of descent:

Facilis descensus averni.

The outcome of it all, in practical life, is the "animal ethics," so highly extolled by the "thinkers." As compared with the sixteenth century, the whole form of aggression has been changed—tactics, arms, and words of command. The question comes back

¹ The very word that Beza impiously applies to the Sacred Body of our Saviour after death.

upon us, daily,—and as it is an important one, there is no harm in repeating it,—Are we properly equipped for the conflict?

Our enemies have left the old battle-ground. They no longer uphold the false against the true Christianity. Finding that, on the field of the Supernatural, the scriptures and tradition, which they had tried to use, only turned against them as engines of destruction, they have deserted this field, and now contend, with every round of sophistry, that the supernatural, for the sanctions of whose revelations they so stubbornly fought, does not exist at all. They have thrown themselves, heart and soul, into the exploration of the not merely natural, but of the sensible, the visible, the tangible; and, holding up every molecule of earth, now try to make it pose as an argument—a long-hidden argument which they have found—against Christianity and Revelation. And they are teachers. They have made explorations, and, in their expositions, can figure as teachers. What wonder, then, if, after listening to learned discourses that evidence great research and long experiment, people who do not understand the long, earnest and intricate preamble, but who know the meaning of the one invariable conclusion drawn, *i.e.*, that the Revelations of Christianity are contradictory to the facts of “SCIENCE,”—what wonder if people begin to doubt? Not, certainly, that the argument is anything more than jugglery; but the children of darkness are wiser in their generation than the children of light. With one object in view—the overthrow of Christianity—they, literally, leave no stone unturned, if the mere turning of it can but add to their air of research. Their thesis, or, if they start without thesis, their conclusion, is always this: Science is the antithesis of faith, and the success of their efforts is too evident and too disastrous to be ignored. With the mass of men to-day the dominant idea is the wonderful leap physical science has suddenly taken into its maturity, waiting long like the cereus, and then bursting forth into glory in a night; and with this idea dominating the whole harmony of their thoughts, they feel glad to have lived and to have been born in such an era of science; and their faith is simple belief in its future power. It has done so much, it has proved itself to them in so much, that, when its “high-priests” come forward and declare that it has moulded the casket and woven the shroud and pall of Revelation, they, too often, quietly submit.

There are multitudes who make at least a pretence of seeing in the Bible nothing more than one of the variations of human emotion. We no longer hear controversies on the Trinity or Unity of God, the twofold Will of Christ, the middle state of Purgatory, the jurisdiction of Peter. The chief points attacked to-day are the very elementary truths of religion—of natural religion. A

hundred Reviews, stamped with names that carry learned appendices, scatter plausible sophistry over the world, and it is taken up and popularized in a thousand ways, so that it may not fail to reach the lowliest. Here and there we meet with an erudite refutation; and we rest satisfied that our work has been done. But the evil is not undone. It continues to be spread with feverish solicitude in newspapers and reviews, in class-rooms, in lecture halls, in parlors. Women, girls just entering society, are eager to show that they are not behind the age, and ask with a sparkle of vanity where the defenders of Christianity have hid themselves, at the approach of the great machine of Science.

Many calm themselves with the reflection that the very absurdity of the attack makes it harmless. This is a very false view of the case, and one as fatal as it is false. We are not pessimists. It is not pessimism to admit the height and build of your adversary and the length of his arm and to prepare accordingly. Mr. Mallock, whom we cite in the character of inquirer which he chooses to assume, says: "We are literally in an age to which history can show no parallel, and which is new to the experience of humanity; and though the moral dejection we have been dwelling on may have had many counterparts in other times, this is, as it were, solid substance, whereas they were only shadows."¹ Cardinal Newman does not hesitate to point to the calm threatening growth of positivism as to a phenomenon vaster than the mere outburst of a heresy. Neither can we disregard the testimony of those few—alas, too few—who, having helped to unchain the winds, are now recoiling in horror at their work. Even ten years ago, the profession of faith applauded to the echo in the socialistic congress of workingmen showed that the new metaphysical theories had reached their ethics, and had become a social reality. "They speak to us of a future life, they speak to us of heaven; but science has proved that this is all a dream, a lie. We do not want any of it. What we demand is hell—nothingness—with all the voluptuousness that goes before."² M. Jules Simon put it all in a sentence for the French people: "*Nous étions croyants, nous sommes devenus sceptiques, demain nous serons nihilistes.*" "We were believers, we have become sceptics, to-morrow we shall be nihilists."

A few years ago when Virchow, Haeckel and Oscar Schmitt put their heads together to deliberate upon the school programmes of Germany, it was asked whether monistic atheism should be reserved for the higher education, or whether it should not be introduced into the intermediate schools, and given in successive doses

¹ *Is Life Worth Living?* p. 197.

² From Report in *Bien Public* of Ghent, Sept. 12th, 1877.

in the primary schools, so that it might enter gradually into the family, and that children might grow up to it. Virchow could not bring himself to pronounce for the latter plan, but the others did not shrink from it. The *Revue Scientifique* (May 18th, 1878) answered boldly that it was expedient to lead the child gradually from anthropomorphism to the theory of the "*unknowable*," and to avow frankly that we do not know where the world came from or what becomes of us when we die.

All science may be divided, according to its object, into supernatural and natural. The object of supernatural science is God. St. Thomas tells us that it is God, considered as supreme cause; not merely in so far as we can know Him through creatures, for thus He may be the object of philosophy, but also and especially as to that which belongs to His own proper knowledge of Himself, and which He has communicated to us by revelation.¹

Natural science may be subdivided into that which has for its object intellectual and moral truths, and that which has for its object purely material phenomena. The former constitutes philosophy proper, more specifically metaphysics; the latter, embracing the material universe, constitutes physics. Metaphysics, employing consciousness and reason, discusses primary truths, substantial causes, questions of origin and finality, the essence of the necessary, the contingent, the immaterial, the free, etc. The domain of physics is circumscribed by the limits of purely material phenomena,—of that which can be reached by the five senses. Hence the term physics extends not only to that which is commonly called physics, but also to chemistry, geology, meteorology, and even to biology, which has for its object the sensible phenomena of life. Physics tries by repeated experiment to deduce the general laws that govern what is material in the universe in its material action. It is clear, then, that physics holds the lowest place in the hierarchy of the sciences. Physics as a science is as far below metaphysics as sight is below intelligence. Physics is a science which is, objectively, purely material, yet some of its devotees have had the presumption to arrogate to it the name of "Science," to the exclusion of every other science; and themselves they have crowned as "Scientists." From the definitions of the three orders of science it should be easy to determine their respective limits. But the lowest order, having with an amazing charlatanism hung up its sign, "all things knowable *à bon marché*," professes to have superseded the two other orders, denying or declaring unattainable or mythical those realms which, with all its presumption and effrontery, it acknowledges it cannot reach.

Step into its wonderful palace of knowledge. Its princes, coun-

¹ Summ. Theol., P. I, Q. 1, a 6.

terfeiting the air of a very suave conservatism, will meet you at the portal.

"Ah! Seeking for knowledge?"

"Yes, I want some instruction about God and immortality."

"Ah! Yes; I see—about—well, the fact is, science has no data on those points. It has never had any evidence that these things exist at all. Science adheres strictly to facts,—visible, tangible, audible facts,—and draws its conclusions after testing its facts under modifying influences. As to the things you speak of, science has not yet one fact, not to speak of a series of facts. Hence, science not only cannot draw a conclusion; science cannot even propound a theory. All science can do is to ignore such things. Science has gone high into the upper strata of the air and deep into the bowels of the earth, and has found nothing to indicate the existence of what you speak of. Hence, having no time to lose, it has relegated all such things to the region of the unknowable. This is the very mildest attitude it can assume. And it takes this position only out of courtesy to those who, less instructed, still hold on to what science really knows to be a fable. Science, I say, knows this; for, having explored all realms, it has proved it by a negative argument, by elimination. This argument is too lengthy for the majority of mankind to follow through all its details; so science avoids useless discussion with most men by saying: 'It may be so. We do not know. We have not found it.' But go in. Walk through the Palace at your leisure. Put a few questions to the Operators."

You advance, and, at once, there bursts upon your view a scene that makes you feel like a very Aladdin in the land of Alchemy. Here are no idlers. You accost an operator, and ask him for some information about miracles.

"Miracles! Yes. I know what you mean. We do not use the word. It is no longer found in our vocabulary, except as a mythological term. See that coil of wire? With that I can talk across the ocean. Is that what you call a miracle? The paradoxes of nature we are putting into toys. You say there are a great many things we do not know. Oh, yes; there are a great many. But, give us time. See what we have done in a quarter of a century!"

"But the spiritual soul, what can you say about that?"

"The spiritual soul! Well, we say nothing about it. We have never found it. And if there is one thing that we have done more than another, it is to study every fibre of the human frame. We have resolved it into its last elements; and what you call soul we now call mechanism. You have only to disturb some essential valve or pump, and it will not work. The same thing happens when you loosen the piston of a locomotive. The locomotive cannot

go. Of course, there are certain secrets in the complicated movement called life, that we have not yet reached; but we know all the elements, and we are on the way."

Well, if this is not a quackery that outdoes in brazenness all the quackeries at which men have ever gaped in awe! Quackery is defined in the dictionaries as "false pretensions to a knowledge of physic." What other name than that of supereminent, transcendental quackery can we apply to these "false pretensions to a knowledge of all things?" The Positivist school contents itself with saying that the questions which regard origin, substance, final cause, first cause, are absolutely inaccessible to us, because they lie outside the range of sensible observation. The avowedly materialistic school goes farther, and professes to decide all problems moral, metaphysical and religious. With the same code of laws which it has picked up out of matter, it passes sentence on ideas and atoms, on force and will, on intelligence and motion. Both materialistic monism and positivism repudiate the immaterial, as rationalism before them repudiated the supernatural.

The scientific question, therefore, which confronts us to-day, resolves itself into this: Must we admit a contradiction between the positive data of the experience of the senses and the teachings of conscience, reason and faith? between the testimony of the external faculties and the testimony of the internal? between the testimony of the internal faculties to-day and the testimony of the external faculties handed down to us by tradition? To keep up with modern progress, must we keep throwing away, as we would so much ballast, the deep-seated, uniform, universal beliefs of the human race? To be, and to be deemed, worthy of the future, must we deny the past, its glories, its geniuses, its thought?

This is not an arbitrary statement of the question. It is the one to which an affirmative answer is urged upon us in the name of science. We have to answer that there is not and cannot be opposition between knowledge and knowledge respectively in the three orders. Physics deals merely with the laws that rule matter in its material action. As physics it has not to ask, "whence or why matter?" It takes what it can find, what it can see, hear and feel, watches it to see how it acts, and then records the result of its experiment. If it attempts to do more, it goes out of its province. Philosophy, metaphysics, determines, in general, the nature of the material and the immaterial, the finite and the necessary. Theology, using a new light, faith, writes higher truths, supernatural; and it sheds this new light upon truths even physical and metaphysical, and illuminates them for the ken of a higher intelligence, to become the tenets of a higher belief. The three orders of knowledge are not contradictory. It is not necessary to deny the

existence of the higher order simply because its truths are not visible by the light of the lower; simply because we cannot build it up from the principles that suffice in the lower domain of matter. There is no more reason in this—less reason—than there would be in denying the existence of the golden harvest bathed in sunlight, because we should not be able to fathom it by the data, the handful of facts we might have gathered by the aid of a safety lamp down in the azoic stratum of primitive granite. We should not deny the flight of birds because we cannot fly ourselves; especially when we see the birds flying.

We should not deny the possibility of a second story to a building simply because our scaffolding will not reach high enough to make a second story, especially when we see houses of four, five and six stories all along the block. And yet similar things a few of the most forward and loud-spoken "scientists" arrogantly insist must be done. Verily, it would make one wroth if it were not such a comedy, and it would make one laugh were there not tears of tragedy at the end. But why is it that men will be deceived? Because most men are able to see better than they are able to think. When they have been shown through the brimming storehouse of visible wonders whose existence they had not suspected, they are disposed to believe the lie, the *ne plus ultra*, that is drawn as a conclusion. And the other reason is this: that when the lie favors the gratification of their gross desires, by eliminating conscience and the hereafter, they are doubly disposed to adopt it as the norma for the ethics of life.

In what has been hitherto said mention has been purposely omitted of that group in the departments of knowledge which, classified as one physical science under the heading of erudition, would embrace archæology, philology and historical criticism. Erudition is in the sphere of the natural sciences, and has played a great part in apologetics. The demonstration of Christianity reposes definitively on historical fact. From history we have an invincible proof of the Apostolicity, the Sanctity and the Divinity of the Church, and of its paramount civilizing action on the world. The adversaries of Christianity have been almost entirely driven from this field. Pope Leo XIII., in his letter to the erudite scholars, Cardinals Hergenröther and Pitra, urges them to strengthen and fortify with evidences of historical truth the position that has been attained. For us—the English-speaking Catholics—the war was long carried on upon the domain of history, for the mere reason that the press was in the hands of our adversaries. They have been almost routed from this battle ground, and have intrenched themselves behind the barrier of matter, professing to ignore facts that imply the action of free will. There is a beautifully mournful

passage in M. Renan's *Dialogues et Fragments Philosophiques*, which runs thus: "Here upon the seashore I was seized with regret at having preferred the historical sciences to those of nature. . . . There was a time when I was impassioned by these latter studies in the highest degree; but I was drawn away from them by philology and history. Yet every time that I converse with the *savants* I ask myself whether, in espousing the science of history, I have chosen the better part.

"What are the three or four thousand years which we can know out of the infinite duration that has gone before us! . . . History in its common acceptance—that is, the series of facts which we know of the development of humanity—is only an imperceptible portion of the true history, understood as the tableau of what we can know of the development of the universe." And he sings in the same strain, but more intensely, in an article in the *Revue des deux Mondes*: "I was drawn to the historical sciences, petty conjectural sciences, which are continually undoing themselves, and which will be rejected in a hundred years. Things now point to an age when man shall have little interest in his past. I fear much that the precious documents of the Academy of Inscriptions and Belles-Lettres, destined to give exactness to history, will mould before they are read.

"It is by chemistry at one end and astronomy at the other, and especially by general physiology, that we hold the secret of being, of the world, of God—as you choose to call it. The regret of my life is to have chosen for my studies a kind of research which will never have any influence, and which will always remain only as interesting considerations upon a reality gone forever."²

This is lugubrious. It is one more "epitaph written by himself." He had in view the sceptical school to which he belongs. His estimate does not affect the real science of historical fact and of the development of humanity. But his testimony is valuable as an intellectual weather-vane, showing the real direction of ideas towards the purely material sciences, where adventurers are constructing the new faith, monist or nihilist, to continue the war against the faith of ages. The natural domain of history has been deserted, and matter, *pure matter*, has been chosen as the stronghold. The once favorite arms of historical criticism, philology and rational exegesis, have been thrown away. We may judge of the condition of these weapons in the hands of unbelievers, when we see them, to-day, obliged to go as far as India to produce, as arguments against Christianity, falsified translations from a language little known in the Occident. To the testimony of Renan, it may

¹ Page 153, ann. 1876.

² "Revue des deux Mondes," Dec. 15th, 1881.

be well to add that of his master, Friederich Strauss. We take from what he called his *Confession* :

“Men must go, men will go thither—to the science of nature. . . . We, philologists and critical theologians, made an idle display of words when we decreed the end of the miracles. Our sentence met with no echo, because we did not teach men to do without the miracle. We could not provide a force of nature to take its place at the very point where it was found indispensable. Science (Darwinism) has discovered this force, this action of nature ; it has opened the door through which a happier posterity shall drive out the supernatural forever.”¹

There is opened up to us a new Crusade. Our present Sovereign Pontiff says : “It is necessary, therefore, for the defender of the Faith to apply himself, more than ever, to the study of the natural sciences.”²

The defence is not nearly so difficult as that which had to be conducted on the basis of Scripture, Tradition, History or Metaphysics. There is no scientific knowledge so easy of acquirement as general physics and biology. They are the more necessary to the apologist because they are popular, attractive, and, in a degree, accessible to all. They are bound up with daily life, with the industries of the world. They are of things visible. They make pictures for books. They form the riches of museums and exhibitions.

It is their very easiness of acquirement that has been utilized to make them instruments of evil. The natural curiosity of the child is stimulated in the primary classes, and explanations are given and his questions are answered in such a way that, even from his Primer of Geology, he goes forth with the germs of all the sophisms and negations of “Science.” These negations and sophisms strike deeper than does historic untruth, with which school books are still teeming ; deeper, too, than rationalistic criticism. For whilst the untruth of history and rationalism in interpretation disturb religion and faith, confound the origin of worships and lead to religious scepticism, they, nevertheless, leave humanity and do not ignore a moral order. Hence it is still possible, out of their ruins, to rebuild the edifice of truth. But presumptuous physics and biology strike at metaphysics. It is not merely the origin of Christianity that they assail, but the origin of the visible universe and of man. They strive to do away with the idea of God and of the soul, to enforce that of identity between man and beast. This is a low and loathsome form of aggression, no doubt ; but, driven

¹ “The Old and the New Faith,” § 54.

² Encyclical of Feb. 15, 1882.

from every other position, the enemies of Christianity have not hesitated to take this one, and even to glory in its degradation.

The character, therefore, of the apologetics called for to-day is eminently "scientific," using the word "scientific" in its much abused sense. The work to be done is to oppose the true science to the false. There is great scope for those who wish to engage in the defence of Christianity on the new battle ground of "Science." Their method should be one of untiring attack. However, mere ridicule will not do. They must be skilled in the facts of their case. They must "speak that which they do know;" but then they must speak it as "plain, blunt" men, and be not afraid, in season and out of season, with all patience, to hold up to scorn the logical bankruptcy of scientific charlatans. We purposely abstain from names in this article. Hitherto, as a rule, there has been too much hesitancy. One cause of this has been lack of knowledge of the bare facts of physical science. This can be remedied by study.

Another cause has been a fear of departing from the etiquette prescribed for religious controversy. Of course, where there was profession of religious belief, and where we had to begin by supposing men in good faith, we could not but laud their sincerity and the necessity of following the dictates of conscience, even whilst we offered them a new light which, owing to the circumstances of their lives, it had not been their good fortune to fall in with. But with the "scientific" adversaries this cannot hold. In their denial of God they are either sincere or not sincere. If they are not sincere, why should we pay court to their hypocrisy and treat them as if they were? If they insist that they are sincere, then we know that only the fool has said in his heart, there is no God.

There is a great work to be done. It may, indeed, be tiresome to follow them, to track their steps, to watch the results of their explorations, so as to be able to expose the chicanery with which they set forth their gathered treasures. But we have to follow them. They are wolves in sheep's clothing, and we must be ready when they appear to strip them of their masquerade. Theory—hypothesis—has reached its "lowest depth," but beneath that "lowest depth a lower deep . . . threatening to devour . . . opens wide." It is the "lower deep" of practice, the ethics of materialistic atheism, which means the search for brute satisfaction, without even the instinct of brute restraint. Though there are still multitudes who pray and who die consoled by faith and hope, how many are there not who go into eternity after coldly abdicating their sonship, their faith, their hope,—leaning, as they say, on the authority of "Science." There is no sadder picture in the panorama of the wanderings of human intelligence.

FEDERAL SCHEMES TO AID COMMON SCHOOLS IN THE SOUTHERN STATES.

NO thoughtful citizen can view without alarm the steady tendency towards centralization going on in the country and the breaking down of the constitutional limits with which our fathers wisely encircled the powers granted to the General Government created in 1787. The great civil war was a most dangerous period, when every doubtful exertion of power was excused by the plea that the very existence of the Constitution was at stake. Since its close the array of precedents then established makes every new attempt more sanguine of success, and induces fanatics to stigmatize any opposition to their wildest theories as disloyalty.

There is, however, a limit, and the sound sense of the people will ultimately prevail. Once a genuine alarm is created, all the unconstitutional usurpations will be annulled and the Supreme Court, true to the spirit of the Constitution formed by the Convention over which Washington presided with such providential wisdom, will sweep them away as the tornado brushes from its path the petty works of meaner men.

The plans are often so masked with the disguise of public good, of zeal for the general welfare, that the inherent and unconstitutional elements are not seen in all their naked deformity, and well meaning persons are led away.

The creation of a Department of Education was in itself a dangerous symptom, as the Federal Government has under the Constitution no power to interfere in the educational affairs of the States. Over the Territories, with a sparse population, Congress has indeed a constitutional power, over the District of Columbia, over West Point, forts, and navy yards. At any time in the last century Congress, in its deep and earnest anxiety for the education of the young in these inchoate States and spots withdrawn from the exercise of State systems, might have provided a general system of schools, and even paved the way for higher educational institutions. But you search in vain the statute book or the annals of Congress for any such beneficent action. The old Continental Congress indeed, in its ordinance for the government of the territory northwest of the Ohio, which, by the treaty of 1783, devolved on the Congress as a cession of part of Canada by England, did provide for education from the public lands, after Virginia and

other States had surrendered their vague and shadowy claims to it. But under the Constitution of 1787 the powers of Congress and of the Federal Government are strictly limited.

Even after Congress in our time created a Bureau of Education, the department made only more glaring its neglect of a real duty. We can find evidence that Congress annulled the charters of colleges and broke up schools in territorial limits; but the light of research shows that, like ordinary sinners, Congress has neglected to do what it ought to have done, and has done what conscience should have forbidden it to do.

But in time it became evident that the Bureau of Education was part of a scheme to bring the whole school system of the separate States under the control of Congress. The working of the scheme can be traced in the debates of Congress, though it is hardly safe to follow the printed issues of the *Congressional Record*; for if we are to take that publication as a type of truth and honesty displayed by the General Government in its new part of great moral educator and elevator, we shall be somewhat startled on a very cursory examination. It is probably the most false, mendacious, and intentionally dishonest and misleading publication ever issued; for while it purports to be a record of what is said and done in Congress, it reports not what members actually have said, but what on sober second thoughts they wished they had said, omitting much they really uttered and introducing matter never pronounced in the Senate or House. It is a stigma on our civilization that such a work will live to deceive men and falsify history.

The Rev. Mr. Mayo, of Massachusetts, one of those general benefactors of humanity from his own standpoint, and a great dabbler in educational matters, interested himself in the education of the Southern negroes. To his mind the white population of the South, impoverished by the war and still more by the terrible governments to which they were subjected during the years that followed it, were not doing enough to educate the negroes whom the North had liberated. To his mind it became the duty of the General Government, which had made them citizens and invested them with the elective franchise, to educate them. He prepared tables showing the fearful illiteracy that prevailed, but, like most one-sided men, did not set in very bold relief what the robbed and impoverished white population of the South had done and were doing even while smarting under a sense of wrong and oppression.

The scheme thus generated in the brain of a New England Protestant clergyman required some one to take it up and push it in Congress. Such a person was found in Senator Blair, of New Hampshire.

In December, 1881, this Senator introduced "A Bill to aid in

the establishment and temporary support of Common Schools." Under this \$105,000,000 were appropriated to be paid out in ten annual sums, beginning with fifteen millions the first year, and ending with six millions in the last. It professed that these amounts were to be expended to secure the benefits of common school education to *all* the children living in the United States. The basis of distribution was certainly remarkable. The money was, of course, raised by taxes, which are supposed and intended to be imposed on all parts of the country and all the inhabitants equitably. In the treasury it is the property of the people of the United States at large. But how was it proposed to return this money to the people? By States according to population? No. According to wealth, on the principle that the State contributing most should receive most? No. But the census of illiterate persons ten years old and upward in the whole country was to be taken as the basis, and each State was to receive according to its proportion of this class. A State having none of this class would get nothing, a State that contained half the illiterate population of the country would receive fifty millions of the public money. The word "children" was a lure,—the persons "ten years of age and over" included the great mass of adult negro voters up to the age of ninety, who certainly could not be expected to enter the schools or profit by the new educational facilities. The money was to be expended jointly by the Secretary of the Interior and the State Superintendent of Schools or other supreme school officer or body in each State; but if the State officer failed to agree with the ideas of the Federal Secretary, that State's share was to go back into the Treasury to be added to the distributive fund of the next year. In other words, the State officer had no power except to concur with the Federal officer. The money in each State was to be disbursed through a Commissioner of Common Schools in that State, appointed by the President, and rewarded with a salary of from three to five thousand dollars. Existing public schools, not sectarian in character, might be aided, and new ones might be established. If any State declined to accept the act, or neglected to take steps to obtain its share, its portion became a part of the general fund for distribution among the other States and Territories. The Secretary of the Interior was to administer the law through the Bureau of Education, and the Commissioner of Education was to act as Commissioner of Common Schools for the District of Columbia.

In the use of the word "sectarian," the Rev. Mr. Mayo and his mouth-piece, Senator Blair, forgot the words of honest old Elihu Burritt in a letter addressed to the New York *Tribune*, October 9, 1875:

"Now as 99 common school teachers in 100 in all these Northern States are Protestants, as the literature of all our reading books and the very atmosphere of our schools and even their out-door sports are Protestant in their influence, would it not be judicious as well as liberal to remove all religious bars to the admission of Catholic children? We ask and require them to yield some of their scruples in sending their children to schools which are effectively Protestant and which they have considerable reason to expect will influence their young minds. Then we may well and justly make some concessions of the same kind to them. . . . My only object has been to show that the term *sectarian* cannot properly be applied to it (the educational question) in the sense generally adopted."

How was the Secretary of the Interior to define "sectarian"? The use of the Protestant Bible makes every school where it is read a school under the Protestant sects, and therefore sectarian.

The word "sectarian," however, was intended to be, and really was, a slur on the Catholic body in this country, who, finding their children expelled from the State schools by their intensely anti-Catholic character, and by the license given to teachers to insult and expel Catholic children at their fancy, have been compelled to establish schools of their own where their children can be educated morally and religiously.

In debates which subsequently arose on this bill and others like it, Senator Vest, of Missouri, said: "I wish to call the attention of the Senator, irrespective of the census, to a simple fact, which is known, I presume, to every Senator present, that the Roman Catholics in the United States do not send their children to the public schools, that as a matter of religious duty, at least, they think they should not attend these schools, and I am utterly amazed to hear the statement, even from the census or anywhere else, that there are only 500,000 children in the United States in private schools. I undertake to say that if the fact is ascertained it will be found that there are that many children of Roman Catholic parents who, on a question of religion, do not attend the public schools."

To this Mr. Blair made a very lame answer, and said: "It is not worth while to quarrel with the Senator over a million or two!" A million or two! What precious statistics must they have been which Senator Blair has paraded so zealously for the last seven years, if to his figure of half a million we can in any part add a million or two!

The term "sectarian" was aimed especially at Catholic schools, for it is the only church which has any extensive system. To exclude these schools it actually lays down this as a principle: If

you teach the children to read, write and cipher, you deserve aid ; but if you are such enemies of God and man as to teach them at the same time religion and morality, you become outcasts, and deserve not the aid of the State, but its heaviest and severest punishment. We will make a "shibboleth." The form of the Lord's Prayer which Rev. Dr. Schaff and other revisers rejected from the Protestant Bible shall be our test. Any pupil who will not repeat the spurious form must be expelled from the schools ; we do so in Massachusetts.

But if we examine this Blair bill of 1881, not only in its spirit, but its form, we find it utterly un-American and indefensible. It strikes at every principle of sound government. It created a horde of officers, proposed to swell to an enormous extent the employees of the Bureau of Education, and required an army of sycophants and time-servers. No grosser attempt to debauch the public morals was ever brought forward.

Under this bill the head of the school system in each State had to be the tool of the Secretary, ready to "bend the pregnant hinges of the knee" at his every dictate, or his State lost its share. Any State or Territory that failed to carry out in detail whatever whim the Secretary might entertain, lost its share, so that in fact it depended solely on him whether each State in the Union obtained a share, or whether it was paid to two or three favored and compliant States. What a system for sycophancy and toad eating !

Taking the whole body of illiterates as a basis of calculation was not only without precedent, but absurd, for more than two-thirds of the illiterates in the South in 1880 were adults too old to attend school, and, therefore, hopelessly illiterate, who should not have been taken into consideration in a matter of schools which they would not attend even if an opportunity was afforded.

The project of Senator Blair was essentially sectarian, and at once received strong sectarian support, Congregational, Methodist, Baptist and Presbyterian associations advocating it in a memorial to Congress in March, 1882. At first, however, it made little progress, and was not carefully scrutinized or debated. But as a strong sectarian influence had been aroused, an agitation was kept up for a more vigorous effort at a future period. Catholics, of course, had nothing to do in the matter. They are practically excluded from all share in the management of the public schools, and their children are liable at any moment to be expelled from them. Strong Catholic opposition to the Blair bill would have helped it greatly, it was earnestly desired by its friends, but it did not come. Catholics took no step.

Senator Blair brought the matter before the Forty-eighth Congress, and a bill was reported in which, however, the States were

in a manner recognized, and the proportional amount was to be paid "to the treasurer of the State, Territory or District; or to such officer as shall be designated by the State," but the Governor of each State was required to make an elaborate report including any information the Secretary of the Interior might require; and, if a State misapplied the funds, or the Governor failed to make a satisfactory report to his superior officer, the Secretary of the Interior, that State was to forfeit its right to any subsequent apportionment, until it had made up and duly applied the misappropriated money or a more pliant Governor made a report.

This bill excited serious debate. The Senators had had time to look into the matter, and the glaring difficulties were exposed by many.

The right of Congress to appropriate money for public schools—the right to make an appropriation for ten years—the new and unwise basis of distribution—the improbability of Congress being able to suppress illiteracy in the South when it had utterly failed to suppress it in the petty limits of the District of Columbia, over which it had entire and absolute control—the vagueness of the term school age, embracing in some States a period twice as long as it did in others—the attempt to make State Governors mere deputies of the Secretary of the Interior, all these and other points were raised and vigorously pushed by Senator after Senator, till Mr. Blair was forced to yield some points and make amendments.

Senator Pendleton said: "I do not find in the Constitution any provision—I have not found it, I have sought for it diligently, I would like to find it—any power to provide for the education of the voters of the United States." Senator Saulsbury in vain called upon Mr. Blair to show any power in the Constitution. He could shield himself only under the power given to the General Government to pay debts incurred for the "general welfare of the United States." Senator Vest and others showed from the words of Madison and others who helped to frame the Constitution, that it was not a grant of power, but a limitation of the ability to tax; and that it referred exclusively to matters affecting the country as a whole, and that it never was intended to authorize Congress to interfere in any way in the domestic affairs of any State.

If the latitude claimed by Senator Blair was admitted, Congress might on the same plea pass a general law of marriage and divorce, assume the direction of prisons, poor-houses, and asylums; for no power once assumed by Congress has ever been relinquished, but has been steadily developed, and made a means of drawing more and more money from taxation. Taught by experience in similar cases, Senator Butler said: "If this money is appropriated under this bill, and I beg the Senator to mark that prediction, ten years

will not roll around before the National Government will have control of every common school in the United States."

Whenever the bill came up these objections to its constitutionality were constantly raised.

Senator Hawley, in the debates of 1888, put them very distinctly:

"The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States; but all duties, imposts and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States."

"It is claimed that herein Congress is empowered to provide for the 'general welfare'; that is, to do anything which in its judgment conduces to the welfare of the nation, and as education is a good thing, Congress has a right to go to work to educate the people, especially as it is alleged that many of them are either unable or unwilling, or partly both, to educate themselves. The Senator from New Hampshire pushed this claim to a most extravagant extent, likening the bill to the desperate endeavors of a nation to save its life in time of war, and affirming for the National Government a right to say that school education is a matter of such vast and vital importance, and is so woefully neglected, that the nation must in a time of peace and wonderful prosperity assume measurable control over it, even though it were admitted to be beyond constitutional reach. Pomeroy's Constitutional Law has become a standard authority. This authority (he was my classmate and old friend, I am happy to say) declares:

"If the construction should be adopted which regards the second clause [to pay the debts and provide for the common defence and general welfare] as an independent grant of power, it would, in effect, be making our general government unlimited. Providing for the common defence and general welfare includes everything which any government could possibly do; and a grant of power in these broad terms would be the same as making Congress omnipotent, equal in the extent of its functions to the British Parliament."

"The usual and constant theory of the Government has been that the expression 'to pay the debts, and provide for the common defence and general welfare' is not an independent grant of power. The power of unlimited taxation is truly granted, for that is essential to sovereignty, but it is granted for specified purposes, and the application of the levied money is confined to paying the debts and providing for the common defence and general welfare. As Story and others suggest, the clause has now the same meaning and purpose that it would have if it read 'The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes' in order 'to pay the debts and provide for the common defence and general welfare.' So far from being used to signify a grant of power the words 'general welfare' are used for a limitation of power."

At the time, however, of which we are speaking many Senators were afraid to go on record as opposing a bill to advance education, leaving it to the Supreme Court to decide the question of constitutionality. Hence when it came to a vote many declared in its favor.

The bill as it passed the Senate on the 7th of April, 1884, by a vote of 33 to 11, reduced the amount to \$77,000,000, beginning with seven millions, gradually rising to fifteen millions, and descending to five millions in a period of eight years. By the third section no State or Territory was to receive any of the benefits of

the Act until the Governor filed with the Secretary of the Interior an elaborate report on the common-school system in his State or Territory, and the Secretary was then to certify to the Secretary of the Treasury the names of the States and Territories which he found to be entitled to share in the benefits of the Act.

The moneys were to be used only for "common schools not sectarian in character," and "no second or subsequent allotment" was to be made to any State or Territory unless the Governor filed with the Secretary of the Interior a detailed account of the payments or disbursements made of the school fund apportioned to his State or Territory. If it appeared to the Secretary of the Interior that the funds had been faithfully applied and the conditions observed, "then the Secretary of the Interior shall distribute the next year's appropriation." The Secretary was to administer the Act in regard to Territories through the Commissioner of Education.

This act still retained the fallacy of including adult illiterates in the figures as a basis of distribution when children only were to be benefited, and though it did away with the projected creation of new salaried Federal officers in the several States and Territories, it retained the anomaly of making the Governors of the States subordinates of the Secretary of the Interior, subject to his dictation, and without appeal subject to his judgment whether they discharged their duty. The history of the country can scarcely produce a parallel to this barefaced attempt to place the chief magistrates of the sovereign States in a humiliating position under men whose office is not even mentioned in the Constitution of the United States.

But after passing the Senate Senator Blair's bill rested. There was no disposition in the House to take it up and pass it. In a speech on the appropriations for the naval service the Senator, in March, 1887, recurred to his favorite topic and disclosed one of the underlying motives of his pretended philanthropy. "Nothing but dense stupidity can fail to see that the manufacturing capital and cities of New England and the North generally, are doomed if they are to compete with the cheap labor of the South, which is already becoming skilful with the hand, although, unfortunately, not fully intelligent in the discharge of the duties and in the exercise of the power of citizenship. This condition comes only with education in the art of reading and writing, and in the other common branches of knowledge. Southern products and manufactures are already disputing with *us our* own markets and controlling them in many articles."

"We," on the lips of Senator Blair, is not, as in the Constitution of the United States, "the people of the United States," but the

manufacturers of New England; and the Federal Government is asked to take a hundred millions of dollars, drawn from the people of the whole country by tax, and devote it to educating the Southern negroes, so that they will demand higher wages, and in that way cause the failure of Southern manufacturing enterprises, produce a general bankruptcy at the South, shut up the rising mills and factories, and leave the school-trained negroes without any employment or wages at all, and to do so because Southern men have had the effrontery to consider that they had any rights, and have actually dared to dispute with *us* New England manufacturers *our* own markets!

Yet, though this bill was in direct violation of the reserved rights of the States, was degrading to the Governor of every State, aimed to crush the growing industries of the South, there were Senators from that part of the country who voted for it, enticed by the bribe it contained, even as Mayor Courtenay of Charleston in an elaborate pamphlet had in 1881 maintained that the General Government had the power and was bound to aid the public schools in the South. Yet there were some to oppose it manfully. Senator Coke made an able argument against it. "If the Constitutional power exists in Congress to levy and collect taxes from the people for the purpose of partially defraying the expenses of public schools in the States, it exists for the purpose of paying the entire cost of the public schools of all the States, whenever Congress shall choose to exercise it."

Gradually, however, thinking men studying the whole question, and examining what the effect had been of such aid given to State effort, began to reach the conviction that such aid paralyzed local work, and led people to look for similar contributions in the future, instead of teaching them to exert themselves to their utmost, and receive aid only in case of widespread disaster crippling the resources of a whole community. The very agitation of the question was acting disastrously in the South, chilling the energy with which the question of education had been taken up, and allowing the faint-hearted or mean-spirited the opportunity of seeking to postpone further action till they saw what Congress would do for them.

The *Evening Post*, of New York, took up the matter thoroughly and in earnest. Exposing the fallacy of Dr. Mayo's figures and statements, which were made the basis of all of Mr. Blair's assertions, it showed the absurdity of making the pet theories of any social dreamer the groundwork for voting away millions of money wrung from the people. But when it exposed the evil results of the scheme it gave the heaviest blow to Mr. Blair's project when it justly stigmatized the proposed action as "A Bill to promote Mendi-

cancy." The epithet told, and many soon recognized the justice of the application. The *Post* showed how the Western Reserve Fund had been an incubus on the school system of Connecticut, instead of a benefit. It showed Rev. Mr. Mayo to be "that most dangerous of all guides, a man with a hobby," who, familiar with the school facilities of Cincinnati and Springfield, Massachusetts, was shocked to find the country parts of the South so far behind them. "If he had gone from Springfield through the hill towns of western Massachusetts, he would have found schools which are but little more 'effective' than exist in the South, and are in session but little longer." Judged by the standard of our great cities to-day, the country schools of New England fifty years ago were by no means "effective," but they prevented the mass of the people from remaining illiterate. The assertion, made apparently on the authority of the Rev. Mr. Mayo, that illiteracy in the South was rapidly increasing, was tested by the reports from the several States.

The school attendance in South Carolina rose from 110,416 in 1874, to 185,619 in 1884; in Mississippi, from 166,204 in 1875 to 266,966 in 1883. Florida in one year increased her schools from 1504 to 1724, and in 1885 of a school census of 66,978 children between the ages of 6 and 21, had 62,327 enrolled in her public schools.

Mr. Mayo said that "not one-third of the Southern children and youth between the ages of 6 and 20 are or ever have been in any effective school." From official reports the *Post* showed:

	Per Cent. Enrolled.	Average Attendance.	School Days.	Cost per Pupil.
Alabama had, . . .	56	62	83	2.30
Mississippi, . . .	60	58	77½	3.01
South Carolina, . . .	63	69	70	2.41
North Carolina, . . .	56	62	62	2.12
Georgia, . . .	57	66	65	2.12
Kentucky, . . .	49	63	102	2.48
Arkansas, . . .	48	3.67
Louisiana, . . .	19	69	102	4.24
Florida, . . .	93	73	90	5.37
Texas, . . .	79	...	100	6.78

In fact two-thirds of the children of school age in Delaware, West Virginia, Missouri, Florida, and Texas attend school, and nearly two-thirds in South Carolina, Mississippi, and Tennessee, and more than one-half in Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia and Alabama.

When other statements of Dr. Mayo came to be critically examined men found that what they had been quoting as almost inspired—his assertions as to the short term of Southern compared to Northern schools, his pretence that it was extremely difficult

to secure regular attendance at Southern schools, his charge that the salaries paid to teachers were exceptionally meagre—all fell to the ground. The *Evening Post* put its conclusions in this form: "That the omniscience of a supernatural Being should have been attributed to one who thus proves to be the most fallible of mortals, and that the Congress of the United States should have proposed, upon the vague outgivings of such an oracle, to revolutionize the established educational policy of the government, will be accounted in future years one of the most extraordinary exhibitions of popular superstition on record; and the Mayo myth must hereafter occupy a prominent place in every history of the world's mythology."

A change of opinion set in. Papers that, at first, advocated Senator Blair's project, began to grow lukewarm or openly hostile to it. Great educators, including President Barnard of Columbia College, President Hyde of Bowdoin College, President Angell of Michigan University, President Robinson of Brown and President Eliot of Harvard, gave clear expressions of their disapproval of the scheme. Many saw in it a temptation to fraud, for as the amount received by each State depended on the number of curable and incurable illiterates it could show, each would try to make this class appear from year to year as large as possible. There was a premium offered on their keeping their people illiterate, for a wholesale reduction of the class of illiterates involved a wholesale loss of cash—they would be punished and mulcted for the good they effected. Every child by learning to read and write actually robbed the State.

To prepare for a new campaign in the Fiftieth Congress, Senator Blair prepared a quarto pamphlet which he declared contained as much matter as an octavo volume of 400 pages. All the threadbare arguments and mythical facts of Dr. Mayo were paraded anew, his own speeches given, the recommendations of ministers and conventions duly set forth. Believing that by this campaign document he had recovered public opinion, he again introduced the bill. Debates of course ensued, and Senator Hale said truly: "We are brought face to face with wider and deeper defects in the whole scheme which has been so earnestly and faithfully urged forward by the Senator from New Hampshire, who has charge of the bill. It is the hard fortune of this measure that, as time goes on, there are seen to be more reasons arising against its passage, and less reasons are shown for its necessity as a great public measure. Not only is this apparent in the Senate, but it is clearly discernible outside of Congress among the people at large."

The slur on Catholics had, as we have seen, called forth comment. In a previous Congress Senator Van Wyck, of Nebraska,

had asked: "Why these words as a gratuitous thrust against a sect which has done more for education than any other? The world is indebted to the Catholic Church from the time of the Dark Ages, when she preserved the literature of the centuries preceding, and in our earlier history, when she established missions and schools among the Indians, until now she is aiding to educate the colored man and gathers her own children into parochial schools."

Mr. Blair then declared that the offensive word "sectarian" had no reference to the Catholic Church. But he had not the truth or manliness to say as the Mayor of Charleston did: "The Right Rev. John England, first Bishop of Charleston, founded an English and Classical School sixty years ago in our city, and among those who have been ornaments of our learned professions and mercantile life in the past half century, and some of whom are still spared to us, are those who recall with affectionate regard this distinguished divine as the schoolmaster of their youth."

On the contrary, a hatred of Catholicity had evidently been a concealed but powerful motor in all his acts, some now verging on madness. In a speech in which he denounced the *Evening Post* pamphlet as a tissue of falsehoods, pointing to the reporter's gallery he cried out: "The American people will have truth from that gallery, or they will clear that gallery on which I now gaze"—expressions recorded by that gallery but suppressed in the *Congressional Record*. In the same speech he made this extraordinary and insane outburst:

"Why, Mr. President, I believe some have called this a bill for the promotion of mendicity. It has been so styled by the *New York Post* and the *Washington Post* and other organs of Jesuitism in this country, for this is a great fight initiating and already outlining itself for the future between the common schools of the United States and those influences which would subvert this great system. I tell you, sir, that upon this very floor, soon after we had passed this bill two years ago, and while it was in the hands of a packed committee of the House of Representatives, where it was finally strangled—on this very floor a Senator showed me, and I read it with my own eyes, the original letter of a Jesuit priest, in which he begged a member of Congress to oppose this bill and kill it, saying that they had organized all over the country for its destruction, that they succeeded in the committee of the House, and they would destroy the bill inevitably, and if they had only known it early enough they could have prevented its passage through the Senate. They have begun in season this time, but they will not destroy this bill.

"Twelve years ago, when I was a member of the House of Representatives, and we were undertaking to enact a constitutional amendment which was to prevent the appropriation of the public money to the support of sectarian schools in this country, a friend of mine pointed out to me upon that floor nine Jesuits who were there log-rolling against the proposed amendment of the Constitution. I did not know them. He claimed to know them; and he pointed them out nine at one time. They were not the Catholic Church, thank God. Within the sound of my voice sleep the remains of John Carroll and of Charles Carroll of Carrollton, men who were devoted to civil rights and to true religion; and against the memory of those men, and against the great Catholic organization of this country I say nothing, for I venerate their

memories and I venerate that great organization which, subject to my reverence for the faith of my fathers, is, in my belief, a true exemplar of Christianity.

"I care not how far it exerts, or how widely it extends its power; but within that organization is a Jesuit organization which has set out to control this country, which has been repudiated by every free country, Catholic and Protestant, in the Old World, and they have come to our borders and they are among us to-day, and they understand that they are to secure the control of this continent by destroying the public school system of America. They are engaged in that nefarious and wicked work. And as Jesuits have been expelled from the Old World, let me say that the time is soon coming when the Jesuits will be looked upon as more the enemy of this country than is the Anarchist to-day. And the process either of their expulsion or of their conversion will be one in which the American people will sometime be engaged, unless the Order change their programme and their work."

It is fortunate for future history that this stupendous piece of ignorance, fanaticism, and superstition did not share the fate of the tirade against the reporters. It is in the *Congressional Record* of February 16th, 1888, from which we carefully reprint it. And a man who can display such amazing ignorance has been talking for eight years of removing the ignorance of the country. In all those eight years at Washington he had not ascertained that John Carroll was a Jesuit, and that the Tory Dulany taunted Charles Carroll with being a pupil of the Jesuits; he had not learned that there was a Jesuit College at Georgetown founded by John Carroll aided by Charles Carroll. The story of a letter of a nameless Jesuit priest to a nameless member, asking him to kill the bill, may be believed when the letter is produced, for a man superstitious enough to believe and print that he believed he saw nine Jesuits on the floor of the House of Representatives log-rolling against a proposed constitutional amendment, must have utterly lost his reason. The Jesuit Fathers in and around Washington are better known there than Senator Blair, and nine of them, or even three of them, on the floor of the House, acting as log-rollers, would have been heralded through the country; we should have had their names and their pictures and the full story of the affair. Not a Jesuit Father can be named as active in the matter of the amendment or on the question of Public Schools. As teachers and men of learning, the Colleges and Theological Seminaries are their field. This he could learn from the Catholic Directory published annually in this country. He will find their colleges and houses of theological study from Boston to San Francisco, but not a single parochial school taught by them. To make them teachers of parochial schools is about as true as to assert that United States Senators are all elected by the States to teach district schools in Maine. The parochial schools are under the Bishops, taught by Sisters and Brothers of various orders, and there is not a Bishop in the country who is or ever was a Jesuit.

"His eye in fine frenzy rolling" ought to have seen nine Bishops or nine Christian Brothers or nine terrible Sisters of Charity.

On the 16th of February the bill was passed by a vote of 39 to 29. One Senator, Berry, of Arkansas, acting under instructions from his State, voted against his own conviction.

It remains now to be seen whether this time it will be taken up in the House of Representatives, or whether it will die there, to revive again in the Senate session after session while Mayo's disciple continues to represent the Sovereign State of New Hampshire.

Education when based on religion and morality is a good; without such control it may be and must be a curse and not a blessing to any community. All the early schools of this country were essentially religious, under the control of various churches. Children learned religion with their alphabet and through their whole course of study. The range of study was not great, and in thinly settled parts illiteracy or the nearest approach to it prevailed, yet it was the day when men talked and reasoned on great principles of government, overthrew the power of the English Government in our land and established the Constitution which is such a marvel in men's eyes. In later times there have been colleges and universities established by the State under no religious influence. It cannot be denied that all these institutions are essentially rationalistic and tend more and more to drive from the minds of the young the idea of revelation, redemption, even of a personal God. Under the same impulse the Public School system is modeling itself more and more on that established in France, where Christianity is openly decried and the very existence of God denied. Even now all reference to God and prayer and eternity is carefully expunged from books adopted in the common schools of this country. If this excluding of religion continues, aided by the introduction of books adapted from French works keenly contrived to sap all faith in God, there will not be in the country, twenty years hence, any schools recognizing God or Christ except Catholic colleges, academies and schools, and those which sincere Protestants hasten to establish before it is too late.

If the control of all the public schools in the country is allowed to be grasped by the Federal Government, the rationalizing process becomes comparatively easy. Instead of laboring to effect the dechristianizing scheme in State after State, the whole effort can be concentrated at Washington.

Here is one great danger which it behooves all men who still believe in Christ the Redeemer and God the Creator, to labor to avert.

When the Blair bill comes up in the House of Representatives, the delegates of the people at large must consider its constitu-

tionality. They must decide it, the Senate having thrown the responsibility on them.

They must treat the bill as what it really is, a sectional bill. Though general in terms, it applies in fact exclusively to the South, the amount given to Northern States bearing no proportion to the amount taken from them, and the strange basis of division giving the greatest amounts to the South.

They must bear in mind that by the avowal of Senator Blair, it is a bill intended to crush commercial and manufacturing interests in the South that New England may retain a market for its manufactures, leaving the Southern operatives and the men who would gladly employ them in one general slough of misery.

In view of the gradual increase of schools and scholars in the South all pretext for Federal interference is rapidly vanishing; the Southern States show their ability to educate the ignorant masses among them, who are not by reason of their advanced age hopelessly illiterate, and the Census of 1890 should be awaited to see whether there is any such dangerous condition of affairs as to require the straining of doubtful powers beyond the Constitutional limit. From all the statistics available, it is certain that the Census of 1890 will show that the Southern States are as fully competent to manage this as any other of their domestic concerns.

In the face of all the facts the House of Representatives cannot safely venture to pass a bill of more than doubtful constitutionality, of very doubtful wisdom as a means of improving schools; a bill aimed at Southern commerce and manufactures; a bill to degrade the governors of the States; a bill to promote mendicancy; a bill to cripple and destroy local interest in schools; a bill to render the school system a powerful lever in the hands of those who make Christianity a by-word and a mockery.

Scientific Chronicle.

CATHOLIC SCIENTIFIC MEETING.

THE International Congress of Catholic Scientists will meet in Paris on the 8th of this month.

The brief of his Holiness issued last May, the untiring exertions of Mgr. d'Hulst, President of the Paris Catholic University, and the prompt coöperation of scientists of many lands have combined in assuring for it a splendid success.

The organizing committee of the Congress, Mgr. d'Hulst presiding, had a meeting on November 22d, 1887. It was then officially announced that 430 favorable answers had been received, 285 from France, and 145 from other countries. The list of honorary members enrolled up to that date contained 162 names of eminent men, among them over 40 cardinals. It was also announced at the same meeting that papers to the number of 60 on various scientific topics had already been handed in to the Chairman. This encouraging state of affairs at a date so far in advance of the meeting of the Congress, gave bright promise of the favorable auspices under which the event itself would be inaugurated. We look forward then with lively interest to the reports of the transactions of the Congress, feeling confident that, once more, practical proof will be given of the benefits which science derives from the safe-guard of religion.

There is one subject which we would especially desire to see taken in hand by some of the able men whom the Congress will bring together; we mean the refutation of Darwinism. A baneful and growing fashion is at present in vogue amongst a large class, particularly of English and German speaking scientists, of declaring themselves Darwinists even when the profession seems altogether foreign to the matter with which they are dealing. We could not understand, for instance, why an eminent mathematician such as Prof. Sylvester is known to be, should make a profession of faith of this kind in the course of a purely mathematical article, which some time ago appeared under his name. The origin of the fashion would seem to be, that not a small portion of the scientific press of these countries systematically ignores whatever does not emanate from a Darwinian source.

The mischief accruing from all this is easily perceived. It leads uninformed readers to infer that the Darwinian hypothesis is all but universally adopted by the world of science. In reality, if we consider the whole of the scientific world, the reverse is nearer the truth. In the greater part of continental Europe the adherents of the system are conspicuously few. The old French school is opposed to it, all the great professors of the *Sorbonne* and of the *Collège de France* reject it. Among

the materialists of France, it is true, some ardent admirers of the system are on the point of establishing a new chair in which their views may be inculcated. The French Government, which is only too eager to promote anything even seemingly opposed to Catholic traditions, will, no doubt, lend every assistance to the movement, and before long we may expect to find some second-rate naturalist of the Darwinian type exalted to the position. In Germany, we find among prominent scientists the same general view. In the Congress of German Naturalists and Physicians at Wiesbaden last fall, a trenchant refutation of Darwinism was delivered by the illustrious Prof. Rudolph Virchow. We regret that its length precludes the possibility of reproducing it in these pages, and it would be an injury to it to summarize it or otherwise alter its form. We need not be apprehensive of exaggerating the authority of this remarkable man. As the originator of "Cellular Pathology" and of the present science of tumors, his position in the ranks of science is unequivocal, and his reputation as a master of every subject he enters into is unchallenged. His special field of study, too, rendered him peculiarly fitted to meet the arguments of the Darwinists with contradictory facts, which his own investigations had scrupulously verified. Let us hope that some of the Catholic scientists will follow in the same lines, and show in a still clearer light the baseless and hollow character of the suppositions on which the showy structure of Darwinism is erected.

SPECTRUM ANALYSIS AND THE ROWLAND GRATINGS.

THERE is perhaps no branch of physical science which, for the rapidity of its development and the importance of its discoveries, can be compared with spectrum analysis. Not thirty years have elapsed since the investigations of Kirchhoff and Bunsen, yet to the method of analysis which they introduced we owe some of the most striking discoveries of the present century. The spectroscope has not only led to the finding of several new chemical elements, but it has also proved of great assistance in astronomy. By its means, many of the elements composing the sun have been ascertained, and the question of the solar spots has been almost completely answered. The red prominences which may be seen around the solar disk during a total eclipse, have been observed by the spectroscope even in full daylight; they have revealed to the observer their constituent elements, and, by a slight change in the position of their spectral lines, they have made known the velocity with which the incandescent gas bursts forth from the body of the sun. By spectrum analysis, astronomers have ascertained that some of the nebulae are huge volumes of glowing gases, and are, therefore, not composed of separate stars; they have found that most of the so-called fixed stars are really in rapid motion, and have actually measured their velocity in the direction of our line of sight.

Now, what is this spectrum analysis, and upon what principles does it

rest? When a beam of sunlight, entering a dark room through a narrow slit in the window-blind, is allowed to fall upon a prism, the light will be refracted, *i.e.* turned aside from its straight course. Not only will the sunlight be refracted, but it will also be decomposed into its constituent colors. For, since the different colors are unequally refrangible, some will be turned from the straight course more than others; hence the different colors will, after refraction, follow slightly divergent paths, and if they fall upon a white screen they will form a ribbon of light containing, in regular succession from violet to red, all the colors of the rainbow. This ribbon, or band, is called the *solar* spectrum. If any other kind of light be allowed to pass through a prism in the same manner, it will form its own spectrum, differing from that of sunlight, and by carefully examining any spectrum we can ascertain the kind of light which has caused it.

For this careful examination, however, we need a more elaborate arrangement than a prism and a white screen. The instrument employed is called a spectroscope. Spectroscopes differ widely in their construction, but they generally consist of three parts: 1st, a prism, to form the spectrum; 2d, a collimator, to direct a narrow beam of light upon the prism; 3d, a small telescope, to view the spectrum. The collimator is very much like a telescope with a narrow slit instead of an eyepiece; by widening or narrowing the slit, the amount of light introduced may be increased or diminished at pleasure.

Let us consider the manner in which the spectroscope is used for the analysis of light. Suppose we place in front of the collimator a flame which is strictly monochromatic, containing, for example, no color but red. The light, passing through the slit and meeting with the prism, will be simply bent from its course; as there is only one color, all the light will be refracted to the same extent, and the spectrum will consist of a single red line. Suppose, however, that the flame, instead of being monochromatic, contains two colors,—for example, red and yellow. The naked eye cannot distinguish the two colors in the flame, but when the light passes through a spectroscope the colors are unequally refracted, and thus form a spectrum consisting of two bright lines,—the one red, the other yellow. If the flame contains three colors, its spectrum will consist of three bright lines, and in general every additional color in the flame will produce an additional bright line in the spectrum.

Spectra such as those we have just described are called “bright band spectra,” and their use in analyzing substances may be readily seen. Each one of the chemical elements, if burned, will produce its own peculiarly colored flame, giving rise to its own characteristic spectrum, *i.e.*, its own system of bright lines. Rarely can one distinguish, by the mere color, the flame of one element from that of another, and the difficulty is increased a hundredfold when several elements are burned together. The spectroscope, however, compels each element to make known its presence. So delicate is this method of analysis, that the burning of the one two hundred millionth of a grain of sodium will give the characteristic spectrum of that metal.

The more numerous the different colors in the light examined, the

more numerous will be the bright lines in its spectrum. Now white light contains every color. Accordingly, if white light be analyzed, there will be so many bright lines that they will coalesce into an uninterrupted band of light, very much resembling the solar spectrum, yet differing from it in a manner to be explained later. These uninterrupted spectra are called "continuous spectra." They are given by any incandescent solid or liquid, and also by any gas burning under great pressure.

The solar spectrum belongs to a third class; it is one of the "dark band spectra." To a casual observer the spectrum of sunlight appears to be continuous, but on closer examination it is found to be interrupted by a great number of dark bands. Fraunhofer, in the year 1815, was the first who carefully investigated these dark bands, and they are still known as the "Fraunhofer lines." Their existence in the solar spectrum was a puzzle to physicists, until Kirchhoff explained them in the year 1859. He placed a calcium-light in such a position that the rays from it, before reaching the collimator of his spectroscope, had to pass through a flame colored by sodium vapor. Then, looking into the spectroscope, he found that the bright lines due to the sodium were absent from the spectrum, and that their place was supplied by dark bands. While the white light was passing through the sodium flame, the vapor of sodium had absorbed just those rays which it was itself capable of emitting. Extending his investigations, Kirchhoff discovered that what was true of sodium vapor was true of any other vapor, and that every black band spectrum could be explained by the absorption of certain rays of light. Hence the black band spectra are called sometimes "absorption spectra."

The relations which the various classes of spectra have, one with another, may be seen at a glance. Incandescent solids and liquids, as well as gases under great pressure, give continuous spectra. Vapors and gases, when not compressed, give bright band spectra; and these spectra are different for different substances. The dark band spectrum is given by white light which has passed through an incandescent vapor, and has had some of its light absorbed.

Whenever the spectrum is employed for the purpose of analysis, the exact position of the lines becomes a matter of the greatest importance. At present, there are more than three thousand lines recognized in the solar spectrum; hence, unless the position of each is determined with accuracy, there is great danger of mistaking one for another, and thus rendering the observation useless. The exact determination of the place of each line becomes still more necessary when the spectroscope is used to measure the motion of the stars, for this motion is calculated from a very slight change in the position of the lines. Unfortunately, when the spectrum is formed by means of a prism, the relative distance apart of the lines will depend upon the material of the prism, and, even in the same prism, will vary with the temperature. Thus an element of confusion is introduced, where the greatest accuracy is demanded. The difficulty, however, may be avoided by the use of a grating, instead of a prism, to form the spectrum.

The grating consists of a system of close, equidistant parallel lines, ruled upon glass or polished metal. If the lines are ruled upon glass, the grating acts by refraction; if upon metal, by reflection. In either case we obtain a series of spectra; the principal one of these, called the spectrum of the first order, has the great advantage that in it the relative distances apart of the various bands do not vary. Hence the grating is far better than the prism wherever exact work is needed.

The first gratings that gave really satisfactory results were those manufactured by Rutherford, of New York, about ten or twelve years ago. At present, the best of Rutherford's are surpassed by those ruled by Professor Rowland, of the Johns Hopkins University, in Baltimore. A few years ago, Professor Rowland had a very accurate ruling-machine made in Germany. By this machine nearly all the gratings now in use were made. Those gratings were found to give the best results which contained 14,700 lines to the inch. Quite recently, a new machine was constructed at the Johns Hopkins University, under the personal supervision of Professor Rowland himself. The new machine has ruled as many as 40,000 lines to the inch, and is expected to perform far better work than the old one.

With the improved gratings, there is no doubt that many discoveries will be made. Already Messrs. C. C. Hutchins and E. L. Holden, of the Harvard University Physical Laboratory, claim that their investigations, conducted by means of a large Rowland grating, render doubtful the coincidence of some Fraunhofer lines with the spectra of the metals. This, then, would seem to be the first question demanding a solution. There is also another field of investigation which will scarcely be neglected, namely, the opinion of Lockyer about the chemical elements. He brought forward the theory that many substances now known as elements are really compound. His opinion is looked upon with disfavor by most chemists, but there are several facts which entitle it to further examination. Some of the metals, when raised to a very high temperature, give a spectrum differing from that ordinarily given by the same metals. At the high temperature, several new lines appear in the spectrum, and these new lines seem to be the same for different metals. Now there are several hydrocarbons which have a spectrum of their own when the temperature is not high enough to decompose them, and which, when heated very much, are decomposed and give the spectra of their constituent elements. Lockyer supposed that the metals were, in the same manner, decomposed into simpler substances at very elevated temperatures, and that the new lines were due to those simpler substances. The subject certainly deserves investigation, and fortunately the investigation is now quite possible. For the recently invented "electrical furnace," and the new method of welding by means of electricity, are said to produce a degree of heat hitherto unattained. If, then, the metals be exposed to this heat, and the new gratings of Professor Rowland be employed to analyze the light emitted, the way will be opened for discoveries of the highest importance for Chemistry and for Physical Astronomy.

THE MINERAL RESOURCES OF THE UNITED STATES.

At the present day, in the hurry and bustle of mere material progress, many nations of the earth seem to have lost sight of the God from whose bounty they have received their choicest gifts. It has been justly remarked that the United States, in the religious observance of the Lord's day, and in the yearly proclamation of a day to be set apart for public thanksgiving, shows her gratitude to the Creator for His manifold favors, and sets an example that might well and profitably be followed by other and older nations. And certainly we have just grounds for being grateful, blessed as we are in so especial a manner, with gifts of nature that few other nations possess in such variety and abundance. Our climate, although, by reason of the vast extent of territory, so varied, is as a rule salubrious: our soil is so fertile that, with but little more care than is now bestowed on its cultivation, it would yield sufficient to support a population ten times as great as the present: the beauties of Nature have been lavished with prodigal profusion over the length and breadth of the land. Other points might be dwelt upon to show how great is our debt of gratitude, but for the present we would especially draw attention to the great store of treasure bestowed on us in the abundant mineral resources of the United States.

On this score, the United States may well be an object of envy for other less favored nations in this age when the march of progress demands an abundant store of mineral wealth, to supply the various industries that steadily increase with the rapid advance of science and invention. The remarks that follow are based on statistics furnished by the U. S. Geological Survey Office in its sixth annual report, that for 1885 (the last official report issued). We have also made use of data drawn from other reliable though not official statistics.

According to the government report for 1885, the aggregate value of mineral products for that year is estimated at four hundred and thirty millions of dollars (\$430,000,000.00), showing an increase over 1884 of fifteen million three hundred thousand dollars (\$15,300,000.00). In a note at the conclusion of the report, it is stated that probably the report for 1886 would mark a still greater increase; and the anticipation was fully realized; for according to advance sheets of the report for 1886, which is now in press, the total yield for 1886 is valued at four hundred and fifty millions (\$450,000,000.00), showing an increase of twenty millions over 1885. These figures speak for themselves, but a few details may serve to make them more expressive. According to the custom which obtains in all mining statistics, we shall first speak of the precious metals, gold and silver.

The Census Report for 1880 put the total value of gold produced up to that time from the beginning of mining operations in this country, as something more than fifteen hundred millions of dollars (\$1,500,000,000.00); of silver, at about one billion (\$1,000,000,000.00). Now the value of both metals produced in 1880 alone, reached seventy-five millions (\$75,000,000.00), and it was remarked that the mining industry

for these metals was in a very prosperous condition. It is, therefore, no matter for surprise that the same remarks should be repeated in 1885, when we consider that in the intervening years several valuable mines, especially of silver, were greatly developed; such, for instance, as those of Leadville, Col., while some of the North Carolina and Georgia mines are believed to have a great future before them. The yield of gold and silver for 1885 reached eighty-five millions of dollars (\$85,000,000.00), the increase over 1880 entirely regarding the silver yield, as the yield of gold both in 1880 and 1885 was almost the same, about thirty millions (\$30,000,000.00).

In an interesting paper, "The Future of Gold and Silver Production," read at the November meeting of the National Academy of Sciences, Professor Newberry declared that the production of gold in the United States, while equal to that of the whole of Europe, is not likely to be greatly increased. We need not, therefore, look for such quantities of gold as flooded the world from California, and later, from Australia and New Zealand. The professor further stated that the future of silver actually lies in this country and in America in general; the continent having, since its discovery, given to the world over six billions' worth of this precious metal. In the United States the annual production of silver is likely to reach over fifty millions: in fact, the yield of 1885 almost reached that amount.

While giving the place of honor to the precious metals, we must remember that they are not our most valuable minerals. In the mineral world of the United States, "Coal is King." The total number of tons produced in 1885 was over ninety-five millions, representing a value of about one hundred and sixty millions of dollars (\$160,000,000.00). The supply in the United States is almost unlimited; coal of good quality and in paying quantities is found in over thirty of our states and territories. Just at present the most fully developed mines are in Pennsylvania; this state alone in 1885 furnished nearly two-thirds of the entire yield for the country.

In 1884 the production of iron, valued at twenty millions of dollars, was not so great as the petroleum yield for that year, but in 1885 the metal again took the lead, with an output valued at thirty millions. The "iron region" of this country, especially in the vicinity of coal mines, is being actively developed, and with the revival of trade, the iron industry bids fair to become more important than ever. Great activity is manifested in Alabama, near Sheffield and Birmingham, where the advantages of a combination of coal and iron mines and quarries of limestone are most conspicuously marked.

The greater number of the seventy minerals mentioned in the Report for 1885, showed a wonderful increase in production as compared with previous years; this is especially true of gold, silver, copper, zinc, mercury, nickel and aluminium. The last mentioned metal, owing to improved methods of production, is fast becoming very common. We remarked that iron is again making an advance; coal, however, seems to have fallen back, and this is due to the fact that, in Pennsylvania, and

in a few other exceptionally favored localities, natural gas has, to a great extent, replaced coal in many metallurgical operations, in the manufacture of glass, and in some other industries. It has been estimated that in 1886 this new fuel replaced coal to the amount of ten millions of dollars. At present the cost of gas is about one-fourth that of coal employed for the same purposes; and apart from the great diminution of expense the use of gas is far preferable to the use of coal in many ways. The enormous waste of this valuable agent, though in some cases unavoidable, is much to be regretted. It is said that the value of the gas wasted in a single well within the past five years, amounted to half a million of dollars; had it been possible to use it as fuel, an expenditure of two millions of dollars' worth of coal might have been saved.

Even the briefest notice of the many other minerals of this country would carry us beyond the limits set us in the present chronicle. Suffice it to say that there is almost no mineral, useful or valuable, of which an abundance may not be found in the United States. A few words about copper, and we will close this article. As is well known, the price of this metal has almost doubled within the last few years, owing to the fact that a French syndicate has bought in advance the entire yield for the next four or five years, and now controls—we need not say with what justice—the price and supply of that valuable metal. The copper mines of the United States are the richest in the world, annually realizing about twenty millions of dollars. About one-fifth of this supply comes from the Hecla and Calumet mines. Geologists say that the copper supply of the United States is inexhaustible. The copper ores of this country are very valuable for their qualities: the malachites (copper carbonates) found in some of the Arizona mines are held equal to the best Russian specimens. One class of these carbonates, found together with azurites, is in nowise inferior to those of France, and forms one of the most beautiful of ornamental stones.

ISOLATION OF FLUORINE AND THE CHEMICAL THEORIES.

AFTER eighty years of trials and failures, whose history is as interesting to the chemist as any he can desire to recall, the chemical element fluorine has been isolated. It has long been known in combinations. Mineralogists have for years been familiar with fluor-spar and other fluorides both of metallic and unmetallic elements. Hydrofluoric acid either in the gaseous form or in solution is so well known as to be employed in the arts for etching on glass. However, when chemists tried to isolate fluorine it escaped, corroding or decomposing everything with which it came in contact. Hence it was supposed, and the successful experiment of Mr. Moissan has confirmed the supposition, that perhaps no other element has an affinity so strong and so universal. Nearly all substances, whether organic or inorganic, are attacked by it with great force. The only

metals which can partially withstand its corroding action are those of the platinum group.

It would be impossible to describe the numerous, very expensive and sometimes very dangerous steps, by which the labors of Mr. Moissan were brought to a successful issue. The work was carried on in the laboratory of Prof. Debray in Paris. By electrolysis of the double hydrogen and potassium fluorides, fluorine was obtained in quantities large enough to permit of experiments. The mixture, enclosed in a platinum U-shaped tube with stoppers of fluor-spar, was acted upon by a strong electric current, while, by means of methyl-hydride, it was kept at a temperature of -50° . Under these circumstances the potassium fluoride is first decomposed. The current liberates fluorine at the positive electrode, and potassium, in the nascent state, replaces in the hydrofluoric acid the hydrogen evolved from the negative pole.

Chemists look upon this isolation as a great result, but not because any practical application or great profits may be derived from the process, as in the case of other important discoveries. In the present case the importance is derived entirely from a theoretical point of view. The new discovery affords a remarkable confirmation of chemical theories. Chemistry is essentially an experimental science. Its progress for many years has been necessarily slow, because many facts had to be ascertained before any generalization could be derived from them. Consequently, the so-called *Chemical Laws*, like those of definite and multiple proportion, were stated at a comparatively recent date. Then followed the grouping of the elements and the theory of *radicles* found in organic bodies. Great progress has been made by this latter theory, in which the name of *radical* or *radicle* is given to a compound of several elements acting like a simple element, as, for instance, a metal. It is asserted that in the decade 1860-70 over 100,000 new organic compounds were discovered, of which nearly 5 per cent. were practically useful. Once that a compound of a *radicle* was discovered the chemist sought for corresponding ones of the same with other elements. The analogy which he followed as his guide rarely failed to be borne out by the discoveries which he made. Chemists welcome every new confirmation of these and similar theories, since many, unacquainted with the very principles of the science, when embarrassed by the objections taken therefrom, seek to escape by asserting that all chemical theories are merely imaginary hypotheses stated without foundation. This is an easy but unscientific way of answering objections.

The discovery of fluorine gives a new example of the utility of chemical theories and of the solid foundation on which they rest. Long before the isolation of the element the fluorides were classed with chlorides, bromides and iodides, because their properties both physical and chemical were analogous and gradually progressive. For this reason fluorine, the supposed element, was placed in the same group with chlorine, bromine and iodine, and known with these latter as a member of the Halogen group. Mr. Moissan's discovery and experiments establish completely not only the existence of this element but also the

properties attributed to it on account of the analogy mentioned above. It was always considered as the most active of the group, and the discovery has verified the supposition.

ELECTRIC ITEMS.

Is electricity only in its infancy? A scientific writer and lecturer not long since asserted this. The present condition of the science is most flourishing, yet when we compare it with all that the future promises the statement seems perfectly true; because we have every reason to expect still greater progress in the theoretical study of the science and yet more marvellous applications of it to the needs of modern society. However true the remark may be, all must concede that electricity, though not out of its infancy, is surely a vigorous infant. In proof of this we shall mention a few random items connected with the subject.

One of the most novel applications of electricity to mechanical arts is that of welding by means of the electrical arc. Various processes have been proposed from time to time, but the method lately devised by Mr. N. Von Benardos, of St. Petersburg, seems to be thoroughly practical and the best of all. The following is a brief description of the new method:

The electric arc is produced between a carbon pencil at one end forming the positive electrode, and the metal to be treated at the other end forming the negative. Thus the heat is concentrated at the one point where it is needed, and it has been calculated that, at times, one square centimetre of the metal glows with the intensity of 100,000 candle power. The size of the carbons must be in proportion with the work that is to be done. The new method promises important progress in the working of metals. Metallic plates of all thicknesses can be welded together; iron and copper, tin, zinc, aluminium and platinum, etc., can be united. The use of carbon as the positive electrode prevents all oxidation and is certainly a great improvement. Another advantage of the new method is that the material requires little or no preparation, the intense heat itself sufficing to cleanse the surfaces to be welded. If necessary, sand can be added as a flux, or the action can take place under water. In the plant for different kinds of work a suitable system of dynamos and accumulators is required capable of bearing strong charges of electricity. These can be discharged either at a few amperes or at several hundred times that amount. Thus we see the great variety of circumstances under which the process is applicable.

But there is always some drawback to every good thing, and so it is with this splendid light, which affects the workmen much like ordinary sunstroke. Colored glasses are often used to lessen the glare, but even then accidents occur.

Though all are familiar with the speed of telegraphic messages, the

following feat appears worthy of notice. Last January a conversation was carried on by wire over the longest circuit ever worked, the extreme points of which were San Francisco and London. The message sped over an unbroken circuit, strengthened by many relays, from San Francisco to New York via Vancouver, B. C., Montreal and Albany; thence from New York it was sent to London via Canso, N. S., and Bristol, England. The dispatches were repeated only at the last two points, which are the landing stations of the Mackay-Bennett cable, and at New York. The average time required for an answer to short sentences was about five minutes. Marvellously quick time over a line of nearly 10,000 miles! It beats the record made some two years ago by a New York merchant who telegraphed to Japan about some goods he was shipping and within six hours received an answer via London and the East.

Such feats of telegraphy are surprising and yet not more so than the results that have lately been achieved by long-distance telephones, even though the distances compared to the long circuits we have just mentioned are very short. In January last, the American Telephone and Telegraph Co. completed their line to Albany, and thus made it possible for one in Boston to speak with a friend in Albany via New York, a distance of over 350 miles. True the voice was not quite so distinct as it ordinarily is between points a shorter distance apart. However, it was heard and distinguished, which was all that could be expected under the circumstances.

Speaking of telephones, it may interest our readers to know that there are 400,000 of them at present used in the United States. In Europe they are quite common and becoming more so every day.

Progress in electric lighting both by the arc and incandescent method is very rapid. A novel calculation has been made to show the number of lamps in service. An enthusiastic statistician states that if the carbons daily used in arc lighting in the United States were placed end to end they would stretch a distance of about 50 miles. A new company which started January, 1887, is now working 15,000 arc lights. The incandescent lamps, too, are rapidly increasing in number. For theatres and public halls they are invaluable, both as regards convenience and safety, and this has brought about in Italy and some other continental countries special enactments enforcing their exclusive use in such places. It would be impossible to calculate with any degree of accuracy the number of lamps in our country. We see them everywhere, in hotels, in steamboats and in private residences.

But electricity gives not only light but also power, and this motor power every day finds some new application. At present in all the large cities it is sold at very low rates for moving elevators, printing presses and even sewing machines. The largest motors now reach about forty horse power, and, according to the statistics, last year there were 8000 motors in the United States, while at the beginning of the present year 4000 more were in construction or had been ordered. The necessity that the companies find of building up this special business of electric

motor power accounts for the low rates. Without this application the immense plants that are used during the night for illuminating power would during the day be idle and profitless.

Before concluding these items we wish to call attention to two new projects lately set on foot. One proposes by means of electrolysis to precipitate most of the impure and solid matters carried off in the sewers of our large cities. If this can be accomplished, then the waters pouring through these underground channels will leave behind them the impurities and germs of diseases that they now bear along; they will become inoffensive and no longer pollute the streams. Moreover, the materials left behind can be collected and sold as valuable fertilizers.

The other project is a very small electric railroad elevated on posts to avoid all danger, and, as far as possible, running across the country in a straight line. The cars, for greater safety, will move along three rails, one above and the other two below. On account of their size these cars must of necessity be automatic, and so they will carry motors for propelling, for brakes, etc. Fixed dynamos will produce the currents to work the motors, which are expected to give a speed of about 300 miles an hour. If this project succeeds can we not hope some day to see passenger trains moved by electricity at a much greater rate of speed than the fastest trains of to-day?

MINOR ITEMS.

Mr. H. F. Boyer, of H.M.S. "Malabar," has been carrying out experiments with the view of testing the efficiency of a system of submarine communication between ships. The method is his own invention, and in essential features is almost identical with that of Prof. Blake, which we described in these pages last October. It is remarkable how these two gentlemen, by investigations altogether independent of each other, arrived at practically the same solution of this important problem. Prof. Blake in America conceived the design and thought out the details without having the advantage of being able to test them practically on a large scale, while the English officer had opportunities of subjecting his plan to crucial experiments and of proving it successful even in foggy and stormy weather. It will be remembered that in Prof. Blake's method the signals were to be produced by a gong or peculiarly constructed whistle attached to the vessel as far as possible below the surface of the water; Mr. Boyer employs either the same means, or, in the same conditions, explosions of small quantities of gun-cotton. He employs a system of telephones to receive the signals, whereas Prof. Blake's receiver was a microphone connected with a telephone on the "bridge." The results of Mr. Boyer's experiments have been eminently satisfactory. It was found that the gain in the rate of transmission of the sound was a very considerable advantage, and moreover that the transmission was not interfered with even when the waves were lashed to fury by a storm, because at the depth of some twenty feet the water is very little agitated even by the most violent wind.

2. We have indicated in previous numbers some of the recent inventions relating to submarine and torpedo warfare. This is a direction in which naval engineering is making rapid advances. The latest development is a boat constructed for the Danish Government. The boat was planned by Lieutenant Horgoard of the Royal Navy, and possesses many advantages over similar vessels hitherto designed. It can, of course, be propelled on the surface, as ordinary boats, but may be sunk at will to any desired depth and continue its course for a considerable distance under water. It is so equipped as to render reappearance on the surface unnecessary for many hours. The motive power for propelling it on the surface is supplied by steam, but, when under water, electricity is used. The longitudinal section of the vessel is elliptical.

But it is not only in this direction that naval engineering is advancing. The following returns just issued by Mr. N. M. Bell, superintendent of foreign mail, will show that considerable progress has been made in securing greater speed and immunity from accidents in ocean steamers. The American mail is transported by the fastest steamers only, irrespective of their nationality or the company to which they belong. Hence close records of the speed of the different vessels are officially kept. The shortest time required for conveying the mail between London and New York was 187.5 hours or 7 days and 19½ hours, the longest being 258 hours, while the average was about 255 hours.

Several new vessels now in construction promise to excel even these records. They will be, no doubt, splendid specimens of what engineering skill can do for the greater comfort and convenience of passengers.

3. Many experiments, mostly successful, have lately been made with a view to the substitution of steam-heating apparatus and electric lights instead of stoves and oil lamps in railroad cars. Such attempts are highly praiseworthy, as by these arrangements an element of dreadful danger in case of accident is eliminated. Doubtless the great accident near Haverhill, Mass., in the early part of this winter, would have been far more appalling in character and results had not steam been employed instead of stoves. The frequent and severe cold spells in the Northwestern States put the practicability of heating the cars by steam from the locomotive to a rigorous test. But even during blizzards and in snow-bound trains a satisfactory result was obtained.

4. The "Railway Age" remarks that the year 1887 surpassed any of its predecessors for the extent of railroad mileage built in the United States within the term. The returns show an increase of nearly 13,000 miles of new main tracks constructed. This number represents an increase of more than 1500 miles over the previous year's record, which also was in excess of any preceding one. The increase was almost entirely confined to a few Western States, Kansas taking the lead with an addition

of 2000 miles. New England and New York have only a comparatively small advance to show, and the other Eastern and the Southern States have also been satisfied with slight additions. In December, 1887, the extent of railroads in the United States reached a little more than 150,000 miles.

5. Measures are being taken in regions enjoying an abundant supply of natural gas to employ this useful fuel for two additional purposes. One of these is the heating of fire-engines. In Pittsburg, where, perhaps, the scheme is already carried into execution, it has been proposed to take the gas from the city mains by means of a hose and bring it under the boiler of the fire-engine. Thus the engine would be lit up when in use, and besides, a powerful heat would be had without a moment's loss of time.

The other scheme is to use the gas as fuel for locomotive engines. It is suggested that, instead of coal, the tenders carry wrought-iron tanks similar to those used for the oxyhydrogen light. In these tanks a supply of the condensed gas might be carried sufficient to afford fuel for over 500 miles of a run.

Apart from other conveniences of such a scheme, the saving in the weight to be hauled ought to render it acceptable to railroad companies, while the absence of smoke would increase the comfort of passengers.

6. Now that the question of a Postal Telegraph for the United States has been proposed (and, perhaps, put off for an indefinite period), it may be of interest to recount briefly a few facts about the establishment of a similar system in the United Kingdom nearly twenty years ago. Up to 1870 the telegraph service was in the hands of private companies; the charges were high and varied with the distance. The proposal to take the service into Government hands met, of course, with strenuous opposition from the private companies. Their opposition, however, was removed on the Government agreeing to buy their lines at a price equal to twenty times the net profits for the current year. The Government by this contract paid \$35,000,000 for property that had cost less than \$12,000,000. In spite of this bad beginning the advantages of the new system soon made themselves manifest. The rates were reduced on an average more than one-half, and a uniform charge of one shilling for a message of twenty words to any part of the kingdom was established. The number of messages sent in the first year of the change was over 12,000,000, or double that of the preceding one, and thus the system became self-supporting. The charges were still further reduced and an increase in the number of messages kept on uninterruptedly until it reached, in the year just ended, a grand total of 40,000,000. Recently the charge has been fixed at twelve cents for a message of twenty words. This latest reduction has not had time to show much influence on the number of messages, but we can safely surmise that it will lead to an enormous increase without any extra burden for the country.

Book Notices.

ST. PETER BISHOP OF ROME: OR THE ROMAN EPISCOPATE OF THE PRINCE OF THE APOSTLES. Proved from the Fathers, History and Archæology, and illustrated by Documents from other sources. By the *Rev. T. Livius, C. SS.R., M.A.*, Oriel College, Oxford. Dedicated to His Eminence Cardinal Newman. New York: The Catholic Publication Society Co.; London: Burns & Oates. 1888.

The Roman Episcopate of St. Peter, which is the subject of this work, is of deep interest for its own sake to students of history and especially to Catholics apart from its theological bearings. For, as held by Catholics, it is a great fact inseparably bound up with what is of revealed faith, viz., the Primacy of St. Peter and the succession of the Roman Pontiffs. It is the verification indeed, in all time, of the promise which our Divine Lord made to St. Peter: "Thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build My Church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it." In its bearings upon religious controversy it is a point of vital importance to Protestants, and consequently one which, driven by the necessity of their position as opponents of the Catholic faith, they have incessantly assailed.

It is true that St. Peter's Roman Episcopate was not antecedently necessary for the succession of the Bishops of Rome to his Primacy. For it is quite conceivable that the Primacy might by some other mode of Divine appointment have passed from St. Peter to the Roman Pontiffs without his ever having been himself Bishop of the See of Rome. But though this was antecedently possible, there is no room for doubt that in the order of actual fact St. Peter's Roman Episcopate was the means chosen by Divine Providence for the transmission of the Primacy to the Roman Bishops and its permanence in the See of Rome. This is involved in all Catholic tradition and belief. Hence it is a subject of deep theological interest, and it is impossible to treat it adequately as simply a historical fact. It has this two-fold bearing also for Protestants. For the concession by them of St. Peter's Primacy and the transmission of his Primacy to his successors in the See of Rome taken in its theological significance cuts the ground from under their feet and at once condemns them as schismatics.

Impressed by these considerations, the author of the work before us treats his subject as a complex living moral fact which has its original source in Divine revelation, and is the result and realization of the express promise of Christ to Peter and through Peter to his Church; or, rather, is the Divinely appointed mode by which that promise, which vitally concerns the essential constitution of the Church, is carried into actual effect. It is ever fraught with momentous consequences to the belief, doctrine and discipline of the Church and to the political principles and action of all Christian society. During successive ages it has held its place, and now holds it, in the hearts and minds of all Catholics, not as an isolated event of past history, but, while an actual historical event, yet also an ever-present living principle mightily influencing religious belief and practice.

For these reasons the author has treated his subject in its theological and controversial as well as its historical bearings. At the same time

he has not confused them, but so far as the nature itself of his subject permitted he has judiciously left them separate.

Very properly the author, following the method of all sound theologians, draws a distinction between the *law of succession* to the Primacy and its *conditions*. By the *law* of succession is meant the *title* or juridical decree which denotes that an office is not merely and simply personal, but personal in such sense as to be at the same time real and perpetual. Thus in virtue of the *law* of succession by which our Divine Lord conferred the Primacy on Peter and willed it to be perpetual, there always will be successors to Peter who will be chief Pontiffs, universal Bishops in His Church. Consequently the *law* of succession by which St. Peter has successors in His Primacy, being made by our Divine Lord Himself, is not of ecclesiastical but of Divine origin.

Under the *conditions* of succession are comprised whatever makes one person rather than another the rightful successor and regulates the time and place when and where he is to succeed. Hence for the Bishops of Rome to be successors of Peter must depend on certain facts, viz.: (1) that St. Peter himself was Bishop of Rome; (2) that he was so until his death; (3) that he did not before his death resign to another his ecumenical authority; (4) that he left his supreme authority and prerogatives to the See of Rome.

These four points combined constitute what may be called the *Petrine fact* and the verification of them conclusively proves the Roman Pontiffs to be the successors of St. Peter in his Primacy; and since that Primacy and the law of succession to it is *de jure divino*, it follows that the Roman Pontiffs succeed to Peter's primacy not by virtue of human agreement or assent, but by Divine right and authority.

In treating his subject the author divides his book into three parts. The First Part comprises the historical testimonies from Fathers and writers of the first four centuries, and other matter which serves to prove and elucidate the fact of St. Peter's Roman Episcopate. This part is almost entirely a translation from the Latin of Professor Jungmann's *Dissertatio Prima, De Sede Romana S. Petri Principis Apostolorum*, made by permission of Prof. Jungmann. A few passages in it have been amplified and a few abridged by the author of the work before us, and he has also added a number of valuable foot-notes. The passages from the Fathers are quoted at length, in order to give in full the exact words of their testimony, so that the reader may have the precise evidence before him and thus can see and judge for himself.

The Second Part sets forth the evidences of St. Peter's Roman Episcopate derived from archæology. In this part the writer has freely availed himself (by permission) of the well-known work, *Roma Sotteranea*.

The Third Part contains a series of chapters occupied with arguments and discussions of a more general character on various topics relative to St. Peter's Roman Episcopate. These are entirely the author's own work, except the lengthened extracts which, in order to confirm and elucidate his statements and arguments, he makes from the writings of Cardinal Fisher, Baronius, Murray, Döllinger, Cajetan, Franzelin, Mr. Allies and other distinguished writers.

From this it will be seen that the plan of the work is fairly exhaustive. This is all the more important and gives greater value to the work from the fact that it is the only book in the English language which treats *ex professo* and at length the subject of St. Peter's Roman Episcopate and sets forth *in extenso* the various testimonies and arguments in proof of that important fact.

Before entering upon his immediate subject the author gives a succinct

account of what may be called the literature of the controversy raised by non-Catholics concerning Peter's going to Rome and his being Bishop of that See, and also sketches the general plan and scope of his argument. He shows that the fact of St. Peter's Roman Episcopate was not questioned before the thirteenth century, when the Waldenses undertook to deny that there was any proof of it in Sacred Scripture. The historical fact itself was first formally controverted by Marsilius of Padua, a heretic who espoused the cause of the schismatical Emperor of Germany against Pope John XXII. In the book entitled "Defensor Pacis," of which Marsilius was the chief writer, he says: "As to St. Peter, it cannot be proved from Holy Scripture that he was Bishop of Rome, nay more, that he was ever in Rome at all. Wonderful, indeed, that according to some ecclesiastical legend . . . such things should be said of Peter, and that Luke and Paul should make no mention of them." William of Ockham uses almost the same words as Marsilius, from whom probably he borrowed them. Referring to St. Peter's going to Rome, he says: Holy Scripture does not teach this, but some apochryphal legend. Following Ockham, Wickliffe also denied that St. Peter was ever in Rome. From Luther's time onwards many Protestant writers have written in denial of the fact of St. Peter's going to Rome and his Episcopate there. Chief of these is Frederick Spanheim; and Protestant writers subsequent to him have simply rehearsed his arguments. In this they have been helped by several German rationalists, such as Baur, Weiner and Leipsius. And these, logically following out the method of Protestant writers, have reached the conclusion that St. Peter was not an actual person, but that all the statements respecting him, and the Evangelists and early Christianity are mere fables and myths.

Among many other Catholics who have written in refutation of the cavils and sophistical arguments of Protestants on this subject are Cardinal Gregory Cortesius, Cardinal Fisher, Bellarmine and Foggini. Among the later German Catholic writers are De Smedt, S. J., Windischmann, Herbst, Stenglein, Hagemann, Hundhausen; and among Italians are Perrone, Aloysius Ado and P. Sebastian Sanguinetti, S. J., whose book is one of the most notable on the subject. A number of learned Protestants have also held that the fact of St. Peter's Roman Episcopate is certain on historical grounds. Some of these have written in its defence as a historical fact. Among the most notable of these are Cave, Pearson, Grotius, Usher, Blondell and Basnage. There are many Anglicans, too, who do not deny the fact that St. Peter went to Rome and took part in preaching the faith and governing the Church there, but they refuse to acknowledge that he was ever the Bishop of Rome.

Preliminary to bringing forward his historical proofs, the author makes the following points: (1) that the Roman See has been generally regarded as the centre of Christendom; (2) that the reason it was so regarded is *because the Bishop of Rome was believed to be the successor of St. Peter in the Roman Pontificate*; (3) but, if St. Peter never was in Rome and his going to Rome is a mere fable, then it would follow that the huge mass of facts resulting from the historical development of the preponderating influence of the Roman Pontiff as its centre would be based on some idle legend or some fabricated forgery; (4) but this conclusion would be absurd, for it would be utterly opposed to all the laws which regulate man's moral conduct. Historical Christianity would then be a mere sham were the fact, which more than any other is the key to its historical evolution, not an actual fact at all, but a mere idle tale.

One of two things, therefore, must be acknowledged. Either so constant and universal a persuasion as that of St. Peter's having been Bishop

of Rome is based on unmistakable evidence of the fact being really true, or else those who deny the fact must positively assign some real and adequate reason or cause that gave rise to this false persuasion. But this Protestants utterly fail to do. They construct theories and ingenious hypotheses, but do not attempt, or pretend even, to assign any real and adequate reason for the general continuing belief that St. Peter was in Rome, that he was Bishop of Rome, and that he was put to death in Rome. The whole life and development of the Roman Catholic Church, together with the eminent influence of the Roman See, is a vast, manifest, universal fact. During fifteen centuries the foundation of this fact, that which gave it reality and living power, was believed and acknowledged, to be the Roman Episcopate of St. Peter. If, then, the actual historical existence of this Episcopate of St. Peter be denied, those who deny it are shut in by a necessity from which they cannot escape to point out and prove some other historical fact which will adequately account for this universal belief and will also adequately account for the historical development of Christianity for fifteen centuries.

After having ably proven and elucidated these points, the author brings forward his specific historical proofs. Very judiciously he begins at a century more remote from the Apostolic age, and then traces the stream of history on the subject up to its source. He thinks it unnecessary to commence at a later century than the fifth, because all Protestant historians possessed of any claims to learning admit that in that century the persuasion that St. Peter was Bishop of Rome was universal. Accordingly he commences with the fourth century and gives at length and in their exact words the testimonies of the Church Fathers and other writers of that age. He then passes on through the third and second and first centuries until he reaches the Apostolic age.

Along with each quotation, the author states from what writing it was made, its context, and all the circumstances and details necessary to correctly estimate its value. He then takes up the various objections which Protestants have raised and shows that they are mere sophistical quibbles. He then devotes a chapter to a very interesting and valuable dissertation upon the chronology of the Acts of the Apostle in relation to St. Peter's Episcopate, and in the closing chapter of Part First he discusses the early historical notices of and allusions to the Bishops of Rome until the close of the Sub-Apostolic age.

The Second Part of the book deals with the archæological proofs of St. Peter having been in Rome, his Episcopate there, and his martyrdom. The inscriptions in the various Catacombs at Rome, on the gilded glasses found in the Catacombs, the sculptures on the Christian sarcophagi, the paintings and the symbolical representations, referring to St. Peter having been in Rome and to his Episcopal and Primatial office, are clearly described, and their significance and the evidences of their antiquity lucidly set forth. In other separate chapters the Chair of St. Peter in the Vatican and that in the Cœmeterium Ostianum are described and their historical significance is pointed out. Two additional chapters are occupied with accounts of other monuments of St. Peter's residence and Apostolate at Rome, memorials of his martyrdom there, and an account of the Pallium, its origin, its history and symbolical significance, and its inferential testimony to St. Peter's Roman Episcopate and Primacy.

The Third Part of the work, comprising twenty chapters, is occupied with discussions and arguments bearing on St. Peter's Roman Episcopate. In the first eight of these chapters the bearing of various passages in the New Testament on St. Peter's Roman Episcopate; reflections on some

of the consequences involved in that Episcopate; St. Peter's Apostleship in distinction from his Primacy and the relation of the Apostolate to the Episcopate; the relation of the historical fact of St. Peter's Roman Episcopate to the Dogma of the Primacy, and the nature and right of the Primacy and its Succession as connected with the See of Rome, are stated and thoroughly discussed.

Subsequent chapters are occupied with the relation of St. Paul to St. Peter, and the relation of St. Paul's work at Rome to St. Peter's Roman Episcopate and Universal Primacy; St. Paul's reprehension of St. Peter at Antioch; the evidences of St. Peter's Roman Episcopate and Universal Primacy from the Greek Liturgical Offices; the Succession of the Roman Pontiffs to St. Peter's Episcopacy and Primacy, illustrated from the Greek Liturgies and other like sources. Then in still other chapters the legendary theories of modern rationalists are considered, also the statements and views of various Anglican writers. The last chapter is a statement and exposition of the truth that the Roman Episcopate of St. Peter and his successors is the chief monument of historical Christianity and the realization of the Divine idea in the two Dispensations.

It is not saying too much that, in the discussion of all the various branches and relations of his subject, the author notices and thoroughly refutes every objection which Protestants and infidels have raised against St. Peter's Roman Episcopate and Universal Primacy. He has freely availed himself of the results of the study of the subject by other careful and learned investigators and scholars; and, incorporating them into his work, he has produced a volume of whose value and importance we can scarcely speak too highly.

LIVES OF THE DECEASED BISHOPS OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN THE UNITED STATES; with an Appendix and an Analytical Index. By *Richard H. Clarke, LL.D.* Author's Revised, Enlarged, and Corrected Edition. Three Volumes. New York, Richard H. Clarke, Nos. 49 and 51 Chambers Street. 1888.

The first two volumes of this work were published in 1872, and were received with much favor at the time and have continued to maintain the place in public estimation which when first published they quickly obtained. Since then forty-one Prelates of the Church in the United States have gone to their eternal rewards. The lives of these more recently deceased and of Bishops O'Regan and Chabrât, whose lives were not published in the two first volumes,—forty-three in all—make up the contents of the third volume.

In his preface to this third volume the author refers to the only unfavorable criticism which he deems worthy of notice. We will give it and his reply to it, in his own words. He says:

"The only serious criticism that we have encountered is that our biographies have been one-sided, exclusively laudatory and shielding the Bishops from all blame. The answer to this is, that wherever errors or faults have been committed involving a valuable instruction from the past to the future, such as ecclesiastical savings banks and erroneous methods of financial and property and executive management, we have pointedly exposed them, in order that history might teach its lessons. But to relate the private faults and sins of the dead would be merely to show what is manifest, that they were human. From their human frailties we have sifted their virtues and good deeds, for the latter form the triumphs of faith and grace over the temptations of our fallen state, and are a priceless inheritance. Like the Mexican miners in the Cordilleras, we have sifted the mass of materials; the dross and baser matters have

passed through the sieve and have been rejected, while nothing but the pure and precious metal remained."

It needs no argument to show the correctness of the principle which Dr. Clarke has here stated. A truthful biography resembles a lifelike portrait. The skilful and conscientious painter does not strive to catch and place upon his canvas every little speck or wart that happens to be on the face of his subject. He aims at depicting the features in their just form and proportions, and then, and beyond all this, to catch and delineate the expression which gives to them their individual distinctive character. This accomplished, his portrait becomes real and lifelike.

To pursue a different method from this would produce in painting not a portrait, but a caricature; and in writing, not a true biography, but a lampoon or satire. So far as the human personal frailties of Prelates have deleteriously affected their administration of diocesan affairs and injured the interests of religion, it is right to mention them for the sake of the lessons they teach; but beyond this both justice and charity require that they be consigned to oblivion. This method Dr. Clarke has adopted and endeavored to pursue, and, on the whole, very successfully.

Reading these volumes is like walking through a gallery of portraits of historical personages. Their respective intellectual and moral features are brought to view. Their respective natural gifts, their attainments in knowledge, their Christian virtues, their methods of doing the work which they were consecrated and appointed to do, their trials and labors, the difficulties they had to surmount, what they accomplished, and what they left to their successors to endeavor to accomplish, are brought to remembrance.

The first two volumes are occupied with the lives of Prelates who have belonged to former generations and have passed away entirely from personal knowledge. Scarcely any one now survives who knew them personally. The perusal of their lives is like reading the inscriptions on monuments of heroes who lived in former ages. But the third volume contains biographies of deceased Prelates who belong to our own age, and the memory of them, or of most of them, is fresh and distinct in the minds of many who are still living.

Yet, while we are writing this and endeavoring to show the value, both for information and edification, of these volumes, we cannot refrain from expressing a regret we have often before felt, that there are so few full and complete, or even approximately complete, biographies of any of the Prelates of the Church in the United States. The number of these works is less than a score, and most, even of these, are necessarily brief and meagre, owing to the scanty materials at the command of the writers. And this dearth of historical, or more strictly speaking biographical, material exists even with regard to distinguished Prelates who died but a few years ago.

How precious, for example, would not be a complete life of the learned and saintly Michael O'Connor, First Bishop of Pittsburgh and during the latter part of his life a missionary priest of the Society of Jesus. He was the bosom friend and counsellor of Archbishop Francis Patrick Kenrick. *Par Nobile Fratrum*, in their day and generation, they were Pillars of the Church in the United States. Mighty were their achievements and grand the results of their labors for the promotion of religion. Yet scarcely any materials are now in existence for a life of Bishop Michael O'Connor, none, indeed, except those which the memory, yearly becoming less distinct, of those who personally knew

him can supply; and unless these be quickly gathered up they will soon be lost beyond possibility of recovery. Here is a work for our Catholic Historical Societies to do. And the work must be done quickly and before the persons themselves die who still remember the facts. For Bishop O'Connor, notwithstanding his profound and accurate erudition, wrote no books, and before his death destroyed all his manuscripts, including the letters he had received and copies of those he had written to others. His spirit of self-depreciation was such that he deemed all that he ever wrote unworthy of publication. As during his Novitiate as a member of the Society of Jesus he endeavored to conceal the fact that he had been Bishop, so too, when he felt that he was approaching the end of his earthly existence, he seemed to desire that after death he should be quickly forgotten. He destroyed, so far as he could, whatever would serve to perpetuate and reflect honor upon his memory. As with him, so it doubtless has been with others of our deceased Bishops, among whom was the Right Rev. Jeremiah F. Shanahan, First Bishop of Harrisburg. Of all the powerful and edifying sermons he wrote and preached, of all his eloquent discourses, nothing is extant beyond the newspaper reports of a few of them. He thought his manuscripts unworthy of preservation.

Perhaps it may seem to some of our readers that these remarks are irrelevant to our subject. But they are not. They are made by us for the purpose of bringing out to view the difference between the respective purposes of biographical monographs of a particular personage and a work like that before us. Each has a sphere and purpose of its own. The one does not supplant the other or make it needless. On the contrary, they mutually supplement each other.

The author of the work before us evidently understands this, and has shown his good judgment in not attempting to give to his *Lives of Deceased Prelates* the character of special biographies. In the nature of things it would have been impossible for him to do this without swelling his work beyond all reasonable limits. He aims, not at giving a finely finished portrait of each deceased Prelate, but an outline sketch, less elaborate yet not less accurate and distinct. His work—and in this its great value chiefly consists—furnishes a panoramic view of the history of the Church in the United States, and of the parts performed respectively by the deceased Prelates in extending and building up the Church; their different intellectual and spiritual gifts and attainments, their different methods of work, their success in subduing the spiritual wildernesses in which many of them toiled, or in the cultivation of fields which their predecessors had planted and watered.

Then, too, while it does not supplant and, wisely, does not aim to supplant, biographies of any of our deceased Prelates; yet, owing to the dearth of such biographies—a dearth which will probably continue to exist—it seems destined to furnish the only means in future years, as in the present, by which we can form a distinct idea of who and what our deceased Prelates were and what they did and strove to do.

How unceasingly and rapidly death removes our Prelates is shown by the fact that since 1872, when the first two volumes of the work before us were published by Mr. O'Shea (now republished along with the third volume by Dr. Clarke), forty-one have passed away from earth. But if they have passed away, the results of their labors continue, and how fruitful and blessed they were is seen in the wonderful growth of the Church in the United States. For, whereas in 1872 the American Hierarchy comprised fifty-four Bishops, six Vicars Apostolic, and four Mitred Abbots; now, after the lapse of only fifteen years, it consists

of seventy-four Bishoprics, seven Vicariates Apostolic, ten Mitred Abbots, and one Prefecture Apostolic; and in the same time the Catholic population has increased from five and a half millions to eight or ten millions.

Over the pages of the third volume, the receipt of which furnishes the immediate occasion of this notice, those who read will fondly linger. For it will bring afresh to their minds the memory of Prelates whom they personally knew and whose names were as household words to them—Prelates whom they loved and honored and revered. Some of them presided over and directed the work of extending and building up the Church in fields where the Church had been well-established by their predecessors in office, and was already measurably provided with churches, priests, and religious and charitable institutions. Others were literally Missionary Bishops, whose dioceses were spiritual wildernesses, which they had to subdue by their labors, with no resources or help but those which, under God, their faith and zeal could create. Yet, though they sowed the good seed in tears, God blessed their work and permitted them to see the springing grain and in part, at least, to gather ripened sheaves as a foretaste of the more abundant harvest from their labors, which remains for their successors to reap.

THEOLOGIA MORALIS juxta Doctrinam S. Alphonsi Mariæ de Ligorio, Doctoris Ecclesiæ. Auctore *Jos. Aertnys, C. SS. R.*, Theol. Mor. et S. Liturgiæ Professore. Tornaci: V. H. Casterman, 1886 and 1887. Tomi Duo. 8vo.

There are not a few who object to the indefinite multiplication of text-books that is going on in the literary, scientific and theological world. They say, and with good reason: Why repeat what has been already well said by another? If times were notably altered, what suits one generation might not suit another, as the Fathers of the Church, though complete sources of all theology, will not furnish an apt theological manual for students of our times. But outside of this hypothesis (they keep on saying), where there is no significant difference of time, place, and other adjuncts, why this multiplying of text-books? Is there anything to justify such expenditure of money and labor? If a book is really good, and may be improved by addition and correction, why not reprint it, and correct or add as may be necessary?

They give, as shining examples of this judicious reprinting of standard works, La Croix and St. Alphonsus, who made Busenbaum their text-book, adding and improving where they deem it necessary. They might have added, too, the illustrious example of Francis Antony Zaccaria, one of the most indefatigable and voluminous writers to be found in the last half of the eighteenth century. One-half at least of his works consists of the writings of other authors, whom he reprinted with notes, additions and emendations. Among them we find the Moral Theology of La Croix (or Busenbaum), of Tamburini, of Dominick Viva, the *Jus Canonicum* of F. Vitus Pichler, the great work of Petavius *De Dogmatibus Theologicis*, the *Chronology and History of the Bishops of Osimo, Cremona and Verona* (with notes from Ughelli's *Italia Sacra*), Fleming's "*Mœurs des Chrétiens*," translated into Latin by a German Jesuit, enriched with choice dissertations, and extended to three quarto volumes. A list (though not complete) of numerous works of others, reprinted, enlarged and improved by Zaccaria, may be found in the Preface to his edition of the "*Disciplina Populi Dei*" (Venice, 1782, vol. i., pp. 29-34).

But there are others who do not acquiesce in this reasoning and are

not persuaded by these examples. They think that there is something good and useful in a variety of text-books, as St. Augustine said long ago about books of devotion. Our author has handled his materials very well, and his style is sufficiently clear for the use of either professor or student. His treatise is full and complete in every respect, and if we have a fault to find with him it is that he has adhered too closely to the saying, *Malius est abundare quam deficere*. The contrary often holds good in manuals of this kind.

DE SPIRITU SOCIETATIS JESU. Auctore *Julio Costa Rossetti*, S. J., cum approbatione Superiorum Ordinis. Friburgi Brisgovie, Sumptibus Herder, 1888.

The object of this small volume is to give a clear and complete outline of the religious spirit which in a particular manner characterizes the Institute of St. Ignatius. It gathers, as it were, the principles out of the "Constitutions"—that most perfect code of human legislation for a Divine end—and marks the lines of action which, emanating from these principles, meet directly the errors, moral and intellectual, of our day. Thus, this digest becomes an index for the benefit of those who wish to understand the work, the modes of operation for good, peculiar to the Society of Jesus; modes which the world, not discovering the inner life that gives them shape and aim, suspects too often of being sinister and dark because they are so strangely powerful. And whilst the primary purpose of this book is to serve as a manual for the scholastics of the Order, or as a key later on to the larger works of similar character which are in use in the Society, yet it will prove of great advantage to others who, recognizing the superior mode of warfare which St. Ignatius initiated, aim at combating successfully the evils which surround the apostleship of truth in these times. Father Rossetti is already known as an author familiar with the recent aspects of the ethical question, and this must make us all the more confident in accepting the practical wisdom of this compact treatise; for when we remember that the religious spirit of an order is something apart from the spirit of religious vows, and that the apostolic character of the Society of Jesus, both in its legislation and discipline, somehow covers the distracting problems of modern civilization, we cannot fail to realize how valuable a book of this kind will prove to men employed in the apostolic labor of turning the world from its worldly idols into the ways of truth and sacrifice.

It is but just to say that this little work of 288 pages is made additionally readable from its excellent get-up; arrangement, typography, and binding, together with a very moderate price, equally recommending it.

BIOGRAPHY OF LIEUTENANT-COLONEL JULIUS P. GARESCHÉ, Assistant Adjutant-General, United States Army. By his son. Press of J. B. Lippincott Company: Philadelphia. 1887.

We have here a filial tribute worthy of a brave and pious father. Our late civil war had no nobler victim than Colonel Garesché, who was killed in the first battle in which he was actively engaged, that of Murfreesboro, or Stone River, on December 31st, 1862, while fighting bravely and gallantly by the side of General Rosecrans, whose chief of staff he was. All through life he was remarkable for his earnest but unassuming piety, and piously he died as he had lived, receiving Holy Communion on the morning of the day of battle, and spending some time in prayer immediately before he rode out to meet his death.

Colonel Julius P. Garesché was descended from some of the most honored French settlers in the West Indies, was connected with the best-known families in Wilmington and Philadelphia, and was a brother of the well-known Jesuit Father Frederick Garesché. The story of his too short life is told with beautiful simplicity by his son, Louis, who honors himself in thus honoring his parent. The best part of this deeply interesting and highly edifying story is told in the colonel's own words, in copious but judiciously chosen extracts from his letters, and these let us into the secrets of a truly Christian family life.

But by no means does all the interest of the work end here. We have, besides, references to and illustrations of general Catholic American history, genealogical and other details of pioneer families in Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Maryland, notes of Bishop Odin, Father Domenech, and other early missionaries in Texas, where Colonel Garesché was stationed during the greater part of the interval intervening between the Mexican war and that of Secession, and of the city of St. Louis in those times.

So valuable an addition to our Catholic literature is this book that it is to be regretted only a limited edition of five hundred copies has been printed.

THE LIFE OF ST. PATRICK, APOSTLE OF IRELAND. With a Preliminary Account of the Sources of the Saint's History. By *William Bullen Morris*, Priest of the Oratory of St. Philip Neri. Third Edition. London and New York: Burns & Oates, Limited; Dublin: M. H. Gill & Son. 1888.

This book promises to become the standard biography of Ireland's Apostle. For clear statement of facts, and calm, judicious discussion of controverted points, it surpasses any other work we know of in the literature of the subject. The present edition, Father Morris tells us, has been much altered in form and dimensions; but on it he need not wait the popular verdict with trepidation. "The introduction has been rewritten; an inquiry into the state of Ireland at the period of St. Patrick's advent has been introduced into the life, and there are considerable additions, and some omissions, in the body of the work." The book is, then, practically a new one, and it is a critical history, too. "With something like a pang the writer has been driven to give up the very beautiful legends connected with St. Patrick's infancy, having come to the conclusion that they do not rest on any solid historical foundation, and that it is impossible to make them harmonize with St. Patrick's autobiography." He draws largely upon the Saint's own writings, and practically ignores the controversy about his birthplace, which, after sifting all the evidence adduced by recent controversialists, he concludes "still remains a mystery." The work may not be incapable of improvement, but it is the best of the kind that has so far been given us. "A biographer of St. Patrick," Father Morris concludes, "must ever feel that he is the servant and interpreter of a mysterious master, and, therefore, it is in all sincerity that the writer borrows the declaration of St. Gregory the Great, as it stands in the preface to Villaneuva's edition of the *Works of St. Patrick: Ab omnibus corripi, emendari ab omnibus paratus sum.*"

A VISIT TO EUROPE AND THE HOLY LAND. By *Rev. H. F. Fairbanks*. New York: The Catholic Publication Society Company. 1888.

So many travelers have committed to print their impressions and experiences of the journey or journeys indicated in the title given above, that a wayfarer in these days, no matter how observant he may have been, can hardly be expected to tell us much that is new. But this feat

Father Fairbanks, a priest of the Archdiocese of Milwaukee, has accomplished with rare success in the book now before us. And he is a safe as well as an intelligent guide, one whose company is not only not tedious, but instructive and improving. He shows us the points of most interest in Ireland, Great Britain, France, Italy and its capital, Rome, the other Mediterranean countries, Jerusalem, and the Holy Land, Switzerland, the Rhineland and the Netherlands. We do not hesitate to pronounce his book one of the best of recent works of travel.

CÆREMONIALE EPISCOPORUM CLEMENTIS VIII., INNOCENTII X., ET BENEDICTI XIII.,
JUSSU EDITUM BENEDICTI XIV. ET LEONIS XIII. AUCTORITATE RECOGNITUM.
Editio Typica. Ratisbonæ, Neo Eboraci, et Cincinnatii: Sumptibus, Chartis et
Typis Fr. Pustet. MDCCCLXXXVI.

The publisher of this work seems to have a proper sense of his responsibility as "printer to the Holy Apostolic See and Congregation of Rites." Its typography and binding are all that any one could desire, for taste, use and durability; and the contents are, of course, official.

Accompanying the volume is an explanatory pamphlet of sixteen pages, published by the same house last year, entitled: "De Vi Obligandi Libri Cæremoniale Episcoporum ac de Consuetudine ipsi adversanti Dissertatio quam Disciplinæ Liturgicæ Studiosis Offert D. Joachim Solans, Presbyter, in Ecclesia Cathedrali Urgellensi Cæremoniarum Magister et in ejusdem Civitatis Seminario S. Liturgiæ Professor. Ordinarii Licentia."

THE CANONS AND DECREES OF THE SACRED AND CECUMENICAL COUNCIL OF TRENT.
Translated by the *Rev. F. Waterworth*. To which are prefixed Essays on the
External and Internal History of the Council. London: Burns & Oates; New
York: Catholic Publication Society Co.

This is a fac simile reissue of a book that first appeared forty years ago, and that has long been out of print. It is a preëminently useful work, one that should be brought within the reach of the general Catholic public. The two historical essays are not masterpieces of historical composition, but are fully as good as any treatment of the same subject in the same number of pages that we have in English. These essays occupy nearly as much of the book as do the Canons and Decrees, there being about 250 pages of the former and over 280 of the latter. At the end of the volume are lists of the dignitaries who participated in the Council, and a very full alphabetical index to the Canons and Decrees.

AVE MARIS STELLA. Meditations for the Month of Mary, from the Italian of the
Rev. Canon Berteu. Translated into English by M. Hopper. London: Burns
& Oates; New York: Catholic Publication Society Co.

We have here a very timely publication, well adapted to suggest pious reflections to every class of reader, to help increase devotion in those who have it already, and to inspire it in the lukewarm. The translating is satisfactorily done, making the reading smooth and pleasurable.

THE LESSER IMITATION; Being a Sequel to the Following of Christ. By *Thomas A' Kempis*. Done into English by the Author of "Growth in the Knowledge of our Lord." New York: Catholic Publication Society Company. London: Burns & Oates.

It is impossible to speak too highly of this little work. As the "Following of Christ" is of priceless value, of scarcely less is this sequel.

70746

PERIODICAL

DOES NOT CIRCULATE

THIS BOOK MAY NOT BE
TAKEN FROM THIS ROOM

